Van Meter v. Singletary

• Decision Date: 30 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-57,96-57
• Citation: 682 So.2d 1162
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2343 Robert E. VAN METER, Jr., Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1162

682 So.2d 1162

21 Fla. L. Weekly D2343

Robert E. VAN METER, Jr., Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Appellee.

No. 96-57.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Oct. 30, 1996.

Appellant pro se.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Shannon C. Lord, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WEBSTER, Judge.

Appellant, an inmate of the state correctional system, seeks review of a final order which dismissed his petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a loss of gain time imposed following a finding that he had committed a disciplinary infraction. We conclude that section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995), which the trial court applied to bar appellant's petition, is an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers when applied to limit the time within which a petition for a writ of mandamus may be filed. Accordingly, we reverse.

According to the petition, on October 1, 1993, appellant received a disciplinary report for lying to staff. Appellant was found guilty, and punished by 60 days in disciplinary confinement and the loss of 60 days in gain time. His appeal to the institution superintendent was denied. He then appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (Department), who denied the appeal on March 21, 1994. For reasons that are not clear from the record, appellant did not file his petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court until September 27, 1995.

The circuit court issued an order directing the Department to show cause why the petition should not be granted. The Department responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition was barred by section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995). Section 95.11(8) reads:

95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.--Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:

....

(8) WITHIN 30 DAYS FOR ACTIONS CHALLENGING CORRECTIONAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.--Any court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to s. 944.28(2) must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the prisoner disciplinary proceedings through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section.

On the day following that on which the motion to dismiss had been filed, the circuit court granted the motion, and dismissed the petition as barred by section 95.11(8). Petitioner timely filed a motion for rehearing, complaining that he had been afforded no opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss before it had been granted. He also argued, among other things, that, to the extent section 95.11(8) applied, it infringed upon the authority of the judicial branch to issue extraordinary writs, including mandamus, and, therefore, violated the doctrine of separation of powers expressed in article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing without explanation. This appeal follows.

Since July 1, 1992, prisoners seeking judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the Department have been limited to the extraordinary remedies set out in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630 (i.e., the "writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, and habeas corpus"). Jones v. Department of Corrections, 615 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Section 95.11(8) became law on June 15, 1995. Ch. 95-283, §§ 2, 61, at 2652, 2690, Laws of Fla. Accordingly, there can be little doubt but that the legislature intended section 95.11(8) to apply to prisoner requests for judicial review of disciplinary action, which seek one of those extraordinary writs. Therefore, we conclude that the legislature intended section 95.11(8) to apply to actions such as appellant's, which seek the extraordinary writ of mandamus.

By its express language, the effect of section 95.11(8) was to bar appellant's action seeking mandamus relief on July 15, 1995, some 74 days before the petition was filed. However, appellant argues that section 95.11(8) is ineffective to bar his action because, as applied to requests such as his, seeking the issuance of an extraordinary writ, the statute is an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. We agree.

Article V, sections 3(b)(7) & (8), 4(b)(3) and 5(b), of the Florida Constitution vest in the supreme court, the district courts of appeal and the circuit courts, respectively, the power to issue extraordinary writs, including writs of mandamus. In State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508 (1933), our supreme court concluded that the intent behind the constitutional grant of such power was to vest in the courts the full and complete authority to grant such writs, and that the legislature was prohibited from interfering with that power in any way. Similarly, in Brinson v. Tharin, 99 Fla. 696, 127 So. 313 (1930), the court concluded that the legislature could not extend, limit or regulate the power conferred on the court by the constitution to issue writs of certiorari. And, in Palmer v. Johnson, 97 Fla. 479, 121 So. 466 (1929), the court said that the legislature could not constitutionally impose restrictions upon the time within which one might seek a writ of certiorari to review the decision of a lower tribunal, because such power rested exclusively in the court. Clearly, if applied to actions such as appellant's, the effect of section 95.11(8) would be to regulate, and to limit, the power of the courts to issue such extraordinary writs.

Historically, it has been generally recognized that,

while mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, it is a remedial process, which is awarded not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and upon equitable principles.... It is an extraordinary remedy which will not be allowed in cases of doubtful right ..., and it is generally regarded as not embraced within statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions, but as subject to the equitable doctrine of laches....

United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 371, 39 S.Ct. 293, 294, 63 L.Ed. 650, 652 (1919) (citations omitted). Accord State ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So.2d 843 (Fla.1970); State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 142 Fla. 154, 194 So. 315 (1940); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. State ex rel. City of Tampa, 77 Fla. 705, 82 So. 230 (1919). Thus, it is clear that the law relating to writs of mandamus, including that involving the time within which a request for such relief must be made, has been developed by the judiciary.

We recognize that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630(c), which is applicable to actions seeking relief by extraordinary writ in the circuit courts, addresses the issue of the time within which such an action must be commenced. It reads: "A complaint shall be filed within the time provided by law, except that a complaint for common law certiorari shall be filed within 30 days of rendition of the matter sought to be reviewed." The relevant inquiry for our purposes is the intended meaning of the language which states that a complaint seeking extraordinary relief other than common law certiorari must "be filed within the time provided by law." An argument might be made that this language was intended to include statutory, as well as judicially developed, law, and that, therefore, the supreme court intended to cede to the legislature its power to control the time within which such actions must be commenced. However, we are unwilling to presume that the supreme court intended so cavalierly to surrender to the legislature a power which it had zealously guarded for so long. Instead, we believe that the court intended by such language to refer to the judicially developed law regarding the time within which such relief must be sought--i.e., the concept of laches.

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we hold that, as applied to efforts by prisoners to seek by request for a writ of mandamus review of disciplinary actions taken against them by the Department, section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995), impermissibly infringes upon powers vested exclusively in the judicial branch. As a result, section 95.11(8) is an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers expressed in article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution. Therefore, it may not be applied to bar appellant's action seeking a writ of mandamus. Pursuant to our constitution, if such a time limit is to be established, only the supreme court may do so. Until it does, the time within which such an action must be commenced remains controlled by the equitable concept of laches.

We reverse the order dismissing appellant's action, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

ALLEN, J., concurs.

MINER, J., dissents with written opinion.

MINER, Judge., dissenting.

The majority here has found that section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, constitutes "an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers---." Because I see no conflict between the separation of powers doctrine and the legislature acting under the grant of authority given by the Florida Supreme Court in rule 1.630(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, I respectfully dissent.

Judge Webster is eminently correct when he points out in his opinion that it has long been established law in this state that mandamus is governed by the equitable doctrine of laches and is not subject to statutes of limitations. Likewise, as Judge Webster notes, this case turns on the interpretation of the above-cited rule. However, we need not indulge the presumption that, in adopting this rule, the supreme court did not intend to "cavalierly surrender to the legislature a power which it...