Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 45 v. Montana Liquor Control Bd.
| Decision Date | 24 June 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 11880,11880 |
| Citation | 471 P.2d 541,155 Mont. 300 |
| Parties | TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL 45, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MONTANA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD of the State of Montana et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Hilley & McKittrick, Great Falls, D. Patrick McKittrick, argued, Great Falls, for appellants.
David L. Jackson, Helena, for respondents.
This is a declaratory judgment action by a labor union against the Montana Liquor Control Board seeking a determination of whether certain warehouse employees of the Board are subject to an annual salary limitation of $6,600 or whether they are eligible for a discretionary salary increase not exceeding 5% of their previous annual salary without such $6,600 limitation.
The district court of Lewis and Clark county, the Hon. Victor H. Fall, district judge, sitting without a jury, entered judgment that the Board had no authority to grant such employees any increase in salary that would result in an annual salary exceeding $6,600. From this judgment, the Union appeals.
The underlying issue on this appeal is whether the $6,600 salary ceiling imposed by section 4-108, R.C.M.1947 as amended, is impliedly repealed by the provisions of Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 of the 1969 legislature.
Plaintiff in this case is Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 45, a labor union which is the sole collective bargaining agent for the warehouse employees of the Montana Liquor Control Board at the state liquor warehouse in Helena. Defendants are the Montana Liquor Control Board, its members, and its administrator. For simplicity, plaintiff is referred to herein as the Union and defendants as the Board.
There being no factual dispute, the case was submitted to the district court on an agreed statement of fact. As no facts beyond those previously mentioned are significant, further factual elaboration is unnecessary. The legal issue as defined by the parties 'involves an interpretation of and the relationship of Section 4-108, R.C.M.1947, and Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 upon which there is a substantial difference of opinion', the actual controversy being 'whether the liquor warehouse employees may receive a salary only up to $6,600.00 per year or whether they may receive a salary increase not exceeding five percent (5%) of the annual salary received during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969.'
On April 22, 1970 the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of the Board. The judgment held 'That Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 * * * is not in conflict with Section 4-108, R.C.M.1947' and 'That the Montana Liquor Control Board is not authorized to apply a 5% increase, or any increase, to annual salaries of 'any other employees of the board in the sum not exceeding six thousand six hundred dollars ($6,600.00) * * *' as set forth in said Section 4-108, R.C.M.1947, if such employee is paid at the rate of $6,600.00 per year.' The union appeals from this judgment.
The issue on this appeal as heretofore stated is purely a question of statutory construction. Accordingly, our starting point is the two statutes involved.
Section 4-108, R.C.M.1947 as amended, provides in its pertinent parts:
'The board shall fix the following salaries of its employees at such sums as it deems advisable, to wit: * * * the salary of any other employee of the board in the sum not exceeding six thousand six hundred dollars ($6,600) per year. * * *'
It is acknowledged by all parties that the warehouse employees involved in the instant case fall within the term 'any other employee of the board' as used in this statute.
Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 is a bill appropriating funds for the operations of various state agencies, one of which is the Montana Liquor Control Board. It contains, among other items, an appropriation for the personal services of its employees. Section 1, subsection 2 of that bill provides in pertinent part as follows:
'The term * * *'
The Union advances several arguments in support of its basic position that the $6,600 salary ceiling imposed by section 4-108 is amended by implication by the discretionary 5% annual salary increase contained in Extraordinary House Bill No. 4.
Initially the Union contends that because Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 is a later enactment on the same subject it controls over the earlier enactment, section 4-108, and that Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 is a special statute which controls over the provisions of section 4-108, the general statute. The Union argues that these rules of statutory construction must be applied here to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
While we recognize that the intention of the legislature is controlling (Section 93-401-16, R.C.M.1947), and that various rules of statutory construction have been developed for determining legislative intent (Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660), the two cited rules of statutory construction have no application to the instant case. They apply only where the two statutes under consideration are inconsistent with and repugnant to each other. . Fletcher v. Paige,124 Mont. 114, 119, 220 P.2d 484, 486, 19 A.L.R.2d 1108. And, assuming arguendo that Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 is a special statute and section 4-108 a general one, Emphasis supplied. In re Stevenson, 87 Mont. 486, 498, 289 P. 566, 570. And, as will be developed later in this opinion, the two statutes under consideration are not inconsistent or repugnant, but can be read together as a harmonized and homogeneous whole giving effect to each. Thus, appellant's initial argument fails.
Secondly, the Union argues that the language of Extraordinary House Bill No. 4 includes all employees thereby indicating a legislative intent to permit everyone a 5% annual salary increase. It is true that the discretionary 5% annual increase applies to all employees. But it does not follow that the legislature intended to permit every employee such discretionary salary increase without regard to existing statutory wage ceilings. The legislature is presumed to have enacted law with existing law in mind. In re Wilson's Estate, 102 Mont. 178, 56 P.2d 733, 105 A.L.R. 367. And, as this Court said in London Guaranty & Accident Co., Ltd. v. Industrial Accident Board, 82 Mont. 304, 310, 266 P. 1103, 1105, later quoted with approval in Fletcher v. Paige, supra:
'The presumption is that the Legislature passes a law with deliberation and with a full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, and does not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same matter unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable.'
As will be developed later herein, the two statutes in question are not repugnant and...
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