Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co.
| Decision Date | 29 January 1996 |
| Citation | 914 S.W.2d 79 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,494 David E. RIDINGS and Vickey L. Ridings, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY; Precision Stair Corporation; Walker and Sons Fabrication & Erection Company, Inc.; S & E Construction Co., Inc.; and KTM Associates, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
Michael W. Whitaker, Covington (Dale H. Tuttle, Richard H. Booth, McDonald Kuhn, of Counsel), Memphis, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Louis F. Allen, Thomas L. Parker, Waring Cox, Memphis, Leo Bearman, Jr., Monique A. Nassar, Heiskell, Donelson, Bearman, Adams, Williams & Caldwell, Memphis, Robert L.J. Spence, Jr., Peter J. Dauster, The Hardison Law Firm, Memphis, for Defendants-Appellees.
This interlocutory appeal presents for resolution a narrow question of law. For the reasons hereinafter discussed, the decision of the Court of Appeals, allowing a defendant in an action for damages for personal injuries to plead as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff's employer caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, is reversed.
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff David E. Ridings, when he fell from a ladder during the course and scope of his employment by CBI-Nacon, Inc. The complaint, filed on January 22, 1991, alleges an action in negligence, gross negligence and strict liability against the Ralph M. Parsons Company, Precision Stair Corporation, Walker and Sons Fabrication & Erection Company, Inc., S & E Construction Co., Inc., and KTM Associates, Inc.
After the release of this Court's opinion in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992), on May 4, 1992, each defendant filed a motion to amend its answer to assert as an affirmative defense that other parties or nonparties, including but not limited to CBI-Nacon, proximately caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. The trial court allowed the answers to be amended except as to the affirmative defense that the plaintiff's employer was negligent. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court as to the employer, holding that, pursuant to McIntyre, the defendants are entitled to allege that the plaintiff's employer was negligent and assert that alleged negligence as an affirmative defense.
The issue presented is a question of law raised by the defendants' motions to amend their answers. Consequently, the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Tenn.R.App.P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993).
The issue presented is whether the defendants in this suit for personal injuries based on allegations of negligence and strict liability in tort can assert as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff's employer caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries and damages, notwithstanding that the injuries alleged were sustained in the course and scope of the plaintiff's employment which was covered by the workers' compensation law of Tennessee.
The plaintiff contends that allowing the jury to attribute fault to the plaintiff's employer, against whom the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for damages, violates the McIntyre principle that the "plaintiff's damages are to be reduced in proportion to the percentage of the total negligence attributable to the plaintiff." McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d at 57.
The defendants counter that excluding the plaintiff's employer from those persons to whom fault may be attributed violates the McIntyre principle that defendants will be "liable only for the percentage of a plaintiff's damages occasioned by that defendant's negligence." Id. at 58.
The issue presented was anticipated but not decided in McIntyre. There, the Court observed that the treatment of nonparties "should await an appropriate controversy." Id. at 60.
This is a transitional case which must be tried according to the principles of comparative fault to the extent that the application of those principles does not impose upon any party a substantial injustice. Id. at 58; Owens v. Truckstops of America, --- S.W.2d ----, ---- (Tenn.1996) [slip op. at 7]. However, application of comparative fault principles to this case requires no transitional procedure. The Court finds that the acts and omissions of an employer covered by the worker's compensation law neither enlarge nor limit the rights or liabilities of any party to a tort action by an employee governed by the doctrine of comparative fault.
Prior to the release of McIntyre, the defendants could be held jointly and severally liable for the full burden of the plaintiff's damages even if the acts or omissions of the employer or the plaintiff's fellow employees had contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. Also, each of the defendants found liable could assert a claim for contribution or indemnity against the other defendants and third-party defendants, but not against the employer. The rule was well-stated in Rupe v. Durbin Durco, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976), overruled on other grounds, Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn.1980). That court held that where a third-party tortfeasor is found liable for injuries to a worker, the third party may not seek indemnity from the worker's employer if the employer was liable under the workers' compensation laws. 1 The court stated:
Workmen's Compensation laws are designed to liberalize the basis for employees' claims against employers for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. However, such laws restrict the amount of damages by excluding pain and suffering. The Tennessee Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act expressly prohibits contribution under the Workmen's Compensation laws.
... To permit indemnity against an employer would in effect permit a third party tortfeasor to indirectly force an employer to pay for pain and suffering. The employee is not entitled to this under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The decision in McIntyre obviously does not allow the employer to be held liable directly, as a defendant in the employee's suit for damages, 2 or indirectly, as a joint tortfeasor liable for contribution or indemnity. However, the defendants insist that fault can be attributed to the employer, and the liability of the defendants can be decreased accordingly, without the imposition of liability upon the employer. This proposition is not consistent with the Tennessee doctrine of comparative fault.
The principle of several liability among tortfeasors, announced in McIntyre, provides the policy basis for the decision in this case. In McIntyre, the Court set forth the framework for determining liability on the defendant side of the equation.
Fourth, fairness and efficiency require that defendants called upon to answer allegations in negligence be permitted to allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought. In cases where such a defense is raised, the trial court shall instruct the jury to assign this nonparty the percentage of the total negligence for which he is responsible. However, in order for a plaintiff to recover a judgment against such additional person, the plaintiff must have made a timely amendment to his complaint and caused process to be served on such additional person. Thereafter, the additional party will be required to answer the amended complaint. The procedures shall be in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d at 58.
The rationale of McIntyre postulates that fault may be attributed only to those persons against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action in tort. The designation "nonparty," used in McIntyre, is not a term of art; it means "not a party." 3 However, it is given a particular meaning by the decision in McIntyre, wherein the Court found that, upon a defendant's allegation that a person not a party to the suit, a "nonparty," caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff, by amendment to the complaint and service of process, may make the "nonparty" a "party" that is answerable to the plaintiff in actions for damages according to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, only a nonparty against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action can be made a party. Since the plaintiff's employer cannot be made a party to the plaintiff's tort action for personal injuries sustained in the course and scope of his employment, the rationale of McIntyre, both as to principle and procedure, will not permit fault to be attributed to the plaintiff's employer. 4
This conclusion is confirmed by Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-1-119(a) (1994), 5 which was enacted in furtherance of the Tennessee doctrine of comparative fault. Although that statute is not applicable to this case, 6 it contemplates that those persons to whom fault may be attributed are limited to those against whom liability for the plaintiff's damages may be asserted. The second condition in subsection (a), "if the plaintiff's cause or causes of action against such person would be barred by any applicable statute of limitations," limits the operation of the statute to "a person not a party to the suit" against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action. The statute also contemplates that the plaintiff's cause of action against that person may be asserted according to Rule 15, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, or in a separate action. The principles of liability acknowledged in Section 20-1-119, and the procedure authorized to enforce that liability, preclude the attribution of fault to the plaintiff's employer, which is not "a person not a party to the suit" against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action.
This conclusion is also consistent, on principle, with provisions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, not addressed in McIntyre, which...
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