Vallentyne v. Immigration Land Company
| Decision Date | 16 June 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,301 - (148) |
| Citation | 103 N.W. 1028,95 Minn. 195 |
| Parties | J. W. VALLENTYNE v. IMMIGRATION LAND COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Morrison county to recover $2,000 for breach of contract to convey land. The case was tried before Searle, J., who directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $763.67. From an order granting a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Reversed and judgment ordered for plaintiff upon the verdict.
Breach of Contract.
Complaint construed, and held to state a cause of action for the breach of an executory contract for the sale of land.
Relief in Equity.
Equity will rarely relieve a party from the performance of his contract on the ground that it was entered into on his part through mistake, the mistake not being mutual, and especially where the alleged mistake was the result of negligence, or could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable diligence, on his part.
Election of Remedies.
The vendee in an executory contract for the sale of land, which the vendor is unable or refuses to perform, has the election of two remedies: (1) He may rescind the contract and recover the purchase money paid; or (2) maintain an action for his damages for the breach.
Measure of Damages.
The measure of damages for the breach of such a contract, where the breach is caused either from the inability or refusal of the vendor to perform, is the loss suffered by the vendee -- in this case, the difference between the value of the land as contracted to be sold, and its value after the removal of certain timber standing thereon when the contract was made and which was removed by a third party under a prior grant less the unpaid purchase price.
C. D. & R. D. O'Brien, for appellant.
Lindbergh & Blanchard, for respondent.
A former owner of the land involved in this action conveyed all the timber standing thereon to the Pine Tree Lumber Company, and subsequently sold and conveyed the land itself to the Immigration Land Company, defendant. Thereafter plaintiff entered into an executory contract with defendant for the purchase of the land, for the breach of which this action was brought. The contract is in the usual form of such agreements, and contains provisions to the effect that defendant sells and agrees to convey the land to plaintiff upon payment of the purchase price in the manner and at the times therein stated. The purchase price was $220, payable in annual installments, the first of which was paid at the time the contract was signed and executed. Plaintiff had previously examined the land, and knew that it contained a quantity of standing pine, which was one of the elements inducing him to make the purchase. The printed form of contract used by the parties contained a clause reserving in the grantor all mineral rights and standing pine. But acting on the belief that the timber had all been cut and removed by the Pine Tree Lumber Company previous to this transaction, defendant erased from the contract that portion reserving the timber rights, so that the contract, as entered into, conveyed and entitled plaintiff to all timber then on the land. The lumber company had not in fact yet removed the pine, but did so subsequent to the date of plaintiff's contract, though against his protest. Thereafter plaintiff brought this action for breach of the contract. The facts are practically undisputed, and the court directed a verdict for plaintiff for the difference between the value of the land with the timber and without it, less the balance due on the purchase price, but subsequently granted a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was not sustained by the evidence and plaintiff appealed. No errors at the trial are pointed out which would justify a new trial, and we have to consider only whether the facts stated justify a recovery by plaintiff to the extent of the directed verdict.
1. It is first contended by defendant in support of the order of the court below that the action is not one for a breach of the contract, but one to recover damages for cutting and removing the timber, and that plaintiff can recover only by showing that defendant removed the timber subsequent to the date of the contract, and that, as no attempt was made to show that fact, no recovery can be had. The complaint, fairly construed, states a cause of action for a breach of the contract, and defendant's position in this connection cannot be sustained. It appears from the complaint, as aided and supplemented by the answer, that at the time the contract was made the timber was standing upon the land, and by the contract was transferred to plaintiff as a part of the realty; that it was subsequently removed under a paramount title, and defendant is now unable to comply with or perform the contract on its part. A sufficient breach of the contract is therefore shown to entitle plaintiff to recover damages.
2. It is further contended by defendant that in entering into the contract, and particularly in erasing the clause therein reserving the timber rights in defendant, the latter labored under a mistake, believing at the time that the timber had been removed from the land; that the mistake is fundamental; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of the contract; and it claims the right to rescind the same by returning to plaintiff the amount of the purchase price paid by him. These facts were set out in defendant's answer, and relied upon at the trial in defense of the action. The authorities do not sustain defendant in this defense. The law is thoroughly settled that for the mistake of one party to a contract, not going to the subject-matter or essential to its terms, relief will not be awarded, either by way of reformation or rescission, so as to subject the other party to obligations or conditions to which he never assented; nor will relief be granted in an otherwise proper case where the mistake of the party seeking it could have been avoided by reasonable diligence. 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.) 832. Relief is always granted in cases of mutual mistake either of fact or of mixed law and fact, but for the mistake of one party relief is rarely granted. 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.) 822.
In the case at bar the mistake was solely that of defendant, and the result of its own neglect. There was no fraud or concealment on the part of plaintiff. He had previously examined the property, and knew of the standing timber, and made the purchase in view of that condition of the land; but he knew nothing of the relation between defendant and the Pine Tree Lumber Company until after the contract had been entered into. Defendant was aware of the fact that the timber had been conveyed to the lumber company, and was clearly chargeable with notice that it had not in fact been removed. At least, defendant was guilty of negligence in not ascertaining the fact. It had ample opportunity to do so. The lumber company and defendant occupied the same offices, and the agent of defendant, who drew this contract, was in some respects managing the affairs of both companies. He testified that he managed the lumber company's lumber business, and drew all contracts for defendant on the sale of lands. We have found no case in which, under such circumstances, a rescission of a contract has been granted for the mistake of one of the parties. On the other hand, the authorities are numerous where the relief has been denied. Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55; Montgomery v. City Council, 99 F. 825, 40 C.C.A 108; Pope v. Hoopes (C.C.) 84 F. 927; Massey v. Cotton, 70 Ga. 794; Bonney v. Stoughton, 122 Ill. 536, 13...
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