Hay v. Carter

• Decision Date: 20 September 1956
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 36263,36263,1
• Citation: 94 S.E.2d 755,94 Ga.App. 382
• Parties: C. E. HAY, Administrator, v. Tom CARTER
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 755

94 S.E.2d 755

94 Ga.App. 382

C. E. HAY, Administrator, v. Tom CARTER.

No. 36263.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Sept. 20, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court.

The trial judge erred in denying the motion for a new trial.

Tom Carter filed an action against Annie Lee Gilley Hayes to recover damages resulting from a collision of their automobiles. Annie Lee Gilley Hayes died while the case was pending and her administrator was by consent made a party defendant in her stead. The plaintiff's petition alleged in part:

'On October 16, 1953, while plaintiff was driving his 1953 Mercury automobile in a perfectly lawful manner, going south along the Metcalf and Monticello Road, in Thomas County, Georgia, and in the day time, said defendant, while traveling along said road behind plaintiff and going in the same direction, drove her 1950 Tudor Bel Air Chevrolet Sedan, Motor No. HAA576892, against and into the rear part of plaintiff's said automobile. Defendant's said automobile struck the rear bumper and the left rear fender of plaintiff's said automobile, and wrecked the entire left side of plaintiff's said automobile.

'As a result of said collision, plaintiff's said automobile was damaged in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, because immediately before said wreck plaintiff's said automobile was of the value of $3200, and immediately thereafter and as a result thereof it was of the value of not more than $2000.

'Plaintiff's said damages are caused by the negligence of said defendant, because she negligently drove her said automobile into and against plaintiff's automobile while the same was in plain view of her in the road traveling in the same direction and while she was traveling at a rate of speed in excess of sixty miles per hour and while plaintiff was traveling at a speed of about thirty miles per hour.'

The defendant's answer denied the material allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and further alleged in substance: 'At the time and place alleged by the plaintiff, both parties were traveling south on the Metcalf-Monticello Road, and both were going at about the same speed, he in front. The plaintiff then and there knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care could and would have known, that he was being followed by another automobile. While so traveling, the plaintiff stopped his car in the middle of the road without first giving any signal or other warning that he was about to do so. By the time defendant discovered the plaintiff was bringing his car to a stop, she was too close to him to bring her car to a complete stop before striking his car. In the emergency thus created by the plaintiff's said negligence, defendant swerved her car to the left and actually ran into the roadside ditch in an effort to avoid striking the plaintiff's car, but did not succeed in completely missing it. Defendant's car struck the left fender and left rear bumper of the plaintiff's car, injuring and damaging both cars. The direct and proximate cause of all the injuries and damage done to both of said cars was the plaintiff's negligence, (1) in that he stopped in the middle of the road immediately ahead of defendant's car without giving any signal or warning of his intention to do so, and (2) in that he stopped in the middle of the road without allowing this defendant the use of one-half of the road, which was necessary to enable her to pass him....