Valley v. Crookston Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1915
• Docket Number: No. 18994[221].,18994[221].
• Citation: 151 N.W. 137,128 Minn. 387
• Parties: VALLEY v. CROOKSTON LUMBER CO. et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

128 Minn. 387

151 N.W. 137

VALLEY

v.CROOKSTON LUMBER CO. et al.

No. 18994[221].

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 11, 1915.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; William Watts, Judge.

Action by Archie Valley against the Crookston Lumber Company and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed, with directions that judgment be given for defendant.

Syllabus by the Court

Opinions expressed by one contracting party to another upon doubtful questions of law, arising in the course of compromise of a disputed claim, are not actionable representations, even though the person giving the opinion be an attorney at law.

A party to a compromise cannot rescind it for fraud, where he knowingly and voluntarily uses and enjoys the fruits of the compromise ater being fully advised of the facts. This the plaintiff in this case did, and judgment should be given for defendant. Powell & Simpson, of Minneapolis, E. E. McDonald, of Bemidji, and E. O. Hagen, of Crookston (Ernest C. Carman, of Minneapolis, on the brief), for appellants.

W. E. Rowe, of Crookston, for respondent.

HALLAM, J.

Plaintiff was injured by being thrown from a portable water tank while in the employ of the defendant lumber company. The injury was a fracture of the left thigh. The broken bone did not properly heal or unite and the result was a shortening of the leg about four inches and for a long time an open wound upon the leg. Plaintiff was in a hospital at Bemidji under the care of his physician, Dr. Marcum, from the time of his injury, December 3, 1911, until August 26, 1912. After he left the hospital on this day he was asked to meet the attorney for defendants. He did so and made a settlement of his claim for $1,350, received the amount, and in writing released defendants from all liability. He had previously, on the same day, been given $50 by defendant company to go to St. Paul to buy an extension foot. Notwithstanding this settlement he brought this action for damages and recovered a verdict. Defendant appeals. The question of defendant's original liability was a doubtful question, but we believe that under the evidence it was for the jury to determine. The one question we need consider is whether plaintiff is bound by the settlement he made of his claim. He seeks to avoid the settlement on the ground of fraud. His claim is that the attorney for defendants, in order to procure his assent to the settlement, made the following representations:

‘He said he had talked to Dr. Marcum and he said the doctor had told him that in the course of two or three months I would be strong, pretty near as ever, only I couldn't do as heavy work’

--and that the attorney also said:

‘Furthermore I have investigated into your case with the Crookston Lumber Company, and I see you have no case against the Crookston Lumber Company.’

Defendant's attorney denies making any such statements; but as this denial raises only a question of fact, we are bound on this appeal to assume that the statements were made.

[1] 1. The trial court property disregarded the second alleged representation. This was plainly nothing more than an opinion expressed by one party to a negotiation upon a doubtful question of law. It is true the statement was alleged to have been made by an attorney at law, but he was the attorney for the other party to the negotiation, and there was no relation of dependence or confidence existing between them. There is nothing to indicate that the statement was made in bad faith. As a rule representations, to be actionable, must be of fact and not mere matter of opinion as to legal right. Opinions expressed by one contracting party to the other upon doubtful questions of law are not actionable, even though the person giving them be an attorney at law. Dundee Chemical Works v. Connor, 46 N. J. Eq. 576, 582, 20 Atl. 50. See, also, AEtna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 283. A party may compromise a disputed claim asserted against him without admitting his liability thereon, and he is not to be charged with fraud because in the negotiation leading up to the compromise he denies that liability in fact exists.

[2] 2. We come then to the alleged representation as to what plaintiff's doctor had said. It is a little hard to conceive that plaintiff could...