Valdez, Matter of

• Decision Date: 05 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 10037,10037
• Citation: 88 N.M. 338,540 P.2d 818,1975 NMSC 50
• Parties: In the Matter of George VALDEZ and Albert Garcia, alleged mentally ill Individuals. STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George VALDEZ and Albert Garcia, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 818

540 P.2d 818

88 N.M. 338

In the Matter of George VALDEZ and Albert Garcia, alleged

mentally ill Individuals.

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George VALDEZ and Albert Garcia, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 10037.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 5, 1975.

Coors, Singer & Broullire, Robert H. Borkenhagen, Albuquerque, for appellants

David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Louis Druxman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee.

OPINION

MONTOYA, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Bernalillo County District Court which resulted in the involuntary civil commitment of defendants, Albert Garcia and George Valdez, pursuant to § 34--2--5, N.M.S.A., (Supp.1973).

In June 1959, a jury found George Valdez unable 'to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him or to comprehend his own condition in reference to such proceedings and to make a rational defense, and that the defendant is an insane person or lunatic; * * *.' He was ordered to the New Mexico State Penitentiary. On November 27, 1961, Mr. Valdez was ordered transferred to the New Mexico State Hospital.

On August 16, 1961, Albert Garcia was found to be mentally ill and was hospitalized for an indefinite period at the New Mexico State Hospital. Both defendants have remained in the State Hospital since the time of their original commitments, except for a few brief absences.

Motions were filed on behalf of both defendants on August 10, 1973, in the Bernalillo County District Court seeking their discharge from the State Hospital. On December 19, 1973, a consolidated commitment hearing was held in the district court for both defendants. Subsequently, the trial court found that the only issue before it was to determine whether the defendants should continue to be committed to the State Hospital; that the court was without venue to consider employment conditions within the hospital; that to the extent facilities, equipment and personnel are available, defendants received treatment in accordance with the legislative intent required by the statute for the hospitalization of the mentally ill; and that defendants are mentally ill and should continue to remain in the State Hospital.

Further, the trial court concluded that the State offered sufficient evidence that defendants were mentally ill and were in need of care, custody or treatment in a mental health facility and, because of their illness, they lacked sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to their custody, care or treatment. In addition, the court concluded that both defendants had the constitutional right to be treated in a manner best caldulated to return them to society as soon as possible, and that it was the duty of the State to provide them with treatment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical practice.

On appeal, defendants raise three major points: That the trial court erred in (1) not granting defendants a hearing to determine whether they would receive treatment consistent with their constitutional rights; (2) committing defendants without proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) refusing to consider the question of employment compensation for patients at the State Hospital.

This court disagrees with defendants' first contention on two grounds. First of all, defendants' pleadings contained no allegation as to the constitutional inadequacy of the treatment they received, but during trial counsel continually attempted to present evidence on this matter over the objections of the State. Such a situation is governed by Rule 15(b), Rules of Civil Procedure for the Distrct Courts of the State of New Mexico, ¹ which states in pertinent part:

'When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, * * *. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pledings to be amended * * *.'

As can be clearly seen from the record, the State did not give its assent, express or implied, to trial of this issue, neither party made a motion for amendment of the pleadings, nor did the court allow any such amendment sua sponte. Thus, this issue was not properly before the trial court. In the case of McLean v. Paddock, 78 N.M. 234, 240--41, 430 P.2d 392, 398--99 (1967), involving fraud and misrepresentation, this court made the following statement which is clearly applicable to the present controversy:

'This is not a situation where evidence on the issue was received without objection and the question thus treated as if it had been raised by the pleadings or by trial amendment thereto, (Citations omitted). The record before us is replete with objections to the admission of any evidence concerning fraud, misrepresentations or any parol variance of the written instruments. No trial amendment was offered either for the purpose of making such evidence and any issue presented thereby admissible or to make the pleadings conform to the proof. Indeed, Paddocks do not assert that a trial amendment was either offered or permitted. The author, 3 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 996, in discussing Rule 15(b), identical with our rule 15(b) (§ 21--1--1(15)(b), N.M.S.A. 1953) permitting trial amendments, said 'where evidence has been admitted over objection and the pleadings have not been amended, no amendment can be implied.' (Citation omitted.)' (Emphasis added.)

Secondly, as to this initial point, it is the position of this court that before the constitutional adequacy of treatment at the State Hospital is determined, the State Department of Hospitals and Institutions should be present as a party to the action. Such a result is dictated by Rule 19, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the State of New Mexico:

'(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. * * *' In the present case, the Department of Hospitals and Institutions should have been joined under Rule 19, Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, since it obviously has a great deal of interest in a proceeding which could very possibly result in an order greatly affecting its policies and operations. Any disposition of this matter in the department's absence could greatly impair or impede its ability to protect its interest. Because the department was not joined, the trial court was lacking in jurisdiction and was thus correct in not rendering a judgment concerning the constitutional adequacy of treatment provided by the State Hospital.

Next, we will briefly consider defendants' contention that the trial court erred when it refused to consider the question of employment compensation for patients working at the State Hospital. It appears that this question has become moot. Pursuant to the decision in Souder v. Brennan, 367 F.Supp. 808 (D.D.C1973), the Department of Hospitals and Institutions has been ordered by the Secretary of Labor to apply minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201--219 (1970), to patients employed at all New Mexico institutions providing residential care for the mentally ill. We were advised at oral argument that regulations have been made and implemented concerning patient compensation pursuant to that directive. Accordingly, there is no actual controversy and only a moot question exists; therefore, this court need not determine it. Reeder v. Bowman, 64 N.M. 7, 322 P.2d 339 (1958); State v. Vogel, 39 N.M. 122, 41 P.2d 1107 (1935).

Lastly, we shall consider the alelgation that the trial court erred in committing defendant George Valdez upon evidence which failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he was dangerous to himself or others. This is an important legal question which is a matter of first impression in New Mexico. The pertinent statutes do not prescribe the standard of proof. Traditionally, the question of standard of proof has been left for judicial resolution; therefore, this court has no hesitation in finally deciding the matter. See Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966).

Defendant contends that because civil commitment results in a substantial impairment of his rights, the due process requirements of the U.S.Const. amends. V and XIV, would be violated unless the State was required to prove mental illness beyond a reasonable doubt. From the outset it should be recognized that due process is a rather malleable principle which must be molded to the particular situation, considering both the rights of the parties and governmental interests involved. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

The civil commitment process, though technically a civil proceeding, has elements of both criminal and civil proceedings, a hybrid procedure, with some of the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants applicable to defendants in commitment hearings. See Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1973). Thus, compliance...