Valle v. State

• Decision Date: 26 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 54572,54572
• Citation: 394 So.2d 1004
• Parties: Manuel VALLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1004

394 So.2d 1004

Manuel VALLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 54572.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 26, 1981.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Elliot H. Scherker and Karen M. Gottlieb, Asst. Public Defender, Miami, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Janet Reno, State Atty., and Ira N. Loewy, Asst. State Atty., Miami, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Manuel Valle, was convicted of the first-degree murder of a police officer, attempted murder in the first degree, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant pleaded guilty to automobile theft. The trial judge imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's advisory recommendation. We have jurisdiction. ¹

For the reasons expressed, we must reverse for a new trial. We find that requiring this appellant to go to trial within twenty-four days after arraignment resulted in a denial of effective assistance of counsel where defense counsel, even though diligent, had no opportunity to make proper inquiry into appellant's mental condition or to depose twenty-four of the fifty-nine witnesses named by the state pursuant to the Florida criminal discovery rules. With this holding, we need not address the other issues raised on appeal.

The chronological history of this cause is unrefuted:

On April 2, 1978, appellant allegedly killed a police officer after the officer had stopped appellant for a traffic violation.

On April 4, authorities apprehended appellant.

On April 8, the trial court declared appellant indigent and appointed private counsel as special public defender.

On April 13, the grand jury returned an indictment.

On April 14, the trial court arraigned appellant, and set trial for May 8. Defense counsel protested the date as leaving insufficient trial preparation time.

On April 17, in accordance with Florida criminal discovery rules, the state furnished defense counsel a list of twenty-seven witnesses; statements of appellant, codefendants, and witnesses; documents relevant to searches; and reports of experts.

On April 18, the state furnished appellant with supplemental discovery, twenty-four additional witnesses, more witness statements, and a police report.

On April 24, appellant filed twenty-five motions, including a motion for psychiatric evaluation. The trial court set a hearing for the motions on the next day.

On April 25, defense counsel asked for additional time to present testimony and evidence on some of the motions. The request was denied. Thereafter, all of the motions were either denied or withdrawn. With reference to the psychiatric evaluation the trial court asked defense counsel his basis for making the request. Counsel advised the court that he based the motion on appellant's past history, his conversations with appellant, and appellant's involvement in an industrial accident which resulted in intracranial surgery to the inner ear. The trial judge denied the psychiatric examination. Also on this date, the state furnished to appellant the names of five additional state witnesses, additional witness statements, and a police report.

On May 1, defense counsel filed a motion for continuance which detailed in twenty-two paragraphs the reasons why he could not properly prepare for a May 8th trial and at the same time provide appellant proper assistance of counsel. The motion stated in part that counsel had first received discovery from the state on April 17 and had subsequently received additional discovery; the state had listed fifty-six witnesses; depositions had been set and would be taken as expeditiously as possible; that due to the large number of witnesses and vast array of material, it would be "physically, logistically, practically and realistically impossible to prepare for trial on May 8, 1978." The state also furnished appellant a supplemental discovery list containing three additional witnesses on this date.

On May 2, the state furnished appellant additional supplemental discovery, a tape recording of police broadcasts, the police report of the lead investigator, and experts' reports.

On May 3, the state furnished appellant a certified English translation of notes written by appellant in Spanish.

On May 4, hearing was held on the May 1 continuance motion.

At the hearing, counsel further informed the court that he had received additional discovery since the motion's filing and that he had been diligent in preparing the case for trial. Counsel continued by detailing what had been done since his appointment and stated:

(t)he arraignment, as the Court well knows, was on the 14th. We set a trial date. The Court, over objection of counsel, set a trial date on May 8th with thirty-one witnesses. It's a denial of equal protection; denial of due process of law and I cannot effectively represent this man unless I have sufficient time to prepare his defense, go over these depositions with my client; go over certain matters with my client. There is just so many hours in a day and I just cannot effectively at this particular time proceed to trial in a case of this magnitude with the possible penalty involved, based on the shortness of time.

I just can't do it.

Later in the proceeding, defense counsel stated: "(W)e are breaking a track record here. If we are forced to go to trial on Monday I will be totally unprepared." Counsel further advised the court that he could be ready for trial within sixty days from the date of arraignment. The trial court denied the motion for continuance, and appellant's counsel immediately moved to withdraw on the grounds that he could not adequately represent appellant. The trial court denied the motion.

The case proceeded to trial on the set date. The state presented thirty-two witnesses of whom appellant had deposed all but three. The three-day trial resulted in appellant's conviction for first-degree murder and other crimes.

Immediately after the murder conviction, defense counsel advised the court that he had not had sufficient time to investigate appellant's background or to locate witnesses to testify in mitigation and that the unlimited nature of mitigating circumstances which could be presented only intensified the need for time to prepare. Counsel moved for a continuance to allow for preparation time and also for the purpose of a presentence investigation. The motion was denied, and the cause proceeded immediately to the sentencing phase. The only witness presented in mitigation was appellant's wife who testified that appellant had incurred a head injury which caused him emotional disturbance. Thereafter, counsel renewed his motion for continuance for the purpose of a neurological examination. The trial court denied the request. Again, at the close of the advisory sentence proceedings and prior to the entry of sentence, defense counsel moved for a continuance for presentence investigation. The motion was again denied.

The jury returned an advisory sentence recommendation of death; the trial judge imposed the death sentence.

Appellant contends that the period between arraignment and trial left defense counsel with insufficient trial preparation time both for the trial and sentencing phases of this particular proceeding. It is asserted that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance denied appellant effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.

The state admits that appellant's trial which commenced twenty-four days after arraignment constituted a period of time considerably less than average for capital cases, but contends that the denial of the trial continuance was both reasonable under the circumstances and a proper exercise of discretion. The state argues that the conviction and sentence should stand because (1) appellant failed to identify any resulting prejudice; (2) the evidence of appellant's guilt was overwhelming; and (3) defense counsel would not have been better prepared even if allowed more time. We reject the state's contentions and, under the circumstances of this case, find that the trial judge abused her discretion.

It is a basic due process right and essential to a fair trial that defense counsel in a criminal case be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare his case. The United States Supreme Court has made this clear:

We have many times repeated that not only does due process require that a defendant, on trial in a state court upon a serious criminal charge and unable to defend himself, shall have the benefit of counsel, ... but that it is a denial of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial with such expedition as to deprive him of the effective aid and assistance of counsel.

White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 763-64, 65...