Estes v. Brewster Cigar Co., Inc., 21840.
Decision Date | 23 April 1930 |
Docket Number | 21840. |
Citation | 156 Wash. 465,287 P. 36 |
Parties | ESTES v. BREWSTER CIGAR CO., Inc., et al. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Malcolm Douglas, Judge.
Action by Dean Estes against the Brewster Cigar Company, Inc., and others. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
Stephen V. Carey and Samuel B. Bassett, both of Seattle, for appellant.
Hammond & Frye, of Seattle, for respondents.
The appellant, Estes, instituted the present action against the respondents Brewster Cigar Co., Inc., and M. G. Daymude, and the defendant Clarence E. Failing, to recover for personal injuries. To the second amended complaint of the appellant the respondents interposed a demurrer, based upon three of the statutory grounds, namely (1) that there is a defect of parties defendant; (2) that several causes of action have been improperly united; and (3) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer, whereupon the appellant elected to stand on his amended complaint and refused to plead further. Following the election of the appellant, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the action with prejudice as against the respondents.
Paragraphs I and II of the amended complaint, on which the appellant elected to stand, read as follows:
I. That at all times hereinafter mentioned, the defendant Brewster Cigar Co., Inc., was and now is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Washington, and operating a chain of cigar stores in the City of Seattle including one situated at the premises known as 400 Union Street.
The remaining paragraphs of the complaint set forth the injuries sustained by the appellant from the wounds inflicted upon him by the defendant Failing, and require no further notice.
Whether the complaint is vulnerable to attack on any of the grounds set forth in the demurrer is, of course, the ultimate question presented by the appeal. That it is not so vulnerable, on the ground that there is a defect of parties defendant, would hardly seem to require argument to demonstrate. The term 'defect of parties defendant' means that there are too few parties defendant, not that there are too many; it means that a complete determination of the matters in controversy in the action cannot be had without the presence of other parties than those made parties to the action. To reach the question of too many parties, or the question of misjoinder of parties, a resort must be had to other forms of procedure. In the present instance, from the appellant's point of view, there are neither too few nor too many defendants. His contention is that, under the facts as he has stated them, all of the defendants jointly and each of them severally are liable to him for the injuries he suffered. He may have mistaken the legal principles involved, but he has the legal right to make the contention, and the consequent right to sue all of them in one action.
The second ground of demurrer is also without foundation. The appellant sets out in his complaint but one cause of action, namely, a cause of action for an injury to his person. It is true that the facts stated in the complaint show that the parties defendant are liable, if liable at all, upon different and separate principles of law. The charge is that the defendant Failing is liable because he wrongfully committed the immediate overt act which caused the injury; that the defendant Daymude is liable because he put in motion the chain of circumstances which induced Failing to commit the overt act; and that the defendant Brewster Cigar Co., Inc., is liable because Daymude was its employee and committed the acts charged against him while such employee and while acting within the scope of his employment and in pursuit of his employer's business. But these differences in the nature of the liability of the several defendants do not make the appellant's complaint duplicitous. The appellant is not obligated to pursue the defendants separately. He may join them in one action and recover against as many of them as the facts of his case will warrant.
The third ground of the demurrer raises the question of the sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action. It is at once apparent, of course, that the respondent Brewster Cigar Co., Inc., is not liable for the injury inflicted upon the appellant unless the respondent Daymude is liable, and it is equally apparent that it may not be liable even though Daymude be so liable. Obviously, therefore, the first inquiry is as to the liability of Daymude.
That the acts of Daymude were wrongful, in a legal sense, hardly admits of doubt. The appellant had committed no wrong against the property of the store of which Daymude had charge; nor had he, by wagering and losing at the gambling game conducted in the store, incurred a liability which could be enforced against him. He thus had the right to depart peaceably from the store, as he attempted to and did depart, and for Daymude to pursue him, point towards him, and utter cries which indicated that he had committed a felony while in the store, was a wrong which finds no justification in the conduct of the appellant.
But the acts of Daymude of themselves did not cause, and would not have caused, the injuries for which the appellant complains in his complaint. These were caused by the subsequent intervening acts of the police officer, and the further question is, whether Daymude can be held for the consequences of these subsequent acts. The rule is general, of course, that no person, committing a wrongful or negligent act which is followed by an injury to another, is liable for that injury, unless his act is the proximate cause of the injury. But proximate cause does not always mean the cause which is nearest in time or place to the injury, nor does it mean that there must not be an intervening act of a third person which directly causes the injury. As was said by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136:
The same doctrine is expressed in the often cited case of A. T. & Santa Fé R. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. Rep. 362, wherein it is said:
On the question, our own case of Hellan v. Supply Laundry Co., 94 Wash. 683, 163 P. 9, 10, although not directly in point, has some bearing. In that case two motor vehicles were approaching each other on a street in the ...
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