Valentine v. Collier

Decision Date27 June 2020
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-1115
PartiesLADDY CURTIS VALENTINE, et al, Plaintiffs, v. BRYAN COLLIER, et al, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class (Doc. No. 98). Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of inmates incarcerated at the Wallace Pack Unit ("Pack Unit" or "Pack"). After considering the Motion and all applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Motion must be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Laddy Valentine and Richard King are currently incarcerated at Pack Unit, a geriatric and medical prison within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"). Plaintiffs filed this case as a putative class action on March 30, 2020. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are violating their Eighth Amendment rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by refusing to implement measures that protect Pack Unit inmates from the COVID-19 pandemic. See id. ¶¶ 74-89. Because Pack Unit is a prison that houses primarily individuals who are elderly and/or have health problems, and thus, are particularly vulnerable to serious illness in the face of a COVID-19 outbreak, Plaintiffs argue that such deliberate indifference to the inmates' health amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. See id. ¶¶ 74-79. Plaintiffs also claim Defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to accommodate individuals with disabilities with measures that protect against the spread of COVID-19. Id. ¶ 81.

When this case was filed on March 30, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had already begun spreading rapidly throughout the United States. However, there were zero cases of COVID-19 in Pack Unit. The first positive test of a Pack Unit inmate was confirmed via autopsy on April 13, 2020, two days after that individual had died. As of June 13, 2020, 267 inmates have tested positive. As of June 26, 2020, eighteen people have died.

It is undisputed that TDCJ has adopted system-wide policies in reaction to the pandemic, and updated those policies over the course of the pandemic. However, Plaintiffs maintain that these measures have been, and remain, inadequate to protect a high-risk population like the inmates at Pack Unit. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are not properly implementing their own policies in Pack Unit, such that any protections the policies may confer in theory are not conferred in practice. Plaintiffs thus continue to seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the Plaintiffs and their proposed class, as set out in the Complaint and as updated in their June 1, 2020 letter to the Fifth Circuit (Doc. No. 137-5).

Much has been written about the subsequent preliminary proceedings in this case; the Court will not repeat them here. Given the urgency of the issues in this case, the Court set the trial date for July 13, 2020. (Doc. No. 88). Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Certify Class on May 13, 2020. (Doc. No. 94). Plaintiffs filed the motion as an emergency motion and requested an expedited briefing schedule, which Defendants strongly opposed, arguing that they needed the full response time to properly brief the question of certification. The Court allowed briefing to continue according to its usual briefing schedule. Briefing was completed on June 5, 2020. (Doc. No. 137).

Plaintiffs seek to certify a general class and one subclass:

General Class: All current and future inmates incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Wallace Pack Unit who are subjected to TDCJ and the Texas Correctional Managed Health Care Committee's policy and practice of failing to provide protection from exposure to COVID-19 during the class period.
. . .
High-Risk Subclass: All current and future inmates incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Wallace Pack Unit who are subjected to TDCJ's policy and practice of failing to provide protection from exposure to COVID-19 during the class period and who are, according to the CDC, most at risk for severe illness, injury, or death from COVID-19 due to their age or their health conditions, including the following individuals:
People aged 65 years or older;
People with chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma;
People who have serious heart conditions;
People who are immunocompromised including patients undergoing cancer treatment;
People with other underlying medical conditions, particularly if not well controlled, including, but not limited to, those with diabetes, renal failure, or liver disease; and
People of any age with severe obesity (body mass index [BMI] = 40).

(Doc. No. 98, at 25).1

As noted, the named Plaintiffs are Laddy Valentine and Richard King. Mr. Valentine is a 69-year-old man who suffers from hypertension and who has previously suffered from a stroke. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 58, 60). Mr. Valentine also had a lumbar fusion in his back, and thus, uses a walker for mobility. Id. ¶ 59. Mr. King is a 73-year-old man who has diabetes and diabetic neuropathy. Id. ¶¶ 52, 56. Mr. King was also recently diagnosed with kidney problems. Id. ¶ 55.

Plaintiffs argue that both the class and subclass should be certified because they have met the requirements for certification set out in Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). Defendants oppose certification,disputing whether Plaintiffs have fulfilled those requirements and arguing that the named Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars certification of any class. The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion on June 15, 2020.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) are:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [numerosity];
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class [commonality]
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [typicality]; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [adequacy of representation].

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Parties seeking to certify a class must fulfill all four requirements of Rule 23(a), as well as one of the criteria listed in Rule 23(b). Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 366 (5th Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the proposed class meets all requirements of Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). This burden is more than "a mere pleading standard"; rather, Plaintiffs "must affirmatively demonstrate [their] compliance with the Rule." Id. The trial court must conduct a "rigorous analysis" of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) before certifying a class. Id. at 350-51. Such an analysis will often "overlap" with analysis of the merits of a plaintiff's underlying claim. Id. at 351. However, "Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage." Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans& Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013). Merits questions may only be considered to the extent that they are relevant to determine certification requirements. Id.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under the PLRA

Defendants argue that the Court cannot certify any class in this case because named Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the PLRA. Because exhaustion is required before inmates are allowed to file suit in federal court, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs cannot serve as class representatives because they have no standing to sue.

The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust all available administrative remedies before they file suit in a federal court challenging prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement to exhaust is "mandatory"—no court may "excuse a failure to exhaust," regardless of any "special circumstances." Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016). Where the case is a class action, the Fifth Circuit has held that at least one named plaintiff must have properly exhausted administrative remedies in order for the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to be fulfilled for the class. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2004).

However, while exhaustion is mandatory, the question of whether Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies is "not jurisdictional." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101 (2006). Standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 247-48 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, the question of whether Plaintiffs have exhausted does not affect Plaintiffs' standing in this case. See Dunn v. Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1169 n.9 (M.D. Ala. 2016) ("[T]his failure to exhaust [as required by the PLRA] would have no effect on these plaintiffs' standing . . . ."). Because exhaustion is not a jurisdictional question, lack of exhaustion does not strip Plaintiffs of standing to bring this suit.

While the Court need not decide the question of exhaustion as a jurisdictional matter, the Court finds it prudent to address the question at this juncture in order to properly evaluate certification.2 Because at least one named Plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies on behalf of the class in order for the class to seek relief, it is reasonable to determine exhaustion at the point of certification.

Accordingly, the Court turns to the merits of exhaustion under the PLRA. It is undisputed that both named Plaintiffs failed to fully exhaust their remedies through TDCJ's grievance procedure prior to filing this suit. While prisoners are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before...

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