Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:10–cv–470.
• Citation: 886 F.Supp.2d 639
• Parties: William C. VALENTINE, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

886 F.Supp.2d 639

William C. VALENTINE, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Case No. 3:10–cv–470.

United States District Court,

S.D. Ohio,

Western Division.

March 19, 2012.

Marilyn Ruth Donoff, M.R. Donoff and Associates, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff.

John J. Stark, US Attorney Office, Columbus, OH, Deborah H. Lee, Social Security Administration, Office of General Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. # 10) IN THEIR ENTIRETY; DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO SAID JUDICIAL FILING (DOC. # 11) OVERRULED; JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER, REVERSING COMMISSIONER'S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. AND REMANDING THE CAPTIONED CAUSE TO THE DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER FOR THE PAYMENT OF SSI BENEFITS WITH AN ONSET DATE OF DECEMBER 17, 2005, CONSISTENT WITH THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; TERMINATION ENTRY

WALTER HERBERT RICE, District Judge.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits. On December 7, 2011, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 10), recommending that the Commissioner's decision of non-disability be reversed, as unsupported by substantial evidence, and that the captioned cause be remanded for an award of immediate supplemental Social Security income benefits, with an onset date of December 17, 2005. Based upon reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (Doc. # 10), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court's file, including the Administrative Transcript (filed with Defendant's Answer at Doc. # 4), and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in their entirety and, in so doing, orders the entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Commissioner, concluding that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. The Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. # 11) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Administrator that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is reversed.

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Magistrate's task is to determine if that decision is supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations, is required to make a de novo review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made. This de novo review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate, to determine whether the findings of the Secretary [now Commissioner] are supported by “substantial evidence.” Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir.1983); Gibson v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir.1982). This Court's sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), citing Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir.1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420;Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir.1984). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir.1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939). To be substantial, the evidence “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established ... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir.1986), quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, supra.

In determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.1978); Ellis, supra;Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir.1981); Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365 (6th Cir.1984); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.1984). However, the Court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questionsof credibility. Garner, supra. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security and proceedings on Claimant's application for social security disability benefits are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, Commissioner of Social Security, 246 F.3d 762 (6th Cir.2001). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the Court as a trier of fact would have arrived at a different conclusion. Elkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir.1981).

In addition to the foregoing, in ruling as aforesaid, this Court makes the following, non-exclusive, observations:

1. The Administrative Law Judge erred in not giving the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Skrobot, controlling weight, given that same is supported by objective medical evidence and is consistent with the record as a whole.

2. In the captioned cause, proof of disability is strong and opposing evidence lacking in substance, such that remand would merely involve the presentation of cumulative evidence, etc.

WHEREFORE, based upon the aforesaid, this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. # 10) in their entirety, having concluded that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. # 11) are overruled. Judgment will be ordered entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Commissioner herein, reversing the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, and remanding the captioned cause for an award of immediate Supplemental Security Income benefits, with an onset date of December 15, 2005, consistent with the Social Security Act.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ¹ THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON–DISABILITY FINDING BE FOUND UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND REVERSED; AND (2) THE CASE BE REMANDED FOR AN AWARD OF IMMEDIATE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME BENEFITS WITH AN ONSET DATE OF DECEMBER 17, 2005

MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is a Social Security appeal brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that Plaintiff William C. Valentine (“Plaintiff”) was “not disabled” and therefore unentitled to Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and/or Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). See Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”) 22.

The case is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (doc. 6), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition(doc. 8), the administrative record, and the record as a whole.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed SSI and DIB applications on October 28, 2003, asserting he has been under a “disability” since April 17, 2001. Tr. 373–75, 792–93.² Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to “severe arthritis, deterioration in low back [and] depression.” Tr. 395.

Following initial administrative denials of his application, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Daniel Shell (“ALJ Shell”) on October 26, 2006. Tr. 830–54. At the hearing, ALJ Shell heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. Id. On May 3, 2007, ALJ Shell issued a written decision, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 314–30.

The Appeals Council granted review. See tr. 331–35. In a written decision, the Appeals Council determined that ALJ Shell committed several errors. Id. Specifically, it found that ALJ Shell's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) findings were inconsistent with the record as a whole and did not comply with the relevant Social Security Regulations. Tr. 333. In addition, the Appeals Council determined that ALJ Shell's decision did not adequately address the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Skrobot, that Plaintiff could no longer work. Id. Further, the Appeals Council held that ALJ Shell did not adequately evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints and their impact on Plaintiff's RFC. Tr. 334. Finally, the Appeals Council concluded...