Van Dyke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 25 October 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 7427,7427 |
Citation | 92 Ariz. 173,375 P.2d 373 |
Parties | William VAN DYKE, Petitioner, v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Insurance Carrier; the Stearn-Roger Manufacturing Company, Defendant Employer; the Industrial Commission of Arizona, Respondents. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Jack T. Arnold, Tucson, Hirsch, Van Slyke, Richter & Ollason, Tucson, for petitioner.
Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Richmond, Tucson, for respondent Standard Acc. Ins. Co.
Donald J. Morgan, Phoenix, for respondent Industrial Commission.
This is a review, by writ of certiorari, of actions of the Industrial Commission of Arizona. The petitioner, William Van Dyke, contends that the Commission erred in finding that the petitioner is physically able to perform the duties of a re-bar (reinforcing steel) worker on a full time basis, and that the Commission erred in refusing to consider certain evidence offered to show the nature of re-bar work.
Petitioner was involved in an industrial accident in 1958 while working as a structural steel worker. His claim for temporary disability compensation was processed, an award was made and the claim duly closed. On February 10, 1960, the petitioner filed application to reopen the claim, and in March 1960, the Commission made findings that the petitioner had sustained new, additional or previously undiscovered disability by reason of the 1958 injury. A series of hearings as to the nature and extent of petitioner's disability was held before the Commission between August 10, 1960 and May 10, 1961. On May 24, 1961, the Commission made Findings and Award for Unscheduled Permanent Partial Disability under A.R.S. § 23-1044(C) and (D). This award found that the petitioner had sustained a five percent general functional disability which prevented him from performing the duties of his occupation as a structural steel worker, but did not prevent him from performing the duties of a re-bar worker.
Petitioner made application for rehearing and on July 13, 1961, presented testimony by seven witnesses to the effect that re-bar work was physically harder, and placed more strain on the back than did structural steel work. This evidence was received subject to the respondents' objections, and on September 6, 1961, the Commission entered its order rejecting the evidence for the reason that the same evidence could have been produced by the exercise of reasonable diligence at the earlier hearings. The Findings and Award of May 24 were reaffirmed.
Petitioner's assignments of error present two questions: (1) Is the Commission's finding that petitioner's disability does not prevent him from performing the functions of a re-bar worker supported by the evidence? (2) Did the Commission err in refusing to consider the evidence given at the hearing of July 13, 1961?
The decisions of this Court which state that we will not weigh conflicting competent evidence presented before the Industrial Commission, but will look only to see if the Commission's findings are supported by any reasonable evidence are legion, e. g. McGee v. San Manuel Copper Corp., 89 Ariz. 244, 360 P.2d 1024 (1961); Valerio v. Industrial Commission, 85 Ariz. 189, 334 P.2d 768 (1959); McGill v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 36, 307 P.2d 1042 (1957). We have been equally clear that where there is no evidence in the record upon which the Commission could have based its finding, the award will be set aside, Hunter v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 84, 237 P.2d 813 (1951); Foley v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 82, 237 P.2d 812 (1951); Hobson v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 71 Ariz. 41, 223 P.2d 399 (1950).
In our view, these simple rules are dispositive of the case at bar, and we find it unnecessary to reach the second question raised by the petitioner. A review of the record shows that there is no evidence whatever upon which the Commission could base its finding that petitioner is able to do re-bar work. In reaching this conclusion it is not necessary to consider the evidence given at the July 13th hearing as this evidence was all in favor of petitioner's position that re-bar work is more strenuous than structural steel work.
The evidence concerning petitoner's physical disability was given by two expert witnesses called by respondents at hearings on August 10 and September 8, 1960. One of these witnesses testified:
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The second medical expert testified:
Following the hearings at which the foregoing evidence was given it was suggested that the petitioner might be physically able to perform the duties of another branch of the ironworkers trade, re-bar work, with which he admitted he was familiar. Both sides produced testimony as to the nature of this work.
The principal witness for the respondents testified:
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...183 Ariz. 129, 131 (App. 1994). When no evidence of record supports the decision, the award will be set aside. Van Dyke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 92 Ariz. 173, 174 (1962); Special Fund Div./No Ins. Section v. Indus. Comm'n, 172 Ariz. 319, 324 (App. 1992).¶9 Here, the evidence is insufficie......
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