Valley Gin Co. v. McCarthy
| Decision Date | 22 October 1940 |
| Docket Number | Civil 4210 |
| Citation | 106 P.2d 504,56 Ariz. 181 |
| Parties | VALLEY GIN COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. NEIL S. McCARTHY and MARGUERITE McCARTHY, His Wife, Appellees |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. M. T. Phelps, Judge. Judgment affirmed.
Messrs Phillips, Holzworth & Phillips and Mr. David P. Jones, for Appellant.
Messrs Baker & Whitney and Mr. Lawrence L. Howe, for Appellees.
This is an appeal by Valley Gin Company, a corporation hereinafter called defendant, from a judgment in favor of Neil S. McCarthy and Marguerite McCarthy, his wife, hereinafter called plaintiffs. For the purposes of the appeal the facts shown by the record may be assumed to be as follows:
Plaintiffs were the owners of certain land set forth in the complaint, and on February 11, 1937, they leased it to one B.F. Wells, hereinafter called the lessee, for a period of one year from March 1, 1937. The lease provided it was based on an acreage of 225 acres, and it was contemplated by the parties, among other things, that there would be a mortgage of the crops grown. The lease, therefore, contained the following provisions:
The land in question was to be irrigated from pumps, and it was provided by the lease:
"... However, it is understood between the parties hereto and the lessors hereby covenant and agree that they will, within forty (40) days from the time of the signing of this lease, repair said pumps so that they will produce at least 2250 gallons per minute, and shall also, within said time, install a new motor starter on the well where the worn-out starter is now located."
Lessee went into possession of the premises and found it necessary to finance himself by mortgaging the crop, as provided in the lease. The matter was taken up with plaintiffs, and on February 16 the following letter was sent to the lessee:
Thereupon lessee applied to defendant for a loan to be secured by a mortgage on the crop, and defendant wrote plaintiffs, stating:
Plaintiffs thereupon executed and returned the following waiver:
The waiver was a printed form used by defendants, with the exception of the last sentence, which was written in by plaintiffs before they executed it.
Lessee thereupon planted a crop of cotton on the land, and on August 18 plaintiffs agreed to make a further waiver of their landlord's lien in the following language:
"I am willing that you shall be entitled to priority of the crop for $22.00 an acre instead of $20.00 an acre, upon condition however that the entire $22.00 shall have been spent in the farming of the crop and not otherwise and for no other purpose and particularly that the additional $2.00 an acre, to which I am now consenting, shall be used solely to defray the cost of eliminating the Johnson grass and that the Johnson grass shall be eliminated."
After the crop was made it was harvested and delivered to defendant for ginning and sale. The gross proceeds of the crop which passed into the hands of defendant amounted to $7,730.11, which was by it credited to the account of lessee. Defendant had advanced a total sum to lessee considerably in excess of the amount received from the proceeds of the crop, and applied all of such proceeds to the repayment of its advances. Among these advances was $1,350 for the first installment of rent. Some $1,350 of rent remained unpaid after the crop was harvested, and plaintiffs sued defendant for that amount, alleging that it had converted the proceeds of the crop in a sum in excess of the rent still due.
Defendant answered, claiming that by virtue of the waiver above set forth it was entitled to the proceeds of the crop, not only in the sum of $20 per acre, afterwards increased by the letter of August 18 to $22 per acre, and the rent advanced but also to cover the amount advanced for the harvesting costs and interest thereon, and that such harvesting costs and interest...
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