Casumpang v. ILWU, LOCAL 142

• Decision Date: 02 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 22726.,22726.
• Citation: 13 P.3d 1235,94 Haw. 330
• Parties: Nicanor E. CASUMPANG, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILWU, LOCAL 142, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

13 P.3d 1235

94 Haw. 330

Nicanor E. CASUMPANG, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILWU, LOCAL 142, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22726.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

November 2, 2000.

Reconsideration Denied December 20, 2000.

Nicanor E. Casumpang, Jr., the plaintiff-appellant, on the briefs, pro se.

Herbert R. Takahashi and Rebecca L. Covert (of Takahashi, Masui & Vasconcellos), on the briefs, for the defendant-appellee, ILWU, Local 142.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, and ACOBA, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by LEVINSON, J.

The plaintiff-appellant Nicanor E. Casumpang, Jr. appeals from the order of the district court of the second circuit granting the defendant-appellee ILWU (International Longshore & Warehouse Union), Local 142's (hereinafter, "the Union") motion to dismiss Casumpang's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Casumpang argues that the district court erred in: (1) relying on an order of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i, entered on June 24, 1999, which dismissed a related complaint that Casumpang had filed in federal court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,¹ as a partial basis for dismissing his present action; and (2) ruling that the subject matter of the complaint was preempted by (a) section 403 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 483,² and (b) section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 185.³

We hold: (1) that Casumpang's complaint is not precluded by the June 24, 1999 order of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i in Casumpang v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Civil No. 98-775 ACK [hereinafter, the "federal action"]; (2) that the LMRDA does not preempt the subject matter of Casumpang's complaint, inasmuch as his claim for relief bears, at most, a tangential relation to his eligibility for union office or the validity of a union election; and (3) that the LMRDA is not applicable to the present matter, inasmuch as Casumpang's complaint does not implicate a contract either between an employer and a union or between two unions. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order dismissing Casumpang's complaint and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Casumpang was elected a full-time business agent for the Union in 1994. He took a leave of absence from his position as a journey worker electrician to serve a term of office, which commenced on January 2, 1995 and was to continue to January 1, 1997. On April 2, 1996, the Union charged Casumpang with violating article II, section 1 of the Union's constitution, which provided in relevant part that "[e]lected and appointed full-time officials of the Local, while on the Local payroll, shall not be permitted to hold any other gainful position unless authorized by the Executive Committee with the approval of the Local Executive Board." In a proceeding conducted before the Union's "trial committee" on April 16, 1997, Casumpang stipulated that he was guilty of violating article II, section 1 of the constitution and agreed to abide by a "cease and desist" order that precluded him from engaging in any activity as an electrical contractor unless authorized to do so by the Local Executive Committee. In late December 1997, following a November 1997 election for the office of the Union's Maui division director (in which Casumpang was nominated and ran as one of two candidates⁴), the Union began to investigate charges that Casumpang had violated the April 16, 1997 "cease and desist" order by working as an electrical contractor between May 6, 1996 and October 13, 1997. On January 7, 1998, several members of the Union filed formal written charges against Casumpang. The Union's judicial panel⁵ considered the charges on January 16, 1998 and issued a decision and order on January 17, 1998. The judicial panel found that Casumpang had "knowingly and deliberately" violated both article II, section 1 and the "cease and desist" order by performing work as an electrical contractor on nine occasions between June 14, 1996 and October 27, 1997 and that he had earned $7,636.00 in 1996 for his services as an electrical contractor.⁶ The decision and order provided:

1. Effective June 14, 1996 Casumpang is suspended as a member in good standing of ILWU Local 142 for a period of nine (9) consecutive years.

2. During the period of his suspension as a member in good standing of ILWU Local 142 (a period of nine years) Casumpang shall neither be eligible for nomination nor serve as an officer of ILWU Local 142 or as an officer or steward of any of the units of ILWU Local 142.

3. Effective January 7, 1998, Casumpang shall receive no further compensation as a business agent and Casumpang is hereby ordered to turn in all union office keys and all papers and property of the union on January 19, 1998 at 12:00 noon to the Secretary Treasurer of the union, or his designee.

4. Effective the date of this Decision and Order and continuing up to June 14, 2005 Casumpang shall not be permitted to serve in any appointed full-time position in ILWU Local 142.

5. Within 60 days of the date of this Decision and Order Casumpang shall pay a fine of $7,636 to ILWU Local 142.

Casumpang returned to his position as a journey worker electrician on February 3, 1998. On January 23, 1998, Casumpang appealed the decision of the judicial panel to the Union's Local Executive Committee, which sustained the judicial panel's determination. On April 18, 1998, Casumpang appealed to the ILWU's president, who likewise rejected the appeal, noting that Casumpang had failed to exhaust his predicate appeal rights. Casumpang's subsequent appeal to the Union's Executive Board, dated August 14, 1998, was rejected as untimely.

On September 23, 1998, Casumpang filed the federal action against the Union, in which he alleged that he had been removed from office as the Union's business agent and suspended from its membership in retaliation for expressing his right of free speech as guaranteed by LMRDA Title I, § 101(a)(2), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2),⁷ in order to suppress dissent within the Union. Casumpang prayed for (1) declaratory relief, (2) an order reinstating him to his former position with and as a member of the Union, (3) compensatory damages, including back pay and reimbursement for the value of lost benefits, and (4) punitive damages. On June 24, 1999, the federal district court entered an order granting the Union's motion to dismiss Casumpang's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, the federal court construed Casumpang's complaint as implicating LMRDA Title IV, §§ 401 through 403, codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 481 through 483,⁸ rather than LMRDA Title I; accordingly, the federal court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the complaint, in view of the fact that the exclusive remedy for violations of LMRDA Title IV lay in an appeal to the Secretary of Labor. The federal court noted that, in a second amended complaint, filed on June 4, 1999, Casumpang had eliminated "references to reinstating him in his former position or otherwise overturning the contested election"; nevertheless, the court ruled as follows:

Despite Plaintiff's amendments to his complaint and his assertions of Title I violations, the Court finds that Title IV governs the instant matter. Although Plaintiff no longer wishes to overturn the results of the 1997 rerun election, a course that would certainly run afoul of Title IV, the Court finds that the substance of Plaintiff's complaint still involves Title IV because it revolves around overturning the Union's decision to suspend him as a member in good standing and effectively means reinstating his eligibility to hold union office. This relief—having the Court reinstate him as a member in good standing—would implicitly impact the 1998 rerun election results because it would be akin to having the Court declare the Plaintiff was improperly barred from running in that election, which determination is the exclusive province of the Secretary of Labor.

. . . .

Conversely, the Court finds that Defendants have provided more than adequate evidence to corroborate their contention that the decision to discipline Plaintiff was made in accordance with their powers under Title IV of the LMRDA and was not made to suppress dissent within the Union. As detailed above in the Court's factual summary, Plaintiff was disciplined because he was found guilty of working as an electrical contractor while serving as a business agent, a violation of the Union constitution that required that he be "suspended from office forthwith." ... Thus, in the absence of some evidence that the Union has applied its membership requirements against the Plaintiff in a discriminatory fashion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not been disciplined within the meaning of Title I.

Finally, the federal district court concluded that, even if it were to construe Casumpang's complaint as arising under LMRDA Title I, it would still dismiss the complaint, inasmuch as Casumpang had failed to exhaust the Union's internal appeal procedures.

In the meantime, on October 13, 1998, Casumpang filed the present action in the district court of the second circuit. He fashioned his claim for relief as one in assumpsit for $5,688.24 allegedly owed him by the Union as vacation pay. On November 30, 1998, the Union filed an answer—in which it denied Casumpang's allegations—and a counterclaim—in which it asserted that Casumpang had failed to pay the $7,636 fine that the Union had imposed on him—and prayed (1) that, if Casumpang's complaint were not dismissed, then any award in his favor be offset by the amount of the fine and (2) for a judgment in the Union's favor in the amount of $7,636, together with costs and expenses.

On...