Valerie D., In re
| Decision Date | 18 August 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 14420,14420 |
| Citation | 223 Conn. 492,613 A.2d 748 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 20 A.L.R.5th 981 In re VALERIE D. * |
Kathryn Emmett, with whom were Deborah Fins, Martha Stone, JoNel Newman, Sara R. Martin and, on the brief, Joan E. Bertin, for appellant (respondent mother).
Maureen D. Regula, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Susan T. Pearlman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (petitioner).
Jewel A. Gutman, for minor child.
Janet Bond Arterton, Sara L. Mandelbaum, Talitha Curtis, Nadine Taub and Harlon Dalton, filed a brief for the American Public Health Ass'n as amicus curiae.
Susan Price-Livingston filed a brief for the Connecticut Women's Educ. and Legal Fund et al. as amici curiae.
Tanina Rostain, Jonathan Levine and Deborah S. Freeman filed a brief for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as amici curiae.
Paul Chill, and Robert Scheinblum, certified legal intern, and Felice Sheramy, certified legal intern, filed a brief for the Junior League of Hartford et al. as amici curiae.
Before CALLAHAN, GLASS, BORDEN, BERDON and SANTANIELLO, JJ.
The dispositive issues in this appeal are whether: (1) General Statutes § 45a-717(f)(2) 1 permits the termination of the parental rights of the mother of an infant based upon the mother's prenatal conduct of injecting cocaine; and (2) General Statutes § 45a-717(f)(3); see footnote 1, supra; as applied to the facts of this case, permits the termination of the same parental rights upon the basis of an absence of an ongoing parent-child relationship between the mother and the infant. The respondent mother 2 appeals, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court that granted the petition of the commissioner of children and youth services (petitioner) for termination of the respondent's parental rights with respect to her daughter, Valerie D. (child). 3 The trial court judgment rested on two alternative bases: (1) certain prenatal conduct of the respondent, namely, intravenous injection of cocaine, caused "serious physical injury to [the] child" that constituted "acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights," within the meaning of § 45a-717(f)(2); and (2) there was "no ongoing parent child relationship" between the respondent and the child, and "to allow further time for the establishment ... of [such] parent child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child," within the meaning of § 45a-717(f)(3).
The respondent claims that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be reversed because: (1) § 45a-717(f)(2) does not permit termination of parental rights based upon the prenatal conduct of the mother; (2) if § 45a-717(f)(2) does permit such a termination of parental rights, it violates the respondent's right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws under the federal and state constitutions; (3) under the facts of this case, the termination of the respondent's parental rights upon the basis of an absence of an ongoing parent-child relationship was unconstitutional because the state was responsible for the absence of such a relationship; (4) the record does not support the finding of the trial court that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship; and (5) the trial court used an improper standard in waiving the one year requirement provided by § 45a-717(f) 4 and no such waiver was justified under the facts of this case. We agree with the respondent's first claim, namely, that § 45a-717(f)(2), properly construed, does not permit termination of parental rights based upon the mother's prenatal conduct. With respect to the respondent's third claim, we agree that § 45a-717(f)(3), as applied to the facts of this case, does not permit the state to terminate the respondent's parental rights upon the basis that she had no ongoing parent-child relationship with her child, but we reach that conclusion by virtue of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional analysis. 5 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The child was born to the respondent on July 26, 1989, in Bristol Hospital. On August 1, 1989, while the child was still in the hospital, the petitioner filed in the Superior Court: (1) a petition for an order of temporary care and custody of the child, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(b), 6 upon the basis of an affidavit of the child's pediatrician that the respondent's use of cocaine within hours prior to beginning labor put the child "in great risk of life-threatening medical complications" and that this conduct constituted "intentional and severe parental neglect"; (2) a petition for commitment of custody of the child to the petitioner, pursuant to § 46b-129(a); see footnote 6, supra; upon the bases that the child was neglected, uncared for and abused; and (3) a coterminous petition for termination of the respondent's parental rights with respect to the child, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(e), 7 upon the basis that, due to the respondent's use of cocaine throughout the pregnancy resulting in the child having been born "drug addicted" and "suffering from withdrawal," the child "had been denied by reason of act or acts of commission or omission, the care, guidance or control necessary for [her] physical, educational, moral or emotional well being," and that she had "sustained a nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious injury." On the same date, the trial court granted, ex parte, the petition for temporary custody. 8 On October 4, 1989, the petitioner amended the petition to add, as grounds for termination of parental rights, abandonment and a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship. 9
The trial court heard evidence on the coterminous petitions for custody and termination of parental rights on November 8, 1989, December 13, 1989, January 17, 1990, and February 21, 1990. On March 28, 1990, the court rendered an oral decision from the bench granting the coterminous petitions. 10 With respect to the petition for termination of parental rights, the court found proven by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) by the respondent's intravenous use of cocaine in the last stages of pregnancy, the child had been denied by reason of acts of parental commission or omission the care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being; and (2) as of the adjudication date of November 8, 1989, there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between the respondent and the child, and it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow further time for such a relationship to be established. 11 Having considered the statutory factors listed in § 45a-717(h); see footnote 1, supra; and all the circumstances leading up to the dispositional date of February 21, 1990, which was the last date of the evidentiary hearings, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child's best interest to be placed forthwith in permanent adoption. Accordingly, the court terminated the respondent's parental rights and appointed the petitioner as the child's statutory parent for the purpose of placing her in adoption. On July 24, 1990, the trial court issued a written articulation of its oral decision.
The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In re Valerie D., 25 Conn.App. 586, 595 A.2d 922 (1991). That court held that: (1) a judgment of "termination of parental rights can be supported solely by evidence of a mother's prenatal conduct"; id., at 593, 595 A.2d 922; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between the child and the respondent, and that it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow further time for the establishment of such a relationship. Id., at 594A-95, 595 A.2d 922. This appeal followed.
The respondent claims first that § 45a-717(f)(2), properly construed, does not permit the termination of parental rights based upon the prenatal conduct of the mother. We agree.
The record discloses the following facts pertinent to this claim. 12 The respondent, who was born August 4, 1969, began using drugs at age eleven. At age fifteen she met the child's father, John M., and at age sixteen she left school and home and began living with him. Thereafter, they both began injecting cocaine intravenously. In 1987, the respondent became pregnant with her first child, Amanda. When, during the fourth month of pregnancy, she disclosed her history of drug abuse to her physician, he warned her of its impact on her unborn child and gave her literature on the subject. She was able to discontinue the use of cocaine almost completely during that pregnancy, and Amanda was born, symptom free, on May 12, 1988. Three months later, however, she resumed using cocaine, by smoking and intravenous injection, two to five times per week.
In October, 1988, the respondent became pregnant with Valerie, but did not visit her physician until March, 1989, when he again warned her of the problems that her substance abuse could cause to her unborn child. By this time, however, the respondent had become addicted to cocaine and was unable to stop using it. Although the respondent informed her physician that she would continue prenatal care at the Bristol Hospital clinic because she had no medical insurance, her physician learned in July, when the respondent returned to him, that she had not gone to the clinic until June 5, 1989. The court further noted that, under normal circumstances, a pregnant woman should be seen monthly for the first twenty-eight weeks, and more frequently for a high risk pregnancy posed by a drug-abusing woman.
On June 19, 1989, John M.'s probation officer...
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