Van Norden v. Morton
| Decision Date | 01 October 1878 |
| Citation | 25 L.Ed. 453,99 U.S. 378 |
| Parties | VAN NORDEN v. MORTON |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Thomas J. Durant for the appellant.
Mr. John A. Campbell, contra.
The complainant filed his bill addressed to the Circuit Court sitting in chancery, alleging that he is the owner of dredge-boat No. 3, lying in the river at New Orleans; that Morton, Bliss, & Co. having obtained a judgment in the same court against the Mississippi and Mexican Gulf Ship Canal Company for over $24,000, had issued an execution on said judgment, under which the marshal had seized dredge-boat No. 3, and had advertised to sell it to satisfy the writ; that he, and not the Ship Canal Company, is the owner of the boat; that it is not liable to be taken on said execution; that the seizure has already subjected him to a loss of $5,000, and that his continued deprivation of its use will cause him much greater loss. He prays for process, that the judgment plaintiffs and Packard, the marshal, be made defendants, and enjoined from interfering with him in the possession of the boat; that he be quieted and maintained in his title and possession, and defendants decreed to pay him $5,000 aforesaid as damages. A temporary injunction was granted. Answers and a replication thereto were filed, depositions and other testimony taken. On hearing, the court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill.
The first question we are called to consider is, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of this suit in equity.
If the case had arisen in any State where separate jurisdiction at common law and in equity was fully recognized, there could be no difficulty in answering this question in the negative.
The remedy in all times for this trespass, which is a very common one, has been by an action of replevin to take the property out of the hands of the sheriff or marshal and return it to the owner, or to leave the officer to proceed with the sale of the property and sue him or the purchaser in trespass for its value and for any incidental damage. In the one case the party whose property was wrongfully seized recovered possession of it. In the other he recovered compensation for its loss. No case has been cited to us—we presume none can be found—where equity has interfered under such circumstances. Watson v. Sutherland (5 Wall. 74) is cited by the appellant. In that case, Sutherland, the party whose goods were seized, was engaged in a successful dry-goods trade. The seizure was of all his goods, and it closed his store, and if continued would have broken up a profitable business. For this the court held that the action at law for damages could have given no adequate remedy. The equitable jurisdiction, as will be seen by an examination of the opinion of the court, rested solely on that consideration. The case, as it was, is a very close one, and its main feature is absent in the one before us. There is no reason to believe that the value of the dredge-boat would not be adequate compensation for its loss, and no such allegation is made in the bill. On the contrary, the complainant claims $5,000 damages for the loss of its use while held by the marshal.
It is said, however, that the code of Louisiana does not give an action of replevin in any case, or its equivalent, and that it does give a specific remedy for cases of this class, which, in its nature, is of an equitable character, and should be administered in the Federal courts on the equity side of the calendar.
If the first proposition were true, there would still remain an adequate remedy by an action at law for damages. But while it is true that the Louisiana code provides no process by which, in advance of a judgment as to the right of the parties, personal property can be taken from the possession of one party and delivered to the other, it does provide the remedy of sequestration, by which the possession of the property which is the subject of the litigation may be taken by order of the court and held until the right is decided. See Sequestration, Code of Practice, art. 269-283. Under these articles we see no reason why the complainant might not have brought suit and recovered the ultimate possession of his boat and damages for its detention.
The special provision for such cases as the present is found in art. 298, par. 7, of the same Code of Practice. The whole of sect. 5 is devoted to injunctions, and a careful reading of all the subdivisions shows that the word is used as applicable to cases which are in their nature of a common-law character, and that it is used as synonymous and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Larabee v. Dolley
...statutory right of suit as is therein granted may be enforced by a Circuit Court of the United States sitting in equity. Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U.S. 378, 25 L.Ed. 453; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 19 Sup.Ct. 187, L.Ed. 443; Cummings v. National Bank, supra; San Francisco National Bank ......
-
Twist v. Prairie Oil Gas Co
...Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet. 232, 237, 7 L. Ed. 125; Thompson v. Railroad Companies, 6 Wall. 134, 139, 18 L. Ed. 765; Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378, 382, 25 L. Ed. 453; Rogers v. Durant, 106 U. S. 644, 1 S. Ct. 623, 27 L. Ed. 303; Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 117, 11 S. Ct. 712, 35 L. E......
-
Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, NC
...that right either on the common law or equity side of its docket, as the nature of the new right or new remedy requires. Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378 25 L. Ed. 453. Here there can be no doubt that the remedy by injunction against an illegal tax, expressly granted by the statute, is to......
-
Lyman v. Boston & A. R. Co.
...statute law of a state creates a new right in general, it will be enforced in a federal court. Fitch v. Creighton, 24 How. 159; Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U.S. 378; Bank Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747, 7 Sup.Ct. 757; Wyman v. Mathews, 53 F. 678. It is necessary, however, in order to give the circuit......