Van Emmerik v. Mons
| Decision Date | 03 June 1958 |
| Docket Number | 49453,Nos. 49452,s. 49452 |
| Citation | 249 Iowa 1299,90 N.W.2d 433 |
| Parties | C. A. VAN EMMERIK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florence W. MONS, Marcia Vuille-Mons and Robert Vuille, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Herrick & Langdon, Des Moines, for appellants.
Bray, Carson & McCoy, Oskaloosa, for appellee.
One of the important by-products of our jury system of determination of law cases is that the courts are thereby relieved of the necessity of finding the facts. But this refuge is not available to them in equity actions. Facts must be found; often, as in the case at bar, under the most substantial difficulties. As an appellate court we have the advantage of the rule that we give weight to the findings of the trial court on controverted matters, particularly when the credibility of the parties is concerned. Yet the matter is triable here de novo, and we must in the end make our own determination. It is a course fraught with danger. We cannot be sure, under a record such as we have here, that we are reaching the correct result. We reach the conclusion which seems most likely to be right; but with the reflection that it is possible we may be denying justice to some litigant. Struggling through a maze of pleadings and contradictory testimony consuming more than 600 pages, no human agency can be sure it has reached the truth.
Particularly is this so in the instant case. The parties contradicted each other throughout. They changed their positions from time to time, as expediency seemed to demand. On occasion, denials were made of self-evident facts. This seems especially true of the plaintiff. He admitted, then denied; often he evaded. His case would have been, if not better, at least more commendable if he had not attempted to deny his signature on important instruments. He changed his position in the middle of the trial; we may assume because it clearly appeared from the evidence then taken that he could not support his first stand. The principal defendant, Florence W. Mons, is also not free from the appearance of inconsistencies and contradictions in her case. It will be impossible in an opinion of reasonable length to comment upon all the evidence which the record shows and which able counsel have urged upon us as supporting one side or the other; nor would such an effort, if made, be of any benefit to the legal profession. We shall present a stripped-down version of the case referring only to what we deem the most important and controlling points.
The plaintiff was in 1949 the owner of two farms: one of 205 acres in Mahaska County, and one of 260 acres in Jasper County. He lived in New Sharon, in Mahaska County, and was 62 years of age. He was a bachelor, with a limited grade school education; but he had by industry and thrift, starting as a farm laborer, accumulated the farm lands referred to. He had some substantial bank indebtedness. Florence W. Mons, who will be hereafter referred to as the defendant unless otherwise specified, lived in New York. She is a university graduate. At all times material here she has been married but living apart and estranged from her husband. There was a distant relationship by marriage between her and the plaintiff, and they had met at times when he was visiting relatives in New York. The defendant was about 50 in 1949. She had been engaged in business, but had recently sold it. She still owned the building in which it was conducted, but soon after sold it also. From these sources, and perhaps from invested savings also, she had considerable sums available.
In 1949 an arrangement was made under which she came to Iowa to keep house for the plaintiff. Here began the tangled skein of affairs which the courts are asked to unravel. The result was this lawsuit, which started as an action by plaintiff to cancel two joint tenancy deeds, one to each of the farms, made by him to himself and the defendant Marcia Vuille-Mons, the daughter of Florence W. Mons; and likewise to cancel two mortgages, one upon each of the farms, running to Florence W. Mons and Marcia Vuille-Mons in joint tenancy. Separate actions were filed in Mahaska and Jasper counties, the allegations of the petitions being the same except for the description of the lands involved. By stipulation the cases were consolidated for trial. The petitions averred that both the deeds and mortgages were obtained fraudulently and through the exercise of the dominant influence of the defendant in a confidential relationship, and that nothing of value was paid for them. The defendants answered, averring the validity of the mortgages and of the deeds, denying fraud and lack of consideration; and by counterclaims asking that the instruments be established as valid. The counterclaims further alleged that when the defendant came to Iowa it was orally agreed that if she would act as housekeeper and assist plaintiff in the management and operation of his properties he would furnish her a home for the remainder of her life, which agreement had been breached to defendant's damage in the sum of $10,000; and that plaintiff further agreed, for the same consideration, to arrange his affairs so that upon his death Marcia Vuille-Mons would receive all of his property, for which purpose he made a will leaving his entire estate to her; and it was prayed that this will be declared to be irrevocable. Replies denying the material averments of the counterclaims were duly filed.
I. After the defendant came to Iowa in the year 1949, she and the plaintiff lived in a rented house in New Sharon until the following March, when they moved to plaintiff's Mahaska County farm. From that time until about the end of 1955 they continued to reside there, farming the Mahaska County land and managing the Jasper County property. Under what arrangement defendant came, what agreements were made after she came, the court can only surmise from the vast array of contradictory and confusing evidence with which the record is filled. There were no writings of consequence except for the deeds and mortgages and ten promissory notes; and under what circumstances these were made there is vast disagreement. It seems likely that for some years all went well and no one thought it worth while to reduce whatever vague understandings existed to writing. 'Writing maketh an exact man'; but there were no writings here and this lawsuit is the result.
It is fairly well established that the defendant was industrious and that the farms, which in 1949 were 'run down' and showed the effects of poor husbandry, were much improved through her efforts, including a good deal of manual labor. Some of plaintiff's witnesses admitted that the land was more valuable after defendant had been there several years. But plaintiff contends that she did too much managing; in short, that by various artifices she secured his confidence and so procured the execution of the mortgages by fraud. He first made the same contention as to the joint tenancy deeds. But, the trial having commenced on January 2, 1957, on January 9th next the plaintiff amended his substituted petition and the prayer thereof by alleging that all money paid to him by the defendant and all work done by her for him was the consideration for the execution of the deeds; and the amended prayer asked only the cancellation of the mortgages. This, therefore, and defendant's counterclaims for establishment of the will as irrevocable and for damages for failure to furnish her a home for life, are the questions we must determine. The court found all issues for the plaintiff.
II. We will take little space in discussing the question of confidential relationship of the plaintiff and defendant, or whether, if such a condition existed, the defendant was the dominating element. The parties have given much attention to it, and it apparently was given considerable weight by the trial court. We have said that the burden is upon one who relies upon such a relationship to prove it by clear evidence. Barber v. Powell, Iowa, 82 N.W.2d 665, 669; Groves v. Groves, Iowa, 82 N.W.2d 124, 130; Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 247 Iowa 127, 139, 73 N.W.2d 50, 57. The rule should not be used merely to relieve the indiscreet man from his indiscretions, or the wastrel from his extravagances, or the fool from the consequences of his folly. In the case at bar, the plaintiff was an adult, not senile, without much formal education, it is true; but he had been able enough to accumulate a considerable fortune in farm lands, in doing which he must have had considerable business experience. He had traveled somewhat; he was considered a good risk for bank loans. We are not convinced that he has made a showing sufficient to demonstrate that he was dominated by the defendant. Since the major issue here is the validity of the mortgages and we think the record shows that he got value for them, at least to the extent hereafter set forth, the question of the burden of proof to prove fraud on the part of the defendant in procuring them is not important. We content ourselves with the statement that we do not find the evidence so clear that the rule of Curtis v. Armagast, 158 Iowa 507, 138 N.W. 873, and many other cases, applies.
III. Nor do we consider the defendant's claim that the actions to cancel the mortgages are barred by laches and the statute of limitations. As indicated in Division II, we think the mortgages are valid as security for moneys actually loaned by the defendant to the plaintiff. The question of the bar of the actions to cancel by lapse of time is therefore not material.
IV. We turn then to consideration of the facts concerning the two mortgages which the trial court held to be barred because they were obtained by fraud and without consideration. Each was dated May 9, 1950, and each was acknowledged on the same date before Cornelius Ver Ploeg, a notary public. Mr. Ver Ploeg was for many years a reputable member of the Iowa bar. The...
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Luse v. Grenko
...subservient one. Groves v. Groves, supra, and citations; Barber v. Powell, 248 Iowa 785, 792, 82 N.W.2d 665, 669; Van Emmerik v. Mons, 249 Iowa 1299, 1304, 90 N.W.2d 433, 436. III. The question of confidential relationship assumes such importance here because actions of this kind in which s......