Haber v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 6-CV-74608-DT.,6-CV-74608-DT.
• Citation: 958 F.Supp. 321
• Parties: Thomas HABER, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

958 F.Supp. 321

Thomas HABER, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 6-CV-74608-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 20, 1997.

Ronald Reosti, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

Gregory Muzingo, Auburn Hills, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND ORDER REMANDING CASE TO WAYNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Thomas Haber instituted this wrongful discharge action on November 20, 1995 in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Defendant Chrysler Corporation answered Plaintiff's complaint in January 1996. The action proceeded in the state court through discovery, and on August 6, 1996, Chrysler filed a motion for summary disposition to which motion, Plaintiff responded a month later, on September 12, 1996.

Chrysler contends that in Plaintiff's Response to its motion for summary disposition, Mr. Haber asserted "for the first time" a breach of contract claim "that directly implicates the [Chrysler-UAW] collective bargaining agreement." [Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 3-4.] Based upon this interpretation of Plaintiff's summary disposition response, on October 3, 1996, Chrysler removed Plaintiff's action to this Court alleging federal question jurisdiction on the basis of "complete preemption" of Plaintiff's complaint under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (the "LMRA").

On October 18, 1996, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that Plaintiff's removal was untimely, and further arguing that Plaintiff's complaint is not preempted under the LMRA. Chrysler responded to Plaintiff's Motion on November 5, 1996.

Having had the opportunity to review and consider Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant's Response and the entire record of the case presented to this Court, the Court has determined that oral argument on Plaintiff's Motion is not necessary. Therefore, in accordance with Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(e), Plaintiff's Motion will be decided "on the briefs." This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling on the matter.

II. PERTINENT FACTS

Plaintiff Thomas Haber is a former non-union management employee of Chrysler Corporation. Mr. Haber actually began his career with American Motors Corporation ("AMC"), in 1972, as an hourly worker, represented by the UAW. He remained an hourly worker and union member through 1973. In late 1973, however, he was promoted by AMC to a salaried, non-union supervisory position at AMC's Kenosha, Wisconsin plant. He remained in that position until 1989, when he became a Chrysler employee following Chrysler's acquisition of AMC.

Shortly after the Chrysler-AMC merger, Chrysler closed the Kenosha plant. Mr. Haber then accepted a position at Chrysler's MOPAR Parts warehouse in Centerline, Michigan, which, like his previous AMC Kenosha, Wisconsin position, was a non-union, supervisory position. In 1991, he was moved to the Warren Distribution Center. His position in Warren, like his position in Centerline, was a non-union management position.

Mr. Haber worked at the Warren Distribution Center until 1995 when he was discharged for misconduct — the taking of unauthorized parts for personal use.

Haber subsequently filed the instant one-count lawsuit in Wayne County Circuit Court claiming that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of an alleged just cause contract.

III. DISCUSSION

As indicated above, Plaintiff's wrongful discharge action proceeded in state court for nearly nine months. After completion of discovery, Defendant moved for summary disposition, contending that Plaintiff's employment with Chrysler was terminable "at-will". In its brief in support of its motion for summary disposition, Chrysler argued that Plaintiff could not identify any documents or any oral representations which would support his claim of an employment contract terminable for cause, only.

In Response to Chrysler's summary judgment motion, Plaintiff contradicted Defendant's assertion of absence of evidence supporting his "just cause" claim, and, citing several excerpts from his deposition testimony, Plaintiff argued that he was not only relying upon a "legitimate expectation" of termination for cause only, but was also relying "on the express agreement that he could return to the bargaining unit if Chrysler was dissatisfied with his performance as a salaried employee." [Summary Disposition Response Brief, p. 3.] Plaintiff claimed that he was specifically told when he was promoted from his hourly union position to a salaried position when he was with AMC that he could return at any time to the hourly work force. He further argued that, "[a]lthough Plaintiff's contract was originally made with AMC, Chrysler is bound by that contract because it is the successor to AMC and has the same policy with regard to salaried employees being allowed to return to the bargaining unit." [Summary Disposition Response Brief, p. 6.] In support of this contention, Plaintiff quoted from pages 57 and 98-99 of his May 30, 1996 deposition testimony.

The examination of Plaintiff at page 57 of his deposition was as follows:

Q: [by counsel for Chrysler] ... [D]id you have any conversations with anybody in Chrysler management that specifically dealt with whether your employment, you being Mr. Haber, was terminable at will or with just cause.

A: [by Mr. Haber] I don't know, I really don't know.

Q: Are there any documents or is there anything that might refresh your memory with respect to that?

A: All I know that in the hourly working agreement there's a paragraph that states you can return to the hourly work force from salary and management positions, that I know.

[Haber 5/30/96 Dep. p. 57.]

His deposition continued as follows:

Q: [by counsel for Chrysler] But you are not a member, at the time you were employed at Chrysler you were not a member of the UAW, you were not a member or covered by the collective bargaining agreement, correct?

[Objection by Plaintiff's counsel]

Q: You're not a member of the hourly work force?

A: No, but I could return to the hourly work force....

[Haber Dep. p. 57.]

At pages 98-99 of his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was expressly told when he first moved to management from the hourly ranks that he could return to the hourly work force:

Q: When you went from an hourly worker to a salaried worker back when you were at American Motors * * * did you ask and were you told at the time. did you ask at that time whether or not you could go back to being an hourly worker?

A: Yes....

Q: What were you told?

A: That you could return at any time or they could return you, you know. at any time ... to the hourly work force.

Q: Did you feel that that provided you with job security?

A: Yes.

[Haber Dep. pp. 98-99]

In his response to the motion for summary disposition, Plaintiff further indicated that his understanding of the terms and conditions applicable to his employment as a salaried employee was consistent with the testimony of Chrysler's personnel director. [Response Brief, p. 4.] As Plaintiff pointed out in his response, "Mr. [Cody] Cooper, the Group Personnel Director,.. testified in his [June 1996] deposition that the right of salaried employees to return to the bargaining unit was, in his opinion, contingent on Chrysler's discretion." Id. See also Cooper Dep. pp. 19, 24-25 (attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's summary disposition response brief).

Mr. Cooper's testimony on this issue was as follows:

Q: If an hourly employee ... covered by a UAW contract is promoted to a salaried position, does that employee have the right to return to the hourly ranks?

A: I don't believe he has the right, but there's an opportunity that would allow us to do that if we chose.

Q: So under the contract with the UAW, the UAW would accept the person back as an hourly employee?

A: Under certain terms, yes.

Q: What terms?

A: There would be definitions in terms of the amounts of seniority they would return depending on the dates that they had transferred to the salaried rank....

Q: What if a salaried, employee — I'm sorry, a non-represented employee was unhappy in their salaried or non-represented position and wanted to return to a represented position?

A: In the vast majority of cases, if they had an acceptable record and there wasn't [sic] any considerations that we were worried that they would be an abuser or use their previous experience to our detriment, then most of those requests would be agreed and they would be returned to a bargaining unit provided their seniority allowed them to do that.

* * * * * *

Q: I think your earlier testimony was that unless there was some compelling reason to say no, your practice or —

A: The vast majority.

Q: — was to allow them?

A: Yes.

Q: In fact, when people are recruited from the hourly ranks or the represented ranks to go into salaried positions they're told that they have they have the opportunity to return to hourly or represented positions; isn't that true?

A: I don't know that the word opportunity is [used] — they're told that they have contractual abilities to take their seniority back in these instances if we decide they can go back, that's my understanding of what they are told.

[Cooper Dep. pp. 19, 24-27.]

Mr. Cooper also testified regarding Chrysler's policy regarding termination of long service employees and testified that Plaintiff was covered by this policy.

Plaintiff argued that the statements made to Plaintiff by company management coupled with Chrysler's policies regarding long term employees and returning salaried employees to the hourly work force was sufficient to establish an express agreement for just cause employment under recent Michigan Court of Appeals decisions. See Response Brief, pp. 7-8.

Relying upon Mr. Haber's and Mr. Cooper's deposition testimony, Plaintiff disputed Defendant's summary disposition argument that his claim of just cause employment lacked...