Valley Vista Development Corp., Inc. v. City of Broken Arrow, 69292
| Decision Date | 06 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 69292,69292 |
| Citation | 1988 OK 140,766 P.2d 344 |
| Parties | VALLEY VISTA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., Appellee, v. CITY OF BROKEN ARROW, Oklahoma A Municipal Corporation, Appellant. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County; Tony Graham, presiding.
This appeal involves a suit for money damages against the City of Broken Arrow for the breach of a written contract. A prior judgment concerning the same contract and cause of action was reversed by the Court of Appeals and declared void for lack of the necessary financial evidence under 62 O.S.1981 §§ 362 and 363. Giving preclusive effect to the void judgment in a subsequent action brought pursuant to the savings provision of 12 O.S.1981 § 100, the trial court held that sufficient evidence of indebtedness under 62 O.S.1981 §§ 361-363 had been presented to support a money judgment against the municipality. The appellant/City of Broken Arrow asserts: (1) That a trial court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law encompassed within a void judgment; (2) That 12 O.S.1981 § 100 does not operate to extend the time period within which an action may be brought where the original proceeding resulted in a void judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 363; (3) That insufficient evidence was presented to support a judgment under 62 O.S.1981 §§ 362 and 363; and (4) That the contract entered into between the City of Broken Arrow and the appellee/Valley Vista Development Corp. was either illegal or impossible of performance. We find that: (1) A trial court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law encompassed within a void judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 363; (2) The savings clause of 12 O.S.1981 § 100 does operate to extend the time period within which a new action may be filed where the original proceeding resulted in a void judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 363; (3) The record contains sufficient evidence of the municipality's indebtedness to support a money judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 362 and § 363; and (4) There having been no resolution of the factual or legal issues necessary to determine liability, any ruling on the issues of illegality of contract or impossibility of performance would be premature.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
City of Broken Arrow by Michael R. Vanderburg, City Atty., Broken Arrow, for appellant.
Doyle and Harris by Steven M. Harris and Julie E. Lamprich, Tulsa, for appellee.
The four questions presented are: (1) Whether after a void judgment has been rendered, the trial court may take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in such judgment in a subsequent proceeding; (2) Whether the savings clause of 12 O.S.1981 § 100 1 operates to extend the time period for filing a new action where the original action resulted in a void judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 363; 2 (3) Whether the record contains sufficient evidence of the financial status of the municipality under 62 O.S.1981 § 362 3 to support a money judgment; and (4) Whether the contract entered into between the City of Broken Arrow and Valley Vista was either illegal or impossible of performance.
We find that: (1) A trial court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact and conclusions of law encompassed within a void judgment; (2) The savings clause of 12 O.S.1981 § 100 operates to extend the time period within which a new action may be filed where the original proceeding resulted in a void judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 363; (3) The record contains sufficient evidence of both long and short-term indebtedness of the municipality to support a money judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 362; and (4) There having been no resolution of the factual or legal issues necessary to determine liability, any ruling on the issues of illegality of contract or impossibility of performance would be premature.
The appellant, City of Broken Arrow (City), and the appellee, Valley Vista Development Corporation, Inc. (Valley Vista), entered into a contract on April 17, 1972. Under the contract, the City agreed to allow connection of the Melinda Park Edition to the City's sewage system in return for Valley Vista's construction of excess capacity lines. These excess capacity lines, built at a cost of $96,043.00, were designed to transport more waste than the Melinda Park Edition would produce. In exchange for construction of the excess capacity lines, the City agreed that it would not approve sewage plans to service property contiguous to the Melinda Park Edition unless the plan provided for connection to Valley Vista's oversized lines. When these connections were made, Valley Vista was to be allowed to recover $48,021.50--the cost of building the oversized sewage disposal system from the connection charges. Under the terms of the agreement, once Valley Vista recovered the excess expense, ownership of the sewage system reverted to the City.
In January, 1982, Valley Vista sued the City for breach of contract for its failure to require connection of adjacent land development projects into its oversized lines. Judgment was rendered for Valley Vista on September 9, 1983. The City appealed the judgment on the basis that no proof of indebtedness or of the City's ability to pay the judgment had been offered at trial. On November 5, 1985, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court for lack of authority to render a judgment under 62 O.S.1981 § 362 based on the absence of proof of the City's indebtedness declaring the judgment of September 9, 1983, void pursuant to 62 O.S.1981 § 363.
Valley Vista filed the present action on September 5, 1986, alleging essentially the same cause of action as that encompassed by the 1982 petition. Valley Vista moved for summary judgment on March 19, 1987. The City failed to respond to Valley Vista's motion and a journal entry of judgment was entered in favor of Valley Vista on April 15, 1987. This entry was corrected on April 16, 1987, to reflect awards of both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. On April 24, 1987, the City filed a motion with the trial court to vacate the judgment. The motion was granted in an order dated June 25, 1987, in which the trial court, after considering pleadings and other proper supporting documents, again sustained Valley Vista's motion for summary judgment.
In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court gave preclusive effect to all issues raised and litigated in the original action. The court labeled this "issue preclusion" 4 which left only the jurisdictional issue for determination. The trial court found that Valley Vista had proven the indebtedness of the City pursuant to 62 O.S.1981 § 362, thus conferring authority on the court to render judgment. 5 Valley Vista's motion for summary judgment was sustained, and the City appealed.
A TRIAL COURT MAY NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM A VOID JUDGMENT.
Even with a finding that Valley Vista presented sufficient evidence to carry its burden of proof under 62 O.S.1981 §§ 362 and 363 concerning the availability of funds to satisfy a judgment, the dispositive question remains whether the trial court's reliance on the previous void judgment for a determination of liability was justified.
In granting Valley Vista's motion for summary judgment, the trial court treated all issues as resolved by its order issued on September 9, 1983, except for the issue of indebtedness pursuant to 62 O.S.1981 §§ 362 and 363. By adopting its prior judgment, the trial court gave all issues resolved in the 1983 judgment preclusive effect. The trial court did so despite the Court of Appeals' order dated November 5, 1985, stating that Valley Vista's failure to plead or prove the required elements of § 362 rendered the judgment void pursuant to § 363.
Clear legislative expression leaves no room for judicial construction. 6 Section 363 unequivocably states that judgments rendered in absence of the statutorily required proof of 62 O.S.1981 § 362 are void and of no effect. The statutory directive is clear--a judgment rendered absent the required financial evidence under § 362 is a nullity.
Even without the express language of § 362, our holding would be the same. The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. 7 Where judgments are void, as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any subsequent proceedings based upon the void judgment are themselves void. 8 In essence, no judgment existed from which the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, although sufficient evidence of the fiscal health of the City was presented to support a judgment under 62 O.S.1981 §§ 361-363, there was no determination of liability which would support a finding for Valley Vista on breach of contract or any other theory.
Even when the basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment should be denied, if under the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In appraising the sufficiency of a petition, the accepted rule is that a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle it to relief. 9 Because the trial court erroneously adopted all findings of fact and conclusions of law from a void judgment, there has been no resolution of either the factual or legal issues. Therefore, the award of summary judgment was inappropriate.
THE SAVINGS PROVISION OF 12 O.S.1981 § 100
OPERATES TO EXTEND THE TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH A
NEW ACTION MAY BE FILED...
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