Valluzzo v. Valluzzo
| Decision Date | 23 February 1926 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | VALLUZZO v. VALLUZZO. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; John R. Booth and George E. Hinman, Judges.
Action for divorce by Chiara Iannuzzi Valluzzo against Michele Valluzzo for desertion and intolerable cruelty, to which defendant filed cross-complaint for desertion. Judgment (per Booth, J.) for defendant and for divorce on his cross-complaint. Plaintiff moved before Hinman, J., for allowance to defend, and it was denied. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and from the denial of the motion. No error on the appeal from the judgment, error on the appeal from the denial of the motion, and cause remanded, with direction.
See also, 130 A. 126, 103 Conn. 265.
The finding discloses these facts: The parties were married at Danbury on April 8, 1920. After boarding a few months, they, on October 1, 1920, took up their residence in an apartment in Danbury provided by the defendant. By the acquiescence of the defendant the plaintiff kept at their home a baby child of her brother, at the brother's expense, to which child the plaintiff was greatly attached. The presence and crying of the baby greatly annoyed the defendant, and prevented his sleep. His landlord notified the defendant that the baby annoyed him and prevented his sleep and, unless the crying stopped, they would have to move. The defendant told the plaintiff on several occasions between October 1 and October 25, 1920, that she must send the baby away, but she refused to do this. On October 25, 1920, the plaintiff left the home of the defendant with the child, and has since refused to return. The defendant maintained his home in the apartment for two years longer, and was always willing to receive his wife there and support her if she would not bring the child, but she refused to return, unless she could bring and have the child with her. The defendant on two occasions inflicted slight physical injury on the plaintiff while they were boarding.
From the foregoing facts the court concluded: (1) The defendant did not desert the plaintiff. (2) The defendant did not commit any acts of intolerable cruelty to the plaintiff. (3) The plaintiff, on the 25th of October, 1920, willfully deserted the defendant without just cause, and has continued her desertion, with total neglect of all the duties of the marriage covenant on her part to be performed, to the date of the complaint in the action, being for more than three years.
Chester H. Brush, of Danbury, for appellant.
J Moss Ives, of Danbury, for appellee.
CURTIS, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The ultimate facts amply support the judgment, and, unless they are conclusions that could not legally or logically have been drawn from the facts found, the judgment must stand. We are satisfied that these conclusions were, both legally, logically, supported by the facts found. The plaintiff in brief and argument claims that on the facts found she was entitled to a divorce for intolerable cruelty, and that such a conclusion was logically necessary because the defendant would not permit her to keep the baby to which she was so deeply attached, and, further, that such refusal justified her in living apart from her husband. These claims are so obviously without merit that they do not justify discussion.
There remains for consideration the appeal of the wife, the plaintiff, from the denial by the court (Hinman, J.) of her motion, after judgment, for an allowance to defend. Such a motion necessarily relates to her defending by an appeal. In the special finding relating to this matter the court finds that the wife is without independent means, although able to provide for herself by her own exertions, and that the defendant has ample means to aid her in prosecuting her appeal.
The expense necessary for the wife to carry on her own action for divorce or separation or to defend the action against her for a divorce or annulment of the marriage is usually allowed the wife. This is a recognized part of our procedure. Whether an allowance to defend...
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