Vacca v. Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-2244EM,88-2244EM |
| Citation | 875 F.2d 1337 |
| Parties | 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2478, 112 Lab.Cas. P 11,327, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1147 Matthew D. VACCA, Appellant, v. VIACOM BROADCASTING OF MISSOURI, INC. and CBS, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael Izsak, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
John J. Gazzoli, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.
Before FAGG, ROSS and TIMBERS, * Circuit Judges.
Appellant Matthew D. Vacca appeals from a summary judgment entered July 15, 1988 in the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, Clyde S. Cahill, District Judge, in favor of appellees Viacom Broadcasting of Missouri, Inc. (Viacom) and CBS, Inc. (CBS). Appellant commenced the instant action against appellees for wrongful discharge and for breach of an alleged contract (side agreement) separate from the collective bargaining agreement between appellant's union and appellees (contract claim). Under the alleged side agreement, appellant claims that appellees agreed to pay a portion of his law school tuition in return for which appellant agreed to accept a certain job assignment.
The parties submitted the wrongful discharge claim to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator decided the wrongful discharge claim in favor of appellees. The district court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the contract claim on the ground that the decision of the arbitrator left "no genuine issue as to any material fact" on that claim.
Appellant claims on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the contract claim was separate and distinct from the wrongful discharge claim, it never was submitted to arbitration, and therefore it was not decided by the arbitrator. Appellant also claims that there remain genuine issues of material fact concerning the contract claim that made summary judgment inappropriate.
We affirm.
We shall summarize only those facts and prior proceedings believed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised on appeal.
In the Fall of 1983, appellant had planned to attend law school at St. Louis University. A problem arose, however, which prevented him from starting law school at that time. He then decided to take a temporary job as a researcher in the news department of KMOX-TV 1 or Channel 4 (Channel 4), a St. Louis television station then owned by CBS. Appellant planned to work at Channel 4 until he began law school in the Fall of 1984. In May 1984, impressed with appellant's performance, Channel 4 offered him a permanent full-time position as a writer/editor. He accepted the position but informed Channel 4 that he would work only until the Fall, when he would resign to start law school.
At that time Fred Burrows (Burrows), Channel 4's news director, was having difficulty filling the job of Weekend Assignment Editor, which was an unpopular position because it required working long weekend hours. Burrows suggested to appellant that if he took the position of Weekend Assignment Editor he could work full-time and attend law school part-time. Burrows also stated that CBS might pay for appellant's law school tuition through its tuition assistance program (TAP).
Appellant agreed to accept the position of Weekend Assignment Editor in exchange for some sort of tuition assistance, but the exact contours of this alleged side agreement are in dispute. Appellees deny that there was any side agreement. CBS asserts that its TAP ordinarily did not pay for law school tuition, but in appellant's case CBS agreed that it would pay under its TAP 75% of the tuition of any law school course it felt was job-related. Appellant, however, claims that CBS agreed to pay 75% of his entire law school tuition under a separate side agreement independent of the TAP and the collective bargaining agreement between CBS and appellant's union, the Writers Guild of America (WGA).
Appellant admits that he used CBS TAP forms to obtain his tuition assistance, but he claims that the TAP essentially was a conduit through which he received funds under the alleged side agreement. He claims that, when he received a notice from CBS stating that under his CBS TAP arrangement CBS would pay only 75% of the tuition for job-related law school courses, Burrows told him not to worry about it because the notice was just "paperwork". Whatever the nature of the arrangement, appellant worked at Channel 4 for the next two years while completing one-third of his law school course of study. During this period, CBS paid 75% of the tuition for every law school course appellant completed.
In May 1986, Viacom took control of Channel 4 after purchasing the station from CBS. Appellant then inquired whether Viacom would continue to pay his law school tuition under the separate side agreement he claimed he had with CBS. The new Channel 4 news director, Alan Holzer (Holzer), informed appellant that Viacom would pay his tuition only under the terms of the Viacom TAP, which Viacom considered more advantageous to appellant. 2 On May 20, 1986, appellant confronted Holzer and threatened to sue Viacom unless it paid his law school tuition in the same manner as CBS did. Holzer refused to commit Viacom to any such arrangement. Appellant then refused to do any work. Holzer fired him for insubordination.
Appellant commenced the instant action for wrongful discharge and breach of contract in the St. Louis City Circuit Court. Appellees removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on the ground that, if appellant's claims stated a cause of action at all, they came within Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 (1982), in that the claims asserted an alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement between appellees and the WGA (WGA contract).
The parties submitted the wrongful discharge claim to arbitration under the WGA contract. The arbitrator found in favor of appellees. He held that the WGA contract permitted Viacom to discharge appellant because his refusal to work constituted insubordination under the WGA contract. The district court then granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on the contract claim as stated above. This appeal followed.
We start with some basic summary judgment rules that are beyond dispute. A party is entitled to summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment "should not be granted unless the moving party has established the right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy". Snell v. United States, 680 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982). "[T]he evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party", and the nonmoving party enjoys "the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts". Id. (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). Nevertheless, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment" if there is "no genuine issue of material fact". Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). "[T]his Circuit recognizes the remedy's salutary purpose of avoiding useless and time consuming trials." Butler v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 591 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir.1979).
Appellant asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claim because that claim was separate and distinct from the wrongful discharge claim and was not before the arbitrator. He asserts that the district court "labored under the false impression that the entire dispute between the parties had been submitted [by him] to an arbitrator". Since in his view the contract claim was not submitted to arbitration, appellant contends that the contract claim "was in no way determined by the decision of the Arbitrator". Appellant asserts that the arbitrator himself was well aware that he was not deciding the contract claim, since in his opinion on the wrongful discharge claim he stated that "the remainder of the suit [i.e. the contract claim] is still pending".
We do not believe, however, that the district court was under the erroneous impression that the contract claim had been submitted to arbitration. Rather, we agree with the district court that a crucial issue concerning the contract claim as framed by appellant in his amended complaint--namely, the reason for appellant's discharge by Viacom--was determined by the arbitrator. It follows that we are bound by this finding of fact under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This finding supports the conclusion that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Appellant alleges in his amended complaint that under the asserted side agreement CBS agreed to pay 75% of appellant's law school tuition until he completed law school, and that Viacom assumed CBS' obligation under the agreement. Appellant also alleges that in return he agreed to accept employment as Weekend Assignment Editor, "committ[ing] himself to work each and every Saturday and Sunday" until he completed law school. Accepting as true appellant's allegations that CBS bargained for appellant's performance as Weekend Assignment Editor during appellant's entire law school career, Viacom was entitled to such performance if it ratified the agreement.
Appellant does not allege nor does he offer any evidence tending to show that under the side agreement he could not be fired for insubordination, or that he would be entitled to tuition assistance even after his valid termination for insubordination under the WGA contract. Thus, if appellant were fired for a valid reason under the WGA contract, Viacom would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the...
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