Valdez v. Robertson
| Decision Date | 26 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-14-00563-CV,01-14-00563-CV |
| Parties | JERRY VALDEZ, Appellant v. BRUCE ROBERTSON, JR., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1 Bexar County, Texas1
Appellant, Jerry Valdez ("Valdez"), challenges the probate court's order dismissing his application to probate the will of his mother, Martha Jane Valdez.In three issues, Valdez contends that the probate court erred in dismissing his application and concluding that appellee, Bruce Robertson, Jr., had standing to contest the will.
We affirm.
Valdez's mother died on September 30, 2008 and was survived by twelve of her children. The record shows2 that Valdez filed an application to probate her 1997 will, in which she named him as the independent executor and one of her daughters, Mary Alice Valdez, as the alternate independent executrix. In the alternative, Valdez sought to admit his mother's 1988 will, in which she also named him as the executor. Valdez listed his mother's other children as heirs, provided their addresses, and requested that "citation issue as required by law to all persons interested in th[e] Estate."
In his application, Valdez noted that his mother "may have owned . . . [f]our parcels of real property" in Bexar County "with an estimated value of $800,000.00." And he explained that "[t]he four properties were deeded by [his mother] to [him] previously, but the Warranty Deeds were set aside by aSeptember 5, 2008 judgment." Valdez also represented that his mother had personal property "with an approximate value of $15,000." He noted, however, that "there was a dispute as to the actual owner of $9,200.00, which was awarded to [his mother] in the September 5, 2008 judgment" and affirmed on appeal.3
On February 3, 2012, Robertson, who had represented one of Valdez's sisters, Dorothy Mello, in a previous guardianship proceeding pertaining to Valdez's mother and was awarded $114,800.00 for "legal services" provided to "the Guardian and the estate,"4 filed an "Amended Opposition and Contest" toValdez's application to admit the 1997 will to probate. Robertson argued that the will was "not a lawful and valid will" because Valdez's mother, "on the date of the alleged execution of the purported will, was not of sound mind and lacked testamentary capacity." And the will was executed as a result of undue influence by Valdez.
Robertson further asserted that Valdez had "breached his fiduciary duties to [his mother] in connection with her execution of the will and [a] deed executed at the same time." And Valdez was "disqualified and unsuitable to be appointed Independent Executor" because the jury in the trespass-to-try-title litigation had found that Valdez and his wife had "purloined about $8,400 from [his mother's] bank accounts."5 Robertson requested that "citation be issued to all persons interested in this estate as may be required by law." And he asked the probate court to "deny probate of the purported" 1997 will and the appointment of Valdez as independent executor.
On February 7, 2012, the probate court ordered Valdez, as "Proponent of the purported Will of [his mother], dated [1997], [to] join all the [surviving] children of [his mother], the Decedent, that [were] not parties, as parties to the Will Contest pending under the above cause number."6
Valdez filed an "objection" to the probate court's order, arguing that there was not a valid will contest pending because Robertson did not have standing to contest the will. Valdez asserted that the guardianship court's judgment, in which Robertson was awarded his attorney's fees, was "set aside" on appeal.7 Valdez further asserted that he had already filed a "Second Amended Application to Probate the [1997 Will]" and had "served all of the surviving children of [his mother]."
Valdez also filed a "verified response," opposing the probate court's order that he join all of the heirs. He asserted that it was not necessary for a just adjudication to join all of the surviving children to the litigation. He further argued that because the 1997 will is a self-proving will, the probate court was required to admit it into probate.8
At a hearing on July 22, 2013, Robertson explained that, contrary to the assertion that Valdez had made in his objection, the appellate court had not set aside the guardianship court's award of attorney's fees to him. Rather, it had remanded the case to the guardianship court for the limited purpose of making fact findings regarding the nature of the legal services that he had provided before and after the death of Valdez's mother.9 And although the guardianship court on June 19, 2012 had exceeded its authority on remand by entering an order on the validity of Robertson's contract with Mello, it had subsequently vacated its order.10 At the close of the hearing, the probate court found that Robertson was "still" a "creditor of the estate" and had standing to contest the will.
On August 5, 2013, the probate court, after finding that Valdez had failed to comply with its previous order, again ordered that he "join as parties in this case all of the heirs of [his mother] within 30 days." And it warned that in the event Valdez failed to comply, it would dismiss his application.
Nine months later, on May 21, 2014, the probate court issued an order dismissing Valdez's application to admit the 1997 will to probate, specificallyfinding that "all of the heirs at law of [Valdez's mother] are necessary parties for the complete adjudication of this case" and Valdez had "failed and refused to comply" with its previous orders.
In his second issue, Valdez argues that Robertson lacked "standing to contest the application to admit the 1997 will into probate" because the guardianship court, in its June 19, 2012 order, concluded that Robertson "did not have a valid claim against the [g]uardianship [e]state."
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 55.001 (Vernon 2014). An "interested person" is an "heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in, or claim against an estate being administered," and "anyone interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person, including a minor." Id. § 22.018 (Vernon 2014). The only interest that confers standing to contest a will is a pecuniary one that will be affected by the probate or the defeat of the will. See In re Estate of Stone, 475 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. denied); see also Logan v. Thomason, 202 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex. 1947) ().
Limiting will contestants to interested persons prevents those with no interest in a decedent's estate from "intermeddling with its administration." In re Estate of Redus, 321 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.). "Thus, when called upon to do so, and in a separate hearing in advance of a trial of the issues affecting the validity of the will, a potential contestant must prove [his] interest in the estate." Id. The contestant has the burden to allege and, "if required, to prove that []he has some legally ascertainable pecuniary interest, real or prospective, absolute or contingent, that will be impaired or benefitted, or in some manner materially affected, by the probate or defeat of the will." In re Estate of Adams, No. 14-12-00064-CV, 2013 WL 84925, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
"Texas courts have long held that an attorney who has rendered services on behalf of a probate estate has, as one of his options to obtain payment, the right to file a claim as any other creditor of the estate." In re Guardianship of Fortenberry, 261 S.W.3d 904, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). And a court is authorized to order compensation from the available funds of the ward's estate for an attorney who represented an applicant in a guardianship proceeding. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1155.054 (Vernon 2014).
Here, the record shows that the "guardianship court," in its December 23, 2009 "Judgment Approving Guardian's Application for Payment of Attorney's Fees and Expenses," held that Robertson, "the attorney of record for [Mello] as Guardian," shall recover from the estate of Valdez's mother the sum of $114,800.00 for "legal services" provided "to the Guardian and the estate." The appellate court did reverse the portions of the guardianship court's judgment awarding Robertson his attorney's fees, and it remanded the case for a determination of facts regarding Robertson's meetings with family and the guardianship court's jurisdiction to award such fees. See Valdez v. Robertson, No. 14-10-00323-CV, 2011 WL 2566277, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2011, no pet.). And on remand, the guardianship court, on June 19, 2012, holding that Robertson had "failed to prove that he had a contract to represent the guardianship estate," denied his attorney's fees. However, the record shows that on September 5, 2012, the guardianship court, after a hearing, set aside its June 19, 2012 order. And at a hearing on July 22, 2013, the probate court found that Robertson was "still" a "creditor of the estate" and had standing to contest the will.
It is an appellant's burden to bring forth a record demonstrating that a complained-of ruling of a trial court was erroneous. Bayoud v. Bayoud, 797 S.W.2d 304, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) ().
Accordingly, we hold that Robertson does not lack...
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