Valdez v. Terry
Decision Date | 18 April 2012 |
Docket Number | No. CV 11–0897 JP/LAM.,CV 11–0897 JP/LAM. |
Citation | 874 F.Supp.2d 1262 |
Parties | Sebastian Melero VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. Ray TERRY, Warden, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Amber Lea Weeks, Olsi Vrapi, Noble & Vrapi, PA, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.
Ravi Sinha, United States Attorney's Office, Las Cruces, NM, for Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (Doc. 14) (hereinafter “PF & RD”), filed on February 2, 2012. The United States filed objections to the PF & RD on February 14, 2012 [ Doc. 15,] and Petitioner filed objections to the PF & RD on February 16, 2012 [ Doc. 16.] On March 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a response to the United States' objections. [ Doc. 17 ] No response to Petitioner's objections has been filed and the deadline for doing so has passed. The Court has reviewed the PF & RD, the parties' respective objections to the PF & RD, and Petitioner's response to the United States' objections, and finds that the objections are without merit. Accordingly, the Court will: (1) overrule the United States' and Petitioner's objections; (2) adopt the PF & RD; (3) grant Petitioner's Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus And Immediate Release From Custody(Doc. 1); and (4) enter a judgment dismissing this case with prejudice.
As explained in the PF & RD, § 1226(a) governs the detention of an alien pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States, and provides that the Attorney General may release the alien on bond or conditional parole if he or she does not pose a danger to the community and is not a flight risk. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). Section 1226(c)(1), however, mandates detention of specified criminal aliens pending a decision on their removal without an opportunity for a bond hearing before an immigration judge, including those who are deportable for having committed offenses under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).1Section 1226(c) states that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody [specific criminal aliens] ... when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” In the PF & RD, the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)because he was not detained immediately upon his release on probation. [ Doc. 14 at 10].
The United States' first objection to the PF & RD is that the Magistrate Judge erred by declining to follow the Board of Immigration Appeals' (hereinafter “BIA”) decision in Matter of Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 2001), which held that Immigration and Custom Enforcement (hereinafter “ICE”) does not have to detain a person immediately after release from criminal custody in order for mandatory detention under § 1226(c) to apply [ Doc. 15 at 3–13]. As the Magistrate Judge pointed out, neither this Court nor the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed whether the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) should apply to an alien who was not taken into custody immediately upon release. [ Doc. 14 at 6]. In its objections, the United States contends that the Magistrate Judge's recommendation is not in line “with an ever-growing number of district courts that correctly defer to the [BIA's construction of the statute],” and that “[c]ourts nationwide have dealt with this issue and have repeatedly, though not unerringly, found that Matter of Rojas is entitled to Chevron deference.” Id. at 1–2.
These statements are misleading in that they fail to acknowledge, as the Magistrate Judge pointed out, that the majority of federal district courts that have ruled on this issue have agreed that the language “when the alien is released” in § 1226(c) unambiguously means immediately after their release and have rejected the BIA's interpretation of § 1226(c) in Matter of Rojas. See [ Doc. 14 at 6–8] (citing Louisaire v. Muller, 758 F.Supp.2d 229, 236 (S.D.N.Y.2010) () (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Khodr v. Adduci, 697 F.Supp.2d 774, 774–75 (E.D.Mich.2010) ( ); Scarlett v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., ICE, 632 F.Supp.2d 214, 219 (W.D.N.Y.2009) ( ); Waffi v. Loiselle, 527 F.Supp.2d 480, 488 (E.D.Va.2007) ( ); Quezada–Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1231 (W.D.Wash.2004) () (footnote omitted); Parfait v. Holder, Civil No. 11–4877(DMC), 2011 WL 4829391 at *6 (D.N.J. Oct.11, 2011) (unpublished) ( ); Beckford v. Aviles, Civil Action No. 10–2035(JLL), 2011 WL 3515933 at *7–9 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2011) (unpublished) ( ); Keo v. Lucero, No. 1:11cv614, 2011 WL 2746182 *3–5 (E.D.Va. July 13, 2011) (unpublished) ( ); Sylvain v. Holder, Civil No. 11–3006(JAP), 2011 WL 2580506 at *7 (D.N.J. June 28, 2011) (unpublished) ( ); Dang v. Lowe, Civil No. 1:CV10–0446, 2010 WL 2044634 (unpublished) (same interpretation of § 1226(c)); Bromfield v. Clark, No. C06–757RSM, 2007 WL 527511 at *4–5 (W.D.Wash. Feb. 14, 2007) (unpublished); Boonkue v. Ridge, No. CV 04–566–PA, 2004 WL 1146525 at *2 (unpublished)).
The United States' assertion that “an ever-growing number of district courts that correctly” have deferred to the BIA's construction of § 1226(c) is misleading because: (1) the number of cases that have rejected the BIA's interpretation of § 1226(c) is also growing; (2) there are published decisions rejecting the BIA's interpretation of the statute, while the cases deferring to it are only unpublished; and (3) the cases on both sides are equally recent. Moreover, as both the Magistrate Judge and the court in Beckford have noted, the majority of district courts that have ruled on the issue have rejected the holding of Matter of Rojas.See [ Doc. 14 at 6] and Beckford, 2011 WL 3515933 at *8 () (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, regardless of how many district courts have followed or rejected the BIA's decision in Matter of Rojas, those decisions are not binding on this Court and the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the mandatory detention provision in § 1226(c) does not apply to Petitioner. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that § 1226(c) is not ambiguous and the word “when” in the context of release from custody means immediately upon release. As the Magistrate Judge explained, if the term “when the alien is released” means that the Attorney General shall take into custody any aliens who have committed offenses enumerated within § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D) without regard to the timing of that alien's release from custody, then the phrase “when the alien is released” becomes meaningless surplusage. See [ Doc. 14 at 9]. The Court finds that this interpretation of § 1226(c) comports with the Congressional intent behind the statute to prevent problems locating criminal aliens for deportation after their release, because, if those aliens are immediately detained, they pose no flight risk and the intent behind mandatory detention is attained. See [ Doc. 15 at 4–5] (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003)). This interpretation further comports with the Congressional intent to detain the most dangerous criminals because their immediate detention provides more protection to the community. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (...
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