Valence v. Rosegrant

Citation80 S.W.2d 708,230 Mo.App. 932
PartiesCHARLES F. VALENCE, RESPONDENT, v. VINCENT A. ROSEGRANT, APPELLANT
Decision Date02 April 1935
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.--Hon. Jerry Mulloy, Judge.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Walter Wehrle and T. J. Crowder for appellant.

(1) Instruction No. 3, when considered as a whole and taken together with all the other instructions, especially No. 4 is not prejudicially erroneous, but was a correct statement of the law. Pappas Pie & Baking Co. v. Stroh, 67 S.W.2d 793; Payne v. Reed, 59 S.W.2d 43; Shepard v. Schaff, 241 S.W. 431; Hicks v. Vieths, 46 S.W.2d 604; Denkman v. Prudential Fixture Co., 289 S.W. 591. (2) Appellate courts shall not reverse the judgment of the trial courts except for errors materially affecting the substantial rights of the complaining party, or the merits of the action. Section 1062, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929. Instructions, though not commendable in form or erroneous, are not reversible unless prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party complaining. Ehrlich v Mittelberg, 299 Mo. 284; Cunningham v. Chicago & A R. Co., 215 S.W. 5; Trust Co. v. Surety Co., 285 Mo. 621; Schmitt v. American Press, 42 S.W.2d 969. (3) Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was granted upon the sole ground that the court erred in giving and reading to the jury, at defendant's request and over the exceptions of plaintiff, instruction No. 3, on the burden of proof. This was purely a legal ground, and therefore the court had no discretion. Loftus v. Met. Street Ry. Co., 220 Mo. 470, l. c. 481; Mattocks v. Emerson Drug Co., 33 S.W.2d 142, l. c. 146.

Wm. R. Schneider for respondent.

The appellant's (defendant below) Instruction No. 4 does not have the saving virtue of Instruction No. 5 mentioned in the case of Pappas Pie & Baking Co. v. Stroh Bros. Delivery Co. (Mo. App.), 67 S.W.2d 793.

BECKER, J. Hostetter, P. J., and McCullen, J., concur.

OPINION

BECKER, J.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in consequence of an automobile collision at the intersection of Maple avenue and Leona street, University City, Missouri, between defendant's motor truck and an automobile in which plaintiff was riding as a guest.

Upon a hearing of the case to a jury a verdict resulted in favor of defendant. Thereafter a motion for new trial was filed by plaintiff, which motion was by the court sustained because of error in the giving of instruction numbered three requested by defendant. The court set aside the verdict and judgment, and defendant appeals.

For the purposes of this appeal, as to the pleadings, it is sufficient to state that plaintiff's petition was conventional, setting up various assignments of negligence. Defendant's answer was a general denial coupled with a plea of contributory negligence.

There was a conflict in the evidence as to the manner in which the accident occurred, between the version presented by plaintiff's witnesses and that of the witnesses for defendant.

The sole point raised here is that the trial court erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground that the court committed error in giving said instruction numbered three and in setting aside the verdict of the jury and judgment of the court and granting plaintiff a new trial.

Said instruction numbered three was a conventional instruction on the burden of proof, to which was added, however, the following sentence: ". . . If, therefore, you find the evidence touching the charge of negligence against the defendant to be evenly balanced, or the truth as to the charge of negligence against defendant remains in doubt in your minds after fairly considering the evidence, your verdict must be for defendant." This sentence in said instruction has been criticised for the reason that to instruct the jury that if they find the evidence to be evenly balanced or that the truth as to the charge of negligence against defendant remains in doubt after fairly considering the evidence, they should return a verdict for defendant, is equivalent "to saying that if on the whole evidence there remains a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or negligence, to give him the benefit of the doubt and find for defendant. This is the rule in criminal cases but not in civil cases." [Payne v. Reed (Mo.), 59 S.W.2d 43, loc. cit. 48. And to the same effect the cases of Shepard v. Schaff (Mo.), 241 S.W. 431; Hicks v. Vieths (Mo.), 46 S.W.2d 604, loc. cit. 607; Denkman v. Prudential Fixture Co. (Mo.), 289 S.W. 591, loc. cit. 595, and Pappas Pie & Baking Co. v. Stroh Bros. Delivery Co....

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