Uxbridge Co. v. Poppenheim

• Decision Date: 02 June 1926
• Docket Number: 12005.
• Citation: 133 S.E. 461,135 S.C. 26
• Parties: UXBRIDGE CO. v. POPPENHEIM et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

133 S.E. 461

135 S.C. 26

UXBRIDGE CO. v. POPPENHEIM et al.

No. 12005.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 2, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court of Berkeley County; W. H. Townsend, Judge.

Action by the Uxbridge Company against John F. Poppenheim and others. Order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Watts J., and Marion, A. A. J., dissenting.

Octavus Cohen, of Charleston, for appellant.

B. H Mathews and Paul Macmillan, both of Charleston, for respondents.

COTHRAN J.

Action to establish the boundary lines between the lands of the plaintiff and the lands of the defendants.

The complaint alleges:

"That a dispute has heretofore existed, and still exists, between plaintiff and defendants as to the proper location of the dividing lines between said lands of plaintiff and the lands of the defendants, which said dividing lines have never been definitely established by either of the parties to this action.

That plaintiff has made several attempts to have said dividing lines amicably ascertained and adjusted, but defendants have refused, and still refuse, to enter into any agreement, or to take any steps, by which the dispute as to the location of said dividing lines might be definitely determined and established.

That it is impracticable and impossible for plaintiff to enjoy its said property, or to derive the benefit therefrom to which it is entitled, unless said dividing lines between lands of plaintiff and lands of defendants shall be ascertained and definitely established, either by actual survey or otherwise."

The prayer of the complaint is that surveyors be appointed to establish the disputed lines, and to make plats showing the correct lines, and that the lines so shown be confirmed by the court.

The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, in that an action cannot be maintained for the sole purpose of establishing a boundary.

The demurrer was argued before his honor, Judge Townsend, who sustained the same in the following order:

"The defendants in the above-entitled cause having interposed a demurrer on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action either at law or in equity and the matter having come on to be heard before me at Moncks Corner, S. C., on the 4th day of November, 1924, and it appearing from the complaint that no trespass or other wrong on the part of the defendants is charged, and that no peculiar facts are alleged calling for equitable interference (Watkins v. Childs, 80 Vt. 99, 66 A 805, 11 Ann. Cas. 1123; and Boone v. Robinson, 151 Ky. 715, 152 S.W. 753, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 352), it is ordered that the said demurrer be, and the same is hereby, sustained."

From this order the plaintiff has appealed.

It appears to be settled by the unanimous opinion of judges and text writers that ordinarily the matter of settling disputed questions of boundaries is ancillary to actions at law of trespass to try title or ejectment (as indicated by section 5308, vol. 3, Code of 1922), and that equity will not entertain an action simply to settle and fix a boundary line between adjoining owners, unless the plaintiff's complaint discloses some feature of equitable cognizance, as, for instance, fraud or misconduct on the part of an adjoining landowner, by reason of which a confusion or obliteration of the boundary line has resulted; mutual mistake of the adjoining owners; the neglect of a duty founded upon the relationship of the parties; the practical certainty of a multiplicity of suits growing out of the confusion or uncertainty; and the inadequacy of a remedy at law (perhaps others).

The complaint in this case does not intimate that a line between the parties has never been run. It apparently implies that there has been at one time or other an established line; but that, since the lands have been owned by the respective parties, it has never been definitely established by either; that a controversy has arisen between them as to its exact location; that the plaintiff has made several attempts to have the line amicably adjusted, but that the defendants have refused to enter into any agreement, or to take any steps, by which that result could be accomplished; that an adjustment of the line is essential to the plaintiff's enjoyment of its possession.

What the Court may take judicial notice of the plaintiff need not have alleged in the complaint; and, if the considerations which follow had been specifically alleged there can be but little doubt of the jurisdiction of the court of equity. We cannot but be impressed with the well-known fact among our people, in whom the Anglo-Saxon tenacity to the ownership or claimed ownership of land is proverbial, that no more prolific source of misunderstandings, leading to altercations, breaches of friendly relations, and community and social obligations, and even to homicides, exists than disputes over boundary lines. It is difficult to conceive of a proceeding that would tend more readily to compose these differences than a suit in equity; to turn the energy of wrangles into a channel of usefulness and productiveness and peacefulness. As a matter of public...