Van Pelt v. Hilliard

• Decision Date: 08 March 1918
• Citation: 75 Fla. 792,78 So. 693
• Parties: VAN PELT, Sheriff v. HILLIARD.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

78 So. 693

75 Fla. 792

VAN PELT, Sheriff v. HILLIARD.

Florida Supreme Court

March 8, 1918

Appeal from Court of Record, Escambia County; C. M. Jones, Judge.

Suit by J. G. Hilliard against J. C. Van Pelt, as Sheriff, for an injunction. From an order granting a temporary injunction defendant appeals. Reversed.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The Legislature must be assumed to understand the meaning of words and to have expressed by use of the words employed their intent, and where words employed in a statute have a well-defined meaning, there is no place for construction as to the meaning of the words, but the courts must give to such words the popular or generally accepted meaning.

Where words used in a statute have no definite meaning, or the connection in which they are used is ambiguous, it is the duty of the courts to give to such words a meaning, if it can reasonably be done, that will best harmonize with the object of the enactment, and give effect to the legislative inteent intoxicating liquors k146(6)--construction of statute--meaning of words--'club or other association of persons.'

The words 'club or other association of persons' have no definite or popularly accepted meaning, and the courts must ascertain and declare what was the meaning of the words as intended by the Legislature, and in doing this must ascertain what was the object of the statute, the law as it existed on the subject, and the defect in the existing law, and give to such words a meaning that will harmonize with, and not defeat, the evident purpose of the statute.

The policy of the state in the regulation of the sales of intoxicating liquors in nonprohibited territory had been to prevent the assembling of persons in the open saloon and there drinking intoxicating liquors, wines, and beer, but such prohibition did not apply to clubs or other associations of persons, and the object of chapter 7287, Laws of Florida 1917, was to include such clubs and associations. The purpose of this statute (chapter 7287) is to discourage the habit of social drinking, to prevent the assembling of persons at a certain place and there drinking intoxicating liquors although each should have served to him his own liquors in consideration of pay for such service.

A person who furnishes such a place and holds himself out to receive, keep, and store, and does keep and store large quantities of intoxicating liquors brought there by divers persons, exceeding 50 persons in number, for the purpose of being served to such persons as they desired, such persons furnishing the glassware, ice, milk, bitters, etc., for the concoction of drinks, and serving the said liquors to his patrons who frequently assemble there by day and night and converse together and discuss current topics and events and each have his own liquors served to him by such person in consideration of pay for such service, is conducting a club or other association of persons under chapter 7287, Laws of Florida 1917, and is subject to prosecution as a member employé, or agent of such club or association.

The legislative discretion in classifying the subjects of police regulation will not be disturbed by the courts unless it is wholly without a reasonable basis, nor will the courts because in their opinion other subjects omitted might have been included, and some included might have been omitted declare such classification unreasonable.

The provisions of article 3, s 16, of the Constitution, 'no law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case the act, as revised, or section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length,' refer only to laws in express terms amendatory or revisory, and not to laws that only amend by implication.

The Legislature may in the enactment of a law include the whole or part of the provisions of another statute by a reference to the adopted statute and thus make it a part of the enactment, and any amendment or repeal of the adopted statute will not affect the statute containing the reference. Such statutes are known as reference statutes, and are not strictly amendatory or revisional, and are not violative of article 3, s 16, of the Constitution of Florida.

'It is a sufficient compliance with section 16, art. 3, of the Constitution, if the subject is expressed in the title to the act, the matters properly connected with such subject not being required to be expressed in the title.' State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929.

Neither the Constitution nor article 19 of the Constitution of Florida containing any provision directly or by implication upon the subject of serving or dispensing intoxicating liquors, wines, or beer, the Legislature has the power to pass any statute upon the subject which it may deem proper for the welfare of the state, and may make any reasonable regulation covering the serving or dispensing of intoxicating liquors, and chapter 7287 is not in violation of the Constitution or article 19 of the Constitution of Florida.

COUNSEL John P. Stokes and Clarence J. Stokes, both of Pensacola, for appellant.

Kirke Monroe and Robert H. Anderson, both of Pensacola, for appellee. On October 9, 1917, Hilliard filed his bill in chancery in the court of record of Escambia county against J. C. Van Pelt, as sheriff, alleging that Hilliard was engaged in and carried on the business of a restaurant keeper at No. 222 South Palafox street, in the city of Pensacola, and in connection with said business received and stored in his place of business beer and liquors which were the property of Hilliard's customers, serving the same to said customers when they desired: that scores of Hilliard's customers stored beer and liquors with him to be so served; that Hilliard had procured all licenses required by the state of Florida to be by him procured, and particularly a license to operate a restaurant wherein intoxicating liquors are served; that J. C. Van Pelt, as sheriff, on the 8the day of October, A. D. 1917, entered Hilliard's place of business and seized wrongfully all of the beer and liquors therein stored for Hilliard's customers, which beer and liquors were alleged to be the property of Hilliard's customers, and intrusted to him to be served to them, and to the possession of which Hilliard was entitled as against any person, except the owner thereof; that Hilliard had built up a profitable business, and the seizure of said liquors by the sheriff was without authority of law, and if the sheriff was not enjoined from further unlawful seizures Hilliard's business would be destroyed, and his customers would refuse to intrust their liquors to him for storage; and that the sheriff had openly stated he intended to seize all liquors which might be sent to Hilliard's place of business by his customers.

Hilliard prayed a temporary injunction restraining the sheriff from future seizures and interferences, and that such temporary injunction be made perpetual on final hearing, and for a mandatory injunction requiring the sheriff to return the liquors seized on October 8th.

On October 11, 1917, the sheriff filed his answer to the bill, with grounds of demurrer incorporated therein, in which he admitted the seizure of the liquors as alleged in Hilliard's bill, and further alleged that at that time Hilliard was arrested and taken into the custody of the sheriff for the violation of the provisions of chapter 7287, Acts of 1917, Laws of Florida, because Hilliard did keep, conduct, and operate a club and as such, served and dispensed liquors between the hours of 6 o'clock p. m. and 7 o'clock a. m., and in less quantities than one-half pint and not in securely sealed receptacles, and permitted such liquors to be consumed on his premises, and because he served and dispensed liquors on premises where meals were served, etc.; and in his answer the sheriff admitted it was his intention to thereafter seize liquors which Hilliard might have on his premises, brought there in the manner and for the purpose for which the seized liquors had been brought there; and in his answer the sheriff alleges that at the time and place alleged Hilliard held himself out to receive, store, and serve liquors to all persons who might bring liquors to his place of business and pay his charges therefor, and that Hilliard had provided premises for that purpose and did receive, store, and serve liquors to a large number of persons, exceeding 50 in number, and that such persons did, from time to time thereafter, resort to Hillard's premises and have such liquors served to them by Hilliard; and that Hilliard provided the necessary glassware and other incidentals necessary to make said liquors palatable and for the concoction of mixed drinks, etc.; and that by day and by night large numbers of persons who had stored liquors with Hilliard on his premises resorted to his place of business where Hilliard served them liquors under their directions, which persons so congregated met in social intercourse, etc.

On October 20, 1917, this cause was set down for hearing on bill and answer.

On October 23, 1917, the court made and entered its decree granting a temporary injuction, restraining and enjoining the sheriff from thereafter seizing liquors in Hillard's place of business and interfering with Hilliard in serving such liquors.

On October 29, 1917, the sheriff entered his appeal from the decree of the court granting the temporary injunction as prayed.

The appellant assigns as errors in the court below the following:

,'(1) The court erred in entering said decree, enjoining and restraining the defendant J. C. Van Pelt, as sheriff of Escambia county, Fla., as he is therein enjoined and restrained.

'(2) The court...