Van Hook v. Harris Corp., BRUNO-SHERMAN

• Decision Date: 19 October 1984
• Docket Number: BRUNO-SHERMAN,Docket No. 69978
• Citation: 356 N.W.2d 18,136 Mich.App. 310
• Parties: Richard VAN HOOK, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant, andCORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Ferro Equipment Company, Paul Ruddy Equipment Repair & Service Company, Ace Electric Company, Ross Operating Valve Company, and Allen Bradley Company, jointly and severally, Defendants, v. MARK VIII INDUSTRIES, INC., a Michigan corporation, Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 18

356 N.W.2d 18

136 Mich.App. 310

Richard VAN HOOK, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant, and BRUNO-SHERMAN CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Ferro

Equipment Company, Paul Ruddy Equipment Repair & Service

Company, Ace Electric Company, Ross Operating Valve Company, and Allen Bradley Company, jointly and severally, Defendants, v. MARK VIII INDUSTRIES, INC., a Michigan corporation,

Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.

Docket No. 69978.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 4, 1983.

Decided July 16, 1984.

Released for Publication Oct. 19, 1984.

Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile by X. Orhan and Keefe A. Brooks, Detroit, for Harris Corp.

Seavitt, Westcott & Stowe by Thomas W. Emery, Detroit, for Mark VIII Industries, Inc.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and SHEPHERD and SWALLOW, ^* JJ.

SHEPHERD, Judge.

Plaintiff was injured in an industrial accident involving a Sheridan press and sued, among others, defendant Harris Corporation (defendant), successor to the press manufacturer. Defendant brought in as third-party defendant plaintiff's employer claiming that, to the extent the employer's negligence contributed to the accident, it should not be allowed reimbursement out of plaintiff's potential recovery from defendant for workers' compensation benefits it had paid to plaintiff. Defendant proposed that any statutory lien against recovery granted the employer be reduced by an amount corresponding to the degree of negligence attributable to the employer. Defendant also proposed that plaintiff's recovery against defendant be reduced by that amount in order to avoid double recovery, i.e., the total amount plaintiff could actually receive from defendant after satisfying any remaining lien held by his employer would be limited to his damages less workers' compensation benefits received.

The circuit court agreed with plaintiff's employer that defendant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and entered summary judgment in favor of the employer.

The employer, Mark VIII Industries, Incorporated, argues that M.C.L. Sec. 418.827(5); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(827)(5) allows an employer to recover the entire amount paid by it in workers' compensation benefits with no set-off for its own negligence. Federal cases construing Michigan law have denied to a third-party tortfeasor an action against the injured party's employer for contribution. Douglas v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 765 (WD Mich.1980); McPike v. Die Casters Equipment Corp., 504 F.Supp. 1056 (WD Mich.1980). An identical result was reached by this Court in Downie v. Kent Products, 122 Mich.App. 722, 333 N.W.2d 528 (1983), lv. gtd. 418 Mich. 948 (1984).

Defendant argues that such a claim has been allowed in other jurisdictions, e.g., Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369 (1961); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953). We note that the states following such a rule are clearly in the minority. Furthermore, several, although not all, of those states have statutory schemes or language different from that adopted in Michigan. The Michigan statute, M.C.L. Sec. 418.827(5); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(827)(5), provides that "[a]ny recovery * * * shall first reimburse the employer or carrier for any amounts paid or payable under this act * * * ". This subsection, on its face, applies regardless of the concurring negligence of the employer. As the trial court concluded, "The Legislature no doubt knew that employers are sometimes concurrently negligent. The failure to provide a statutory reduction in such circumstances evinces an intent not to do so."

In affirming the lower court's ruling, we do not hold that the result reached is necessarily the most equitable but rather we hold that the result is mandated by present statutory law. We simply hold that Harris may not obtain restitution based on a claim of unjust enrichment where the benefits conferred result from a valid judgment obtained pursuant to and in conformity with clear...