Van Meter v. Segal-Schadel Co.
| Decision Date | 02 March 1966 |
| Docket Number | SEGAL-SCHADEL,No. 39595,39595 |
| Citation | 214 N.E.2d 664,5 Ohio St.2d 185 |
| Parties | , 34 O.O.2d 345 VAN METER, Appellee, v.CO. of Columbus; Administrator, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Statutes providing for appeals and for proceedings with respect to appeals and for limitations on the right of appeal are remedial in nature and should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of a right of appeal. (Section 1.11, Revised Code, applied.)
2. Where a statute requires an application to be filed in a public office within a certain number of calendar days, the time within which such filing can be made should be computed by excluding the first and including the last day and, when the last day falls on Saturday, then the filing may be done on the following Monday. (Sections 1.11, 1.14, 5.30 and 4141.28(G), Revised Code, construed and applied.)
Appellee, herein referred to as claimant, filed a claim for benefits with the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation.
The administrator of the bureau made a determination disallowing that claim, and mailed a notice of that determination to claimant at his last known post office address.
That notice was maidled on March 14, 1962. On Monday, March 26, 1962, claimant applied in writing for a reconsideration of that determination.
The administrator ruled that the application for reconsideration had not been filed within the time limited by Section 4141.28(G), Revised Code, which reads so far as pertinent:
'Any interested party notified of a determination of an application for determination of benefit rights or a claim for benefits may, within ten calendar days after such notice was delivered to such person or was mailed to his last known post-office address, apply in writing for a reconsideration of the administrator's or deputy's determination * * *.'
The ruling of the administrator was sustained on appeal to the Board of Review and on subsequent appeal from that board to the Common Pleas Court.
The judgment of the Common Pleas Court was reversed by the Court of appeals.
The cause is now before this court on appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Chester T. Freeman, Columbus, for appellee.
William B. Saxbe, Atty. Gen. and Tony Kidd, Marysville, for appellants.
So far as pertinent, Section 1.14, Revised Code, reads:
'The time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first and including the last day; except that when the last day falls on Sunday or a legal holiday, then the act may be done on the next succeeding day which is not a Sunday or a legal holiday.
'When a public office in which an act, required by law, is to be performed is closed to the public for the entire day which constitutes the last day for doing such act or before its usual closing time on such day, then such act may be performed on the next succeeding day which is not a Sunday or a legal holiday as defined in this section.
"Legal holiday' as used in this section means the following days: * * * [Nine holidays are then specified together with '[a]ny day appointed and recommended by the governor of this state or the president of the United States as a holiday.']'
Thus, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 1.14, in determining the time within which claimant's application for reconsideration was to be filed, we exclude March 14, and the 10th day was March 24, 1962, which was a Suturday.
Section 5.30, Revised Code, reads in part:
'Every Saturday afternoon is a legal holiday, beginning at twelve noon and ending at twelve midnight. * * *'
It is contended that, since Section 5.30 designates Saturday afternoon as a legal holiday, then in the instant case 'the last day' (March 24) 'falls on * * * a legal holiday' so that the application for reconsideration could be filed 'on the next suceeding day which is not a Sunday or a legal holiday,' i. e., Monday, March 26. The difficulty with this argument is that it is stated in Section 1.14 that "[l]egal holiday' as used in this section means' certain days, and Saturday as such is not one of the days specified.
Reliance is next put upon the second paragraph of Section 1.14 with the contention that the 'public office in which' the application for reconsideration was to be filed was 'closed to the public * * * before its usual closing time on' the last day for filing that application. However, the statutory words refer to the public office being 'closed to the public for the entire day which constitutes the last day for doing such act [i. e., filing the application for reconsideration] or before its usual closing time on such day.' This last day was Saturday, March 24, 1962. It can be argued that the 'usual closing time on such day' (i. e., a Saturday) would be noon so that there was no closing to the public before the 'usual closing time on such day.'
In our opinion, this...
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