Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.

• Citation: 460 P.3d 976
• Decision Date: 09 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 76845,No. 76417,76417
• Parties: Jose VALDEZ-JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Mark B. Bailus, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest. Aaron Willard Frye, Petitioner, v. The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

460 P.3d 976

Jose VALDEZ-JIMENEZ, Petitioner,

v.The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Mark B. Bailus, District Judge, Respondents,andThe State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.

Aaron Willard Frye, Petitioner,

v.The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge, Respondents,andThe State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.

No. 76417

No. 76845

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED APRIL 09, 2020

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

We are asked to consider what process is constitutionally required when a district court sets bail in an amount that the defendant cannot afford, resulting in pretrial detention. Though the bail issue is moot because petitioners have been convicted and are no longer subject to pretrial detention, we nevertheless elect to reach the issue because it is a matter of public importance and is capable of repetition but evading review.

The right to reasonable bail is guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution for individuals who commit offenses other than capital offenses or first-degree murder. Bail serves the important function of allowing a defendant to be released pending trial while at the same time ensuring that he or she will appear at future proceedings and will not pose a danger to the community. When bail is set in an amount the defendant cannot afford, however, it deprives the defendant of his or her liberty and all its attendant benefits, despite the fact that he or she has not been convicted and is presumed innocent. To safeguard against pretrial detainees sitting in jail simply because they cannot afford to post bail, we conclude that the following due process protections are constitutionally required.

A defendant who remains in custody following arrest is constitutionally entitled to a prompt individualized determination on his or her pretrial custody status. The individualized determination must be preceded by an adversarial hearing at which the defendant is entitled to present evidence and argument concerning the relevant bail factors. The judge must consider the factors set forth in NRS 178.4853 and may impose bail only if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that it is necessary to ensure the defendant’s presence at future court proceedings or to protect the safety of the community, including the victim and the victim’s family. If the district court determines that bail, rather than nonmonetary conditions, is necessary, the judge must consider the defendant’s financial resources as well as the other factors set forth in NRS 178.498 in setting the amount of bail, and the judge must state his or her reasons for the bail amount on the record. Accordingly, we elect to entertain the writ petitions, but we deny the petitions because there is no relief we can provide to petitioners.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioners Aaron Frye and Jose Valdez-Jimenez were arrested and charged with felony offenses. Bail was set for each petitioner in the justice court. Rather than proceed by criminal complaint in the justice court, the State obtained an indictment from a grand jury. Upon the indictment returns, the district court set bail in the amount requested by the State. For Frye, bail was set in the amount of $250,000 based on the State’s representation that he was already in custody on that amount, and for Valdez-Jimenez, bail was set in the amount of $40,000, the amount on which he was in custody in another case. Neither petitioner was present at the indictment return. Each petitioner was later arraigned in district court and subsequently filed a motion to vacate or reduce the bail amount. In their motions, petitioners contended that the bail amounts were excessive and that the bail process violated their right to due process and equal protection. Relying on United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), they argued that setting bail in an amount they could not afford was tantamount to a detention order, and therefore, before the district court could set such bail, it was required to hold an adversarial hearing at which it considered their financial ability to pay and the State proved that bail was the least restrictive means of ameliorating any risk of flight or danger to the community.

The district court held hearings on the motions and denied them. In denying Frye’s motion, the district judge, who was not the judge who set bail on the indictment warrant, indicated that its role was limited to determining whether the bail amount was an abuse of discretion:

Bond was previously set by a competent judge. I don’t find there was any abuse of discretion. In order to assure the defendant is present in court and to protect the community, and the other things that are considered under the various statutes dealing with the amount of bond, I don’t find that an amount of $250,000 is unreasonable.

The district court added, "The only thing that’s before me today is whether or not the $250,000 bail that was set by a different judge was wrong; okay. I can’t find that it was wrong. Would I have imposed the same amount of bail? I don’t know."

The district judge who considered and denied Valdez-Jimenez’s motion found that Nevada’s statutory scheme, and not Salerno , controlled and required that good cause be shown before an accused could be released without bail. The judge stated that, in denying the motion, he had considered the statutory factors for release with bail and without bail, but the judge did not discuss those factors or otherwise explain the basis for the bail amount.

Both defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus¹ in this court challenging the bail process and decisions. We elect to consolidate these petitions for disposition. Cf. NRAP 3(b)(2).

DISCUSSION

We elect to entertain the petitions for a writ of mandamus

A writ of mandamus is appropriate "to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted). Because a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, it is within our complete discretion whether to consider it. Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008). Writ relief is generally available only in "cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." NRS 34.170.

Since filing their petitions, both Frye and Valdez-Jimenez have pleaded guilty and are no longer subject to pretrial detention. The State therefore contends that the petitions should be denied because the issues have been rendered moot. However, petitioners contend that the constitutional issues raised by their bail proceedings are important and will likely arise again but evade review. We agree with petitioners.

As a general rule, this court will decline to hear a moot case. See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). That general rule comports with our duty "to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue before it." NCAA v. Univ. of Nev. , 97 Nev. 56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981). Therefore, "a controversy must be present through all stages of the proceeding, and even though a case may present a live controversy at its beginning, subsequent events may render the case moot."

Personhood Nev., 126 Nev. at 602, 245 P.3d at 574 (citations omitted).

Even where a case is moot, however, this court "may consider it if it involves a matter of widespread importance that is capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. The party seeking to overcome mootness must prove "that (1) the duration of the challenged action is relatively short, (2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future, and (3) the matter is important." Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 129 Nev. 328, 334-35, 302 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2013).

The issues presented here are within the exception to the mootness doctrine. First, given the time restraints inherent in criminal cases, most bail orders are short in duration and the issues concerning bail and pretrial detention become moot once the case is resolved by dismissal, guilty plea, or trial.² See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ("Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted.").

As to the second requirement—"a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future"—we take this opportunity to clarify that this does not necessitate the similar issue to recur with respect to petitioners personally. As the dissent highlights, federal law requires "a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again" in order to satisfy the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540, 200 L.Ed.2d 792 (2018) (emphasis added). But Nevada courts are not bound by the federal standard for determining mootness. See State v. Glusman, 98 Nev. 412, 418, 651 P.2d 639, 643 (1982) (recognizing that it is within this court’s inherent discretion "to consider issues of substantial public importance which are likely to recur," despite any intervening events that have rendered the matters moot). And our jurisprudence has implicitly rejected "the same complaining party" requirement, instead focusing on whether the issues raised by the party are likely to recur under similar circumstances. See,...