Valdez v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | B315309 |
| Citation | 85 Cal.App.5th 466,301 Cal.Rptr.3d 380 |
| Parties | Mark VALDEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Blair & Ramirez, Oscar Ramirez, Matthew P. Blair and Kirill Lavinski for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Yukevich Cavanaugh, James J. Yukevich, Nina J. Kim and David A. Turner, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Mark Valdez (Valdez) and another man engaged in a fistfight at a gas station owned by defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco). Defendant Daniel Terrones (Terrones), a Costco gas station attendant, stopped the fight by physically separating the two men. Valdez later sued for negligence and related causes of action, alleging he was injured when Terrones pulled him away from the other man. Costco and Terrones each moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motions.1 Valdez appealed. His primary contention is the court erroneously concluded the Good Samaritan law of Health and Safety Code 2 section 1799.102, subdivision (b) shielded Terrones from liability.3 We affirm the judgment.
Valdez and Joseph Lizarraga (Lizarraga), a neighbor, had an ongoing feud. On the afternoon of January 19, 2018, Valdez was in his car at a Costco gas station. Lizarraga approached on foot, opened the car door, and began punching Valdez. Terrones was on duty that day in his Costco uniform. Other drivers alerted him to the fight. Terrones yelled at the combatants to stop; they ignored him. Terrones radioed his Costco supervisors for help and ran over to Valdez and Lizarraga. Another gas station attendant phoned the police. By this time, Valdez was out of his car. He and Lizarraga were still struggling with each other. Terrones again demanded the men stop fighting and said the police were on their way. Valdez refused to comply.
Fearing Valdez and Lizarraga would hurt each other further, Terrones decided to intervene to stop the fight. He attempted to separate the two men. Valdez maintained his hold on Lizarraga and tried to punch him. Terrones managed to move Valdez away from Lizarraga, ending the fight. Lizarraga then fled in his car, and Valdez drove off after him.
Valdez's account of the incident differed. According to Valdez, by the time Terrones came over, Valdez had placed Lizarraga in a headlock, thereby preventing him from continuing the fight. Valdez was no longer doing anything to Lizarraga except restraining him. Valdez also stated he was still grappling with Lizarraga when Terrones intervened. Valdez told Terrones that he would not release Lizarraga until the police arrived. In response, Terrones attempted to pry the men apart by pulling on Valdez's shoulder. Terrones ignored Valdez's requests to let go. As Terrones increased his pressure on Valdez's shoulder, Valdez "felt and heard a pop" in his "chest/shoulder area" and his "arm gave out." Lizarraga was able to escape and drive away. Valdez drove after him. Valdez claimed Terrones's actions aggravated a preexisting shoulder injury.
Valdez sued defendants for negligence, premises liability, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and assault and battery.4 Valdez claimed Costco breached its duty of care to protect him from third party (Lizarraga's) assaults on its property and Costco's employee, Terrones, intentionally caused Valdez harm by "prying" him away from Lizarraga.
Costco and Terrones separately filed summary judgment motions. Valdez opposed the motions.
The trial court held separate hearings on the two motions. The court granted Terrones's motion, concluding he was immune from liability under section 1799.102, subdivision (b). The court also granted Costco's summary judgment motion on the ground Valdez failed to show there was a triable issue that the fistfight was foreseeable.
The trial court entered judgment for Terrones and Costco. Valdez timely appealed.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) ; Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656.) A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of action or there is a complete defense. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) ; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) ; Aguilar , at p. 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) We must liberally construe the opposing party's evidence and resolve any doubts about the evidence in favor of that party. ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court , supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 618, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656.) " ‘ "We review the trial court's decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained." ’ " ( Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, 362 P.3d 417.)
Whether summary judgment was proper here primarily turns on statutory interpretation. Valdez's main contention on appeal is Terrones was not a Good Samaritan within the meaning of section 1799.102, subdivision (b) and related statutes as a matter of law when he intervened in the fistfight. The interpretation and application of a statute to an established set of facts are considered questions of law to be reviewed de novo. ( Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 395 P.3d 274.)
Generally, the common law rule is there is no duty to rescue another from harm. ( Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137.) Nonetheless, even when there is no duty to rescue, if a person decides to render aid as a Good Samaritan, he or she will be under a duty to exercise reasonable care. ( Ibid. ) However, the California codes contain a number of immunity statutes for Good Samaritans rendering certain types of aid in emergency situations. Among those statutes is Health and Safety Code section 1799.102. It is found in division 2.5 of the Health and Safety Code, entitled, "Emergency Medical Services," and was enacted as part of the "Emergency Medical Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act." ( § 1797 et seq. )
Originally, section 1799.102 provided a single, generalized immunity for all persons volunteering aid at the scene of an emergency.5 In 2008, the California Supreme Court interpreted this immunity statute as applying solely to persons rendering medical aid at the scene of a medical emergency. (See Van Horn v. Watson (2008) 45 Cal.4th 322, 331, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 350, 197 P.3d 164.) The Legislature quickly responded with the 2009 amendment that superseded the Court's holding. (See Verdugo v. Target Corp. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 312, 327, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662, 327 P.3d 774.) As amended in 2009, subdivision (b)(2) of section 1799.102 reads:
The purpose embodied in the amendment is "to encourage other individuals to volunteer, without compensation, to assist others in need during an emergency, while ensuring that those volunteers who provide care or assistance act responsibly." ( § 1799.102, subd. (b)(1).)
The statutory scheme that contains section 1799.102, the "Emergency Medical Services" division, includes definitions of various terms. At issue here is section 1797.70, which defines the term "emergency" as "a condition or situation in which an individual has a need for immediate medical attention, or where the potential for such need is perceived by emergency medical personnel or a public safety agency."
( People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 885, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 16, 270 P.3d 711.) Where the language of the statute is potentially ambiguous, " ‘[i]t is appropriate to consider evidence of the intent of the enacting body in addition to the words of the measure, and to examine the history and background of the provision, in an attempt to ascertain the most reasonable interpretation.’ " ( Id. at p. 886, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 16, 270 P.3d 711.)
The parties do not dispute the language of section 1797.70 is clear. They disagree, however, on whether it is to be construed as the definition of "emergency" to be used in this case.
Defendants contend section 1797.70 ’s definition of "emergency" should not be used in this case. They reason a different definition should be applied pursuant to section 1797.50, which is also contained in the "Emergency...
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