Estes v. Hopp

• Decision Date: 05 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 39841,39841
• Citation: 73 Wn.2d 263,438 P.2d 205
• Parties: In re the Welfare of Shirley Ann ESTES, also known as Shirley Ann Moskaloff, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for the County of Yakima, Juvenile Department, Honorable Blaine HOPP, Jr., Judge, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 263

73 Wn.2d 263

438 P.2d 205

In re the Welfare of Shirley Ann ESTES, also known as

Shirley Ann Moskaloff, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for the

County of Yakima, Juvenile Department, Honorable

Blaine HOPP, Jr., Judge, Respondent.

No. 39841.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

March 5, 1968.

Lincoln E. Shropshire, Pros. Atty., Donald R. Shaw, Deputy Pros. Atty., Yakima, for respondent.

NEILL, Judge.

We are urged to overrule our prior cases denying jury trials and bail in juvenile court proceedings and to invalidate the portion of RCW 13.04.030 which prohibits a jury trial in juvenile cases.

On June 26, 1967, petitioner herein, then 16 years old, was apprehended near the Canadian border by the police. At the time of her apprehension, she was in the company of her husband and her brother, who were both charged with unlawfully taking a vehicle without the owner's permission. A delinquency petition was filed in juvenile court alleging that she had taken a vehicle without the owner's permission and that she was in need of the court's care, consideration and planning. Counsel was appointed for her who, prior to the commencement of the delinquency hearing, made both oral and written requests that the proceeding 'be heard by a jury as in any other criminal case.' The requests were denied.

At the delinquency hearing, a juvenile probation officer was allowed to testify as to statements made by petitioner while she was held in a juvenile detention home. The police officer who signed the delinquency petition testified that petitioner had been advised of some of her rights as a possible criminal defendant. The prosecution thereupon rested its case. Petitioner moved that the court dismiss the action because of insufficient evidence to establish the unlawful taking of another's vehicle. The prosecution was then granted a continuance of one hour and, when court reconvened, was allowed to reopen its case. Petitioner made timely and proper objections to the testimony of the juvenile probation officer, to the continuance, and to the reopening.

When the case was reopened, the prosecution presented three additional witnesses: (1) the police officer who returned petitioner from the Canadian border; (2) the owner of the stolen automobile; and (3) petitioner's brother, who testified that petitioner knew the car in which she was riding was stolen. The prosecution again rested and petitioner again moved for dismissal. Over petitioner's objections, the prosecution was then allowed to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof.

Petitioner presented no evidence on her behalf. The court found her to be a delinquent child and ordered her confined in a juvenile institution until further order of the court. Petitioner's request that the trial court establish bail, pending the outcome of the hearing in this court, was denied.

We granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to set bail for the petitioner pending the outcome of this appeal or in the alternative a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the trial court from placing her in a juvenile institution until bail has been set.

Petitioner assigns error to the denial of her request for a trial by jury. RCW 13.04.030 specifically provides that all cases within the jurisdiction of superior courts under the juvenile court act 'shall be tried without a jury', and RCW 13.04.240 provides that 'An order of court adjudging a child delinquent or dependent under the provisions of this chapter shall in no case be deemed a conviction of crime.' Similarly, the holdings in our prior decisions have affirmed the proposition that proceedings in a juvenile court are not criminal in nature (In re Lewis, 51 Wash.2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957); Mills v. Park, 67 Wash.2d 717, 721, 409 P.2d 646 (1966)), and have sustained the constitutionality of juvenile court proceedings which deny public trials by jury. Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 146 P. 623 (1915). See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965). Petitioner argues, however, that the holding in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), requires us to overrule our prior decisions involving this issue and to invalidate the portion of RCW 13.04.030 which prohibits a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. We do not agree with this contention.

Since the adoption of the first juvenile court act in 1899 in the state of Illinois, the concept of juvenile courts has been that a child who has committed a criminal offense who is wayward, incorrigible, or ungovernable, is to be recognized as 'delinquent' and subject to treatment under a system of probation and rehabilitation, rather than as a criminal. The focus is on the offender and the factors which brought him before the court, rather than on his offense. However, as often is the case, the altruistic concepts embodied in the 1899 spirit of the juvenile court acts have come headlong into the 1968 construction of 'due process.' The entire idea that juvenile offenders should be treated as wards of the state through a special, nonadversary proceedings is under attack in some quarters and many suggestions are being made for modification. However, it is of interest to note that the recommended changes set forth by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ¹ do not include the institution of jury trial. Further, we note that the Commission's Task Force Report 'Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime' (1967), p. 38, approves an observation ² that 'A jury trial would inevitably bring a good deal more formality to the juvenile court without giving the youngster a demonstrably better fact-finding process than trial before a judge.'

The precise holding in Gault, supra, was that in all juvenile hearings which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed: (1) notice of hearings must be given so as to afford the minor a reasonable opportunity to prepare; (2) the minor and his parents must be notified of the child's right to counsel, including court-appointed attorney if they are unable to afford counsel; (3) the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is as applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults; and (4) in the absence of a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination. While recognizing that in the instant case the above-mentioned requirements were met, and further that Gault did not specifically determine that jury trials are required in juvenile proceedings, petitioner nevertheless argues that, under the reasoning of Gault, a juvenile accused of an act which could lead to his institutionalization is entitled to the same procedural and constitutional rights as an adult accused of a crime, which rights would include a jury trial.

We do not believe, however, that either the specific holding in Gault or the reasoning on which that holding is based requires us to accept petitioner's position. The Supreme Court was quite careful to narrowly define both the scope of its inquiry and the effect of its holding by stating:

We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents.' * * * We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution. As to these proceedings, there appears to be little current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play. The problem is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings. (p. 13, 87 S.Ct. p. 1436)

(T)he observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, Will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. * * * (p. 21, 87 S.Ct. p. 1440)

We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders which are valuable. * * * For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion. Further, we are told that one of the important benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they avoid classifying the juvenile as a 'criminal.' The juvenile offender is now classed as a 'delinquent.' There is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. * * * (p. 22, 87 S.Ct. p. 1441)

We announced (Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966)) * * * that while 'We do not mean * * * to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication of 'delinquency,' * * *. (p. 30, 87 S.Ct. 1445) (Italics ours.) In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

Our research has disclosed only two other appellate cases in which this issue has been raised subsequent to Gault, supra: Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967), and Peyton v. Nord, N.M....