Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1896
• Citation: 74 F. 981
• Parties: VAN PATTEN v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P.R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

74 F. 981

VAN PATTEN v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

June 10, 1896

Spencer Smith and Harl & McCabe, for plaintiff.

George R. Peck, H. H. Field, and Shull & Farnsworth, for defendant.

SHIRAS District Judge.

In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover damages against the defendant railway company, under the provisions of the interstate commerce act, for alleged overcharges; and the question now before the court is that of the jurisdiction of this court, the defendant company being a corporation created under the laws of the state of Wisconsin, but operating many miles of railway within the Northern district of the state of Iowa. On behalf of the defendant it is contended that the provisions of the act of congress of 1887, as amended by the act of 1888, control the question of the place of bringing suits based upon section 9 of the interstate commerce act and therefore such actions must be brought in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, which in the case of corporations must be in the state wherein they are incorporated, and within the district in such state (in case there is more than one district therein) wherein the corporation has its principal or corporate office, as was held by the supreme court in Railway Co. v Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496, 14 Sup.Ct. 401. In considering the question thus presented, we must bear in mind that the matter of the jurisdiction of a federal court embraces two propositions: First. Is the controversy one of federal cognizance, by reason of the subject-matter or by reason of the diverse citizenship or alienage of the litigants? Second. If so, is the particular court whose jurisdiction is invoked competent to entertain the suit?

In determining the first question, it is clear that in the case now before the court the answer to the query whether the subject-matter of controversy is within federal cognizance is to be sought, not in the provisions of the acts of 1887-1888 but in the provisions of the interstate commerce act. As already stated, this action is expressly based upon the provisions of the interstate commerce act, and the right of action created by sections 8 and 9 thereof would exist if the acts of 1887-1888 had never been adopted, and would continue to exist if those acts were to be now wholly repealed. That the subject-matter of the controversy, being a claim to recover damages for alleged violations of the interstate commerce act, the right to recover therefor being created by section 8 of that act, is one of federal cognizance, is not denied by the defendant; and the inquiry is therefore narrowed down to the second proposition, to wit, whether this court is competent to take jurisdiction over the defendant corporation, in the absence of consent upon its part to submit the controversy to the judgment of this court.

Counsel have discussed the question whether, under the provisions of the interstate commerce act, the jurisdiction over actions for damages based upon section 8 of the act is exclusive in the courts of the United States. Upon this proposition I concur in the view maintained by counsel for the plaintiff, that the jurisdiction is exclusive in the federal courts, in that section 9 of the act provides the remedy for the liability created by section 8, and that remedy consists in the right of invoking the aid of the commission, or of seeking damages in a district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction. If it had been the intent of congress that persons seeking relief against the violations of the act named in section 8 should have the right to sue for damages in state as well as federal courts, then the declaration in section 9 would have been that the action for damages might be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction; but, instead of so enacting, the act declares that the remedy shall consist of a right to appeal to the commission, or to sue for damages in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction. Thus, we reach the vital point in this inquiry, and that is, what is meant by a 'circuit court of competent jurisdiction,' as these words are used in section 9 of the interstate commerce act. The use of these words in the section would seem to indicate that, in the view of congress, there are courts of the United States competent to take jurisdiction over each cause of action as it arises under the provisions of the act, and courts not competent to entertain jurisdiction. It is clear that such difference, in the right to entertain jurisdiction in a given case, does not grow out of any difference between the several circuit courts with respect to their jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the controversy. In this particular no distinction or difference exists between the circuit courts in the several districts, and it is therefore clear beyond question that, in using the words 'of competent jurisdiction' in the ninth section of the act, congress did not enact, assume, or imply that, as between the several circuit courts of the United States, there were some competent to take jurisdiction under the provisions of the interstate commerce act, and some that were incompetent so to do. This being true, it follows that the words in question must have been used with reference to the place or district within which the court could obtain jurisdiction over the defendant; and the meaning of section 9, in this particular, is that any person claiming damages against a common carrier, under the provisions of section 8, may bring suit for such damages in any circuit court of the United States before which the defendant in the given case can be lawfully compelled to appear and defend against such claim for damages. The use of the words in question shows that it was the intent of congress to enact a limitation upon the matter of the place of bringing suit, and the extent of the limitation is the material question at issue. I do not find in the interstate commerce act, approved February 4, 1887, any specific provision in the act, it would seem to be the fair conclusion that congress intended to leave that matter to be settled by the general statutes regulating the place of bringing suits in the courts of the United States. When the interstate commerce act was adopted, in February, 1887, the act of 1875 was then in force, which enacted that no civil suit should be brought against any person by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he may be found at the time of serving process. Under this provision of the act of 1875, this court would have jurisdiction over this case, because the defendant company is engaged in operating lines of railway in the state of Iowa and within the Northern district, subject to the provisions of the statutes of the state of Iowa under which due service on the corporation can be had, and the corporation can be found within the district, within the principle recognized in Re Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369. This provision of the act of 1875 having been repealed by the amendatory acts of 1887-1888, the query is whether such repeal affects the question of the place of bringing suits based upon the interstate commerce act.

On behalf of plaintiff it is contended that, in the absence of all statutes, the general rule is that if the subject-matter of a controversy is within the jurisdiction of a court, and the defendant comes or is found within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, so that its process may be served upon him, and process in the given case is thus served upon the defendant, jurisdiction is thereby obtained. Granting this to be true, it is, nevertheless, also true that, by legislative enactment, the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts is in many instances limited by provisions requiring specific actions to be brought only in named courts, or within certain counties or districts. A limitation as to the place of bringing suit in the courts of the United States has always existed, being found in the judiciary act of 1789 and in all subsequent acts amendatory thereof. An examination of the act of 1789 shows that section 11 of that act is the one that created and defined the jurisdiction of the circuit courts both as to subject-matter and parties in civil actions at law or in equity, and in criminal actions, and also as to the place of bringing suit. In other words, the section includes the matter of jurisdiction proper, that is, the question whether, for any reason, the controversy comes within the federal cognizance, and, secondly, in what courts can a defendant be compelled to appear and answer to a matter of federal cognizance? By the act of 1875, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts as to subject-matter and to parties was enlarged to the full constitutional limit, and as to the place of bringing suit the provisions of section 11 of the act of 1789 were not materially changed, except as to cases for the enforcement of liens and coming within the provisions of section 8 of that act. Under both these acts, to wit, of 1789 and 1875, suit in a case of federal cognizance might be brought in any district wherein the defendant might be found at the time of serving process. This continued to be the law until the adoption of the act of 1887, which struck out the words providing for jurisdiction in the district wherein the defendant might be found, and limited the place of bringing civil suits to the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, except with regard to suits wherein federal jurisdiction exists solely by reason of the diversity of the citizenship of the litigants, in which cases suit may be brought in the district of the residence of either party. It is...