Del Valle v. Metropol Hato Rey, LLC
| Decision Date | 21 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 18-1464 (GAG) |
| Parties | JUAN A. SANTIAGO DEL VALLE AND HIS WIFE CÁNDIDA SANTOS DE SANTIAGO, AND THEIR LEGAL CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP Plaintiffs, v. METROPOL HATO REY, LLC; RESTAURANTE METROPOL 3, INC.; OCTAVIO RAVELO, ET ALS. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
On July 9, 2018, Juan A. Santiago Del Valle ("Plaintiff Santiago"), his wife, Candida Santos de Santiago, and their Legal Conjugal Partnership filed suit against Metropol Hato Rey, LLC and Restaurante Metropol 3, Inc. (Docket No. 17). Plaintiff Santiago claims that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of Defendants discrimination on the basis of age and thus seeks to hold Defendants liable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Plaintiffs also invoke the Court's supplemental jurisdiction to bring claims under Puerto Rico Law 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit, 29 §§ 146, et seq.,and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit., 31 §§ 5141 and 5142. (Docket No. 17).
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). (Docket No. 18). Essentially, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed as time-barred for Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Labor ("PR-ADU") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. Consequently, Defendants state that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. Id.
After careful review of the parties' submissions and pertinent law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants motion to dismiss at Docket No. 18.
At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff Santiago was an employee of restaurant Metropol Hato Rey, LLC ("Metropol HR"). (Docket No. 17, ¶9). He had previously been an employee of Restaurant Metropol 3, Inc. ("Metropol 3") from 1988 through December 21, 2013. Id., ¶7.
Plaintiff Santiago filed discrimination charges against Defendants with the PR-ADU and the EEOC for age discrimination and employment harassment. The complaint alleges acts of discrimination from 2010-2013 and seeks, in turn, damages from Defendants. (Docket No. 17). Claims included reduction of working hours from forty (40) to twenty (20) hours and of work station assignments with less seating space for customers than working stations assigned to younger employees with less seniority. Id., ¶11-12. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants discriminatory acts resulted in less income due to a decrease in the amount of tips. Id. Plaintiff Santiago also alleges verbal abuse directed at him in front of management, and that no action was taken to cease the alleged abusive conduct. (Docket No. 17, ¶25). In 2011, the first PR-ADU and EEOC complaints (PR-ADU No. 11-535c and EEOC No. 16H-2011-00055) were dismissed with prejudice as a result of a settlement agreement between the parties. (Docket No. 18 at 17). PR-ADU notified both parties through a letter dated September 6, 2011. Id.
On December 20, 2013, Plaintiff Santiago was informed, along with his fellow coworkers, that the Metropol 3 would close operations in two days. (Docket No. 17, ¶8). On December 26, 2013, the restaurant would reopen a new location in Hato Rey ("Metropol HR"). Id. As part of the reorganization of the restaurant, all employees would maintain their positions within the company. Id.
Plaintiff Santiago worked for Metropol HR from December 2013 until his retirement. (Docket No. 17). On October 27, 2015, Plaintiff Santiago filed a second complaint with PR-ADU and EEOC (PR-ADU No. 15-739c and EEOC 16H-2016-00055c) against Metropol HR. While Plaintiff Santiago's work hours were increased to twenty-five (25) hours per week, he alleges that in retaliation for the PR-ADU and EEOC proceedings, his working hours were never increased back to the former forty (40) hours weekly, additionally he was assigned dining tables with a capacity for two. (Docket No.1, ¶20).
On February 16, 2018, the EEOC issued Plaintiff Santiago a Right to Sue Letter for the second complaint filed with PR-ADU and the EEOC. (Docket No.18 at 18). The letter notified that the EEOC would close the second complaint. Id. On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff Santiago filed the third EEOC charge (EEOC No. 515-2017-000554) against Metropol HR. Plaintiff Santiago reported "age" under the alleged cause of discrimination and continuous discrimination from June 1, 2010 through May 17, 2017. Id. at 21. The EEOC issued a Right to Sue letter on April 9, 2018, for the third EEOC complaint. Id.
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts must construe their jurisdictional grants narrowly. Destek Grp. v. State of N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 318 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2003). Consequently, the party asserting jurisdiction carries the burden of showing the existence of federaljurisdiction. Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998). When deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court "may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as . . . depositions and exhibits." Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996); Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (D.P.R. 2007). Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) are subject to the same standard of review as Rule 12(b)(6). Negrón-Gaztambide v. Hernández-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1994); Torres, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by the Supreme Court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (). First, the Court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Id. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Second, the Court must then "take the complaint's well-[pleaded] (i.e., n o n-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible means something more than merely possible and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the Court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). This "simply calls for enough facts to raise areasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged —but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). If, however, the "factual content, so taken, 'allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,' the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
First, Defendants advance that there is no individual liability under the ADEA, and therefore, claims against Defendant Ravelo, in his individual capacity and his conjugal partnership, must be dismissed with prejudice. (Docket No. 18 at 12). Furthermore, Defendants note that the Amended Complaint (Docket No. 17) does not mention any defendant in their personal capacity among the parties to the complaint. Defendants also claim that most allegations pertaining to the first PR-ADU and EEOC charge should be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Docket No. 18 at 16).
In response, Plaintiffs argue that the venue is proper to seek readdress, for once the agreement was reached the PR-ADU and/or EEOC had no jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. (Docket No. 28, ¶11). Plaintiffs additionally maintain their personal actions are not time-barred under Puerto Rico law.
The ADEA forbids an employer from discharging an employee because of his age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). "There is no individual liability under ADEA [...] only the employer is liablefor the acts of its agents." Correa-Ruiz v. Calderón Sierra, 411 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47 (D.P.R. 2005). In Fantini v. Salem State Coll, the First Circuit held that "Title VII and the ADEA do not provide for individual liability; rather, only the employer may be named." 557 F.3d 22, 29-31 (1st Cir. 2009). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated that ADEA is to be construed in accordance with Title VII. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, n. 15 (1981).
Although, Defendant Ravelo was originally sued, in his personal capacity and his conjugal partnership, Defendants point out that Defendant Ravelo was not included in both capacities in the Amended Complaint. (Docket Nos. 17; 18 at 12). Thus, they should be dismissed from the case. Id. Plaintiffs do not contest said claim in their Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 28). This Court is justified in holding submitted uncontested facts to be admitted when the other party fails to file...
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