V-1 Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission

Decision Date28 January 1977
Docket NumberV-1,No. 11960,11960
Citation98 Idaho 140,559 P.2d 756
PartiesOIL COMPANY, a corporation, and Blair Dean, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Edward W. Pike and Jay B. Gaskill, of Albaugh, Smith & Pike, Idaho Falls, for plaintiff-appellants.

Wayne E. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., J. Michael Kinsela, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff appellants, V-1 Oil Company, a gasoline retail dealer, and Blair Dean, Inc., a gasoline wholesale dealer, against the defendant respondent State Tax Commission for the recovery of motor fuel excise taxes which V-1 and Blair Dean allege to have paid pursuant to the requirements of a statute which they contend was ineffective for a three month period during which the statute was enforced by the Tax Commission. The controversy arose because 1972 I.S.L., ch. 209, which was approved on March 22, 1972, amended then existing I.C. § 49-1210 (which has since been repealed) by raising the motor fuel excise tax from 7cents per gallon to 8 1/2cents per gallon and provided that the act should be in full force and effect on and after April 1, 1972. However, the act did not include an emergency clause, i. e., a declaration that an emergency existed and that because of the emergency the act would become effective earlier than it would become effective in the absence of an emergency. Because chapter 209 provided that its effective date was April 1, 1972, which was only seven days after March 25, 1972, the date the legislature adjourned, chapter 209 was obviously in conflict with Art. 3, § 22, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides:

' § 22. When acts take effect.-No act shall take effect until sixty days from the end of the session at which the same shall have been passed, except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of the law.'

Chapter 209 also conflicted with I.C. § 67-510 (which had been amended earlier in the session in a bill with an emergency clause and which had become effective on March 17, 1972), which provides:

'67-510. Statutes and resolutions-When effective.-No act shall take effect until July 1 of the year of the regular session or sixty (60) days from the end of the session at which the same shall have been passed, whichever date occurs last, except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or body of the law.

. . ..'

On April 14, 1972, V-1 Oil and Blair Dean filed suit in the district court alleging that they 'pay, collect and remit' motor fuel excise taxes to the State Tax Commission, and contending that the requirement of chapter 209 that they begin paying, collecting and remitting an 8 1/2cents per gallon motor fuel excise tax on April 1, 1972, rather than on July 1, 1972, was in violation of the constitutional and statutory provisions quoted above. They further sought from the district court a declaratory judgment that the effective date of chapter 209 would be July 1, 1972, and that the district court enter judgment allowing them a refund for all increased motor fuel taxes they had paid or would pay between April 1, 1972, and June 30, 1972, upon the gasoline they had sold or would sell in that period.

This action was still pending in the district court when the 1973 legislature met. That legislature enacted ch. 280, 1973 Session Laws, which contained the following provisions intended to 'cure' the previous legislature's failure to include an emergency clause in the motor fuel excise tax increase act:

'Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

'SECTION 1. The legislature hereby declares that chapter 209, laws of 1972, was intended to tax at the rate of eight and one-half cents (8 1/2cents) per gallon all motor fuels received on and after April 1, 1972, and further declares that motor fuels received on and after April 1, 1972, were to be so taxed by the retroactive application of chapter 209, laws of 1972, to motor fuels received on and after April 1, 1972.

'SECTION 2. That Section 2, Chapter 209, Laws of 1972, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:

'SECTION 2. This act shall be in full force and effect on and after April 1, 1972. Motor fuels received on and after April 1, 1972, shall be taxed at the increased rate set forth in this act by the retroactive application of this act, if such motor fuels would not otherwise be taxed at the increased rates set forth in this act.

'SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and approval and retroactively to April 1, 1972.' (Underlined material added by 1973 act).

The district court held that the 1973 amendment retroactively 'cured' the omission of the emergency clause from the 1972 session law, and concluded that the 1973 amendment precluded the plaintiffs from making any claim for a refund and granted the State Tax Commission's motion for summary judgment.

However, the 1973 amendment did not cure the defect in the 1972 act. It is clear from reading the 1972 act that the legislature intended that the 1 1/2cents increase in the motor fuels tax should take effect on and after April 1, 1972. What the 1972 act lacked was a declaration of emergency in order to comply with Art. 3, § 22, of the Idaho Constitution. The 1973 amendment did not cure the defect in the 1972 act by attempting to add, retroactively, an emergency clause, assuming that a subsequent legislature could constitutionally do that. What the 1973 amendment did was to spell out in even greater detail that the legislature intended that the increase in the motor fuels tax should take effect on April 1, 1972, something which the 1972 act had already made clear. The 1972 act, even after the purported retroactive 1973 amendments, still does not contain an emergency clause in order to satisfy the requirements of Art. 3, § 22, and therefore the 1973 amendment did not 'cure' the defect in the 1972 act. The fact that the 1973 act contained an emergency clause justifies, arguably, the conclusion that the 1973 amendments to the 1972 act were retroactive to April 1, 1972. But the 1972 act, after applying the 1973 amendments to it retroactively, still does not contain an emergency clause, and therefore does not comply with Art. 3, § 22, of the Idaho Constitution.

It is clear to us, however, that chapter 209 of the 1972 Session Laws, together with chapter 280 of the 1973 Session Laws, do constitute an implied repeal of I.C. § 67-510, which provides in part that 'no act shall take effect until July 1 of the year of the regular session . . .', at least to the extent that I.C. § 67-510 would otherwise apply to the effective date of chapter 209 of the 1972 Session Laws. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 45 v. Montana Liquor Control Board, 155 Mont. 300, 471 P.2d 541 (1970); Cf. Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968). Therefore, we conclude that, based upon Art. 3, § 22, of the Idaho Constitution, the effective date of the 1 1/2cents motor fuels tax increase provided for in the chapter 209 of the 1972 Session Laws, even after the purported retroactive amendment contained in chapter 280 of the 1973 Session Laws, was sixty days after the end of the session in which the same was passed, which in this case would have been May 24, 1972. The State Tax Commission had no authority to collect the 1 1/2cents increase prior to that time.

The State Tax Commission argues, however, that even assuming that the tax increase was not retroactive to April 1, 1972, that neither V-1 Oil Company nor Blair Dean, for a variety of reasons, is entitled to recover for the motor fuels excise taxes which they alleged to have paid between the months of April 1, 1972, and May 24, 1972. We will deal with their respective claims separately.

CLAIM OF BLAIR DEAN, INC.

The disposition of the claim of Blair Dean, Inc., requires an analysis of the Idaho motor fuels tax as it existed on April 1, 1972. At that time the basic tax imposed on motor fuels was an excise tax upon the licensed 'dealer' as defined in I.C. § 49-1201(1)(d) who first 'receives' the gasoline within the state of Idaho as provided in I.C. § 49-1210(a). 1 Blair Dean, Inc., was a licensed 'dealer' of motor fuels as that term was defined in I.C. § 49-1201(1) (d) who between April 1, 1972, and May 24, 1972, was taxed an additional 1 1/2cents per gallon on motor fuels 'received' by it as a result of the State Tax Commission's enforcement of chapter 209 of the 1972 Session Laws on April 1, 1972. The addirtional 1 1/2cents tax paid during that period amounted to $12,108.39, according to the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties. It is clear from our prior decision in American Oil Co. v. Neill, 86 Idaho 7, 383 P.2d 350 (1963), reversed, 380 U.S. 451, 85 S.Ct. 1130, 14 L.Ed.2d 1 (1965), that the legal incidence of the motor fuels excise tax imposed by I.C. § 49-1210(a) is upon the licensed 'dealer', and not upon the ultimate consumer who uses the motor fuels on the highways of the state of Idaho. As summarized by the United States Supreme Court in the American Oil Co. case:

'The trial judge found that the operating incidence of the tax clearly fell on the dealer:

'This conclusion was further buttressed by finding that the Idaho administrative interpretation of the statute in the past has been to treat it as a privilege tax upon the dealer. 5

'On appeal the Idaho Supreme Court left the trial court's conclusions undisturbed. Moreover, the State Attorney General in his brief before this Court expressly states that the tax 'is a privilege tax, the incidence of which falls on the dealer * * *.' This unanimity between the courts of Idaho and its agencies is to us in accord with the literal interpretation of the Act inasmuch...

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