Valenzuela v. People
| Decision Date | 03 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94SC74,94SC74 |
| Citation | 893 P.2d 97 |
| Parties | Henrietta VALENZUELA, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Beth L. Krulewitch, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.
Gale Norton, Atty. Gen. Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert Mark Russel, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Deborah Isenberg Pratt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Enforcement Section, Denver, for respondent.
Henrietta Valenzuela, the defendant, appeals a holding by the court of appeals, People v. Valenzuela, 874 P.2d 420 (Colo.App.1993), requiring her to pay interest on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food stamp benefits she fraudulently obtained. 1
Valenzuela applied for AFDC and food stamp benefits from the Jefferson County Department of Social Services (Department). On her application, Valenzuela claimed that the only household income was AFDC benefits which she received from the Department. From December of 1989 through June of 1990, Valenzuela received AFDC and food stamp benefits in an amount based on the income she claimed in the application. In May 1990, the Department discovered that Valenzuela was gainfully employed during the time she received $5,779 in benefits, including $3,492 in AFDC funds and $2,287 in food stamp funds.
On January 21, 1992, Valenzuela pled guilty to one count of attempted theft of the funds, in violation of sections 18-2-101 2 and 18-4-401, 3 8B C.R.S. (1986). After considering the facts of the case, the sentencing court ordered Valenzuela to serve a four year probationary sentence. As a condition of probation, she was required to pay restitution to the Department in the amount of $6,785.74, pursuant to section 16-11-204.5, 8A C.R.S. (1986), the criminal restitution statute. 4 Of the total, $1006.74 was interest on the amount actually taken.
Valenzuela appealed, arguing that she was not required to pay interest. 5 The court of appeals found that interest may be assessed in a welfare fraud case so long as the Department actually suffered a loss. However, the court of appeals remanded the case because the sentencing court failed to consider Valenzuela's ability to pay, as required by section 16-11-204.5. 6 Valenzuela petitioned this court to review the award of interest, and we granted certiorari. We hold that interest may be charged as part of restitution with respect to both the AFDC and food stamp benefits, but that the trial court must reassess the amount of interest charged on the food stamp benefits. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court of appeals and return the case with directions to remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the proper amount of interest on the fraudulently obtained food stamps.
Valenzuela contends that the court-ordered restitution could not require her to pay interest on the amount she fraudulently obtained from the government. She argues that the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing actual injury with respect to the interest because the evidence did not establish whether the money would have remained in a general interest bearing account if the money had not been stolen. Under her view, the Department suffered no injury requiring payment of interest because the Department would have paid the benefits to a qualified applicant. We disagree.
The restitution statute requires that the defendant make restitution to the victim of her conduct and that such restitution shall be ordered by the court as a condition of probation. § 16-11-204.5. Awarding interest is compensation for actual, pecuniary damage suffered by the victim incidental to the defendant's crime of fraudulently obtaining funds because the victim loses the use of the money involved. People v. Acosta, 860 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Colo.App.1993). Interest is awarded as restitution to compensate the victim for such a loss of use; it is not intended to reimburse the victim for interest that otherwise would have been earned on the funds. Id.; Voight v. Colorado Mountain Club, 819 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Colo.App.1991).
Under our analysis, the prosecution is not required to show that the Department actually lost interest or was forced to pay interest because of Valenzuela's conduct. Rather, because Valenzuela wrongfully deprived the Department of the funds, the statutory law requires that she repay the amount, including interest, to compensate the Department for the loss of the use of the funds.
Similarly, the public assistance statute requires payment of interest as restitution in a civil action. Section 26-2-128(1), 11B C.R.S. (1989), requires:
[A]ny fraudulently obtained public assistance or fraudulently obtained overpayments shall be recoverable and payable in proportionate shares as provided in section 26-1-112(2)(b), and interest shall be charged and paid to the county department on any sum fraudulently obtained calculated at the legal rate and calculated from the date the recipient obtained such sum to the date such sum is recovered.
(Emphasis added.)
The legal rate of interest is defined in section 5-12-102(1)(b), 2 C.R.S. (1992), and requires that:
[i]nterest shall be at the rate of eight percent per annum compounded annually for all moneys or the value of all property after they are wrongfully withheld or after they become due to the date of payment or to the date judgment is entered, whichever first occurs.
While the Department chose not to pursue a civil action under this statute, the statute is instructive for purposes of determining restitutionary damages. To the extent that restitution is required, the statute establishes that the proper measure of restitution is the amount fraudulently obtained in addition to interest.
Thus, applying the legal rate of interest to any fraudulently obtained public assistance requires that eight percent per annum interest be applied from the date when the amount is fraudulently obtained to the date when the amount is recovered. The statute does not require, however, the prosecution to prove that the money would not have been given to another person. Rather, the statute specifically allows the Department to recover the amount fraudulently obtained plus the legal rate of interest.
Therefore, an...
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Ex parte Fletcher
...Most of those courts have answered the question in the affirmative.3 See Clark v. State, 953 P.2d 159 (Alaska App.1998); Valenzuela v. People, 893 P.2d 97 (Colo.1995); Ebaugh v. State, 623 So.2d 844 (Fla.App.1993); Patrick v. State, 184 Ga.App. 260, 361 S.E.2d 251 (1987); State v. Reynolds,......
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