Van Riper v. Constitutional Government League
| Citation | 96 P.2d 588,1 Wn.2d 635 |
| Decision Date | 07 December 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27670. |
| Parties | VAN RIPER v. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT LEAGUE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Department 2.
Action on a death benefit certificate by Effie M. Van Riper against the Constitutional Government League. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald, Judge.
James Young and R. J. Faussett, both of Seattle, for appellant.
Skeel McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, of Seattle, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought suit to recover judgment upon a death benefit certificate issued by defendant. The action was resisted upon the ground that the death of the decedent was caused by acts which were specifically excepted from the risks assumed in the certificate. Trial Before the court without a jury resulted in findings, conclusions, and judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant has appealed.
Appellant, designating itself as a political educational, benevolent, analytical, and non-profit corporation, was incorporated in this state under and by virtue of Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 3872-3883, inclusive. As a part of its regular business, it receives individual applications for registration with the corporation, and, in connection therewith, charges registration fees and also semi-annual dues.
For the purpose of assisting widows, orphans, and other persons dependent upon deceased registrants, it creates and maintains a number of death benefit funds which are financed and supported by registration fees, semi-annual dues for overhead expenses, and fixed contributions from each member of so-called 'mutual benevolent' groups composed of the more than five hundred registrants. The purpose of the plan is to provide the benefits of life insurance to the registrants composing the groups, on a mutually cooperative basis. Upon the death of a registrant, his named beneficiary becomes entitled to an amount represented by the collection of one dollar from each contributing registrant within the particular group.
On January 25, 1936, appellant issued a certificate of registration to William Edmund Van Riper, a barber, residing at Pontiac, Michigan. Respondent was designated as his beneficiary. The certificate, which entitled the registrant to participate in two groups, has at all times since been in full force and effect.
This controversy grows out of the following provision of the certificate, the material part of which, so far as this action is concerned, appears in italics: 'It is agreed and understood that in the absence of fraud, the sum available under any Benevolent Group shall be incontestable and absolutely free from any conditions as to residence, travel, place or manner of death, except suicide or death due to acts committed in criminal violation of Law, including picketing, or the use of intoxicating liquor or narcotics.' (Italics supplied)
Registrant William E. Van Riper met his death in an automobile accident in Michigan on the night of October 17, 1937. It appears from the evidence that, at about 6:30 P. M., Mr. Van Riper, accompanied by his wife and three daughters, was driving west along a graveled county road, approaching a paved arterial highway. The night had become dark and foggy, after a light rain earlier in the evening. A stop sign was posted at the edge of the graveled road about two hundred feet east of the arterial highway. Mr. Van Riper failed to heed the warning sign and drove into the intersection at an excessive rate of speed. In attempting to make a sharp turn to the left within the intersection, he lost control of his car which skidded and collided with another car proceeding south along the arterial highway. As a result of the collision, Mr. Van Riper received injuries from which he died that night.
There was no proof of the traffic law of the state of Michigan, and, hence, it must be presumed to be the same as the traffic law of this state.
Assuming, then, as we must, that the relevant law of Michigan is the same as the Washington motor vehicle act (Laws of 1937, chapter 189, p. 835; Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 6360-1 to 6360-154, inclusive), it is clear from the evidence that Mr. Van Riper violated a number of its provisions. By § 150 of the Washington law (Rem.Rev.Stat. § 6360-150), the violation of any provision of the act constitutes a misdemeanor unless otherwise declared to be a felony or gross misdemeanor. It is not contended herein that the violations committed by Mr. Van Riper constituted more than mere misdemeanors.
Proceeding, then, from the premise that Mr. Van Riper was guilty of negligence which proximately caused his death and that his violations of the statute constituted misdemeanors, we have for decision but one question, namely, whether his violations were 'criminal' and fell within the exception of the provision quoted above.
While the certificate in question is not, strictly speaking, an insurance policy, it is similar to it in nature, and its provisions with reference to liability for death benefits are subject to the same rules as are applicable to analogous provisions in policies of insurance. 1 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, 335; § 168; 2 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d ed.) 971; 45 C.J. 21, 22, § 20.
The rule is well settled generally that a condition voiding a life insurance policy if the death of the insured is caused by, or is the direct result of, the violation of any law, is a valid enforceable provision. 6 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, pp. 4511 et seq., § 1236; 6 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d ed.), pp. 5201 to 5215. Some of the cases recognizing that a traffic violation is a 'violation of law' within the meaning of such an exemption clause in an insurance policy are the following: Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal.App. 308, 299 P. 831; Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N.W. 454, 4 A.L.R. 1235; Lamb v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 129 Kan. 234, 282 P. 699; Witt v. Spot Cash Ins. Co., 128 Kan. 155, 276 P. 804; Ayres v. Atlas Ins. Co., 123 Neb. 285, 242 N.W. 604; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grimsley, 160 Va. 325, 168 S.E. 329; Flannagan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 4 Cir., 22 F.2d 136; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eaton, 4 Cir., 84 F.2d 528.
However the authorities just cited are not controlling of the question here, for the reason that the exception in the certificate under consideration was not for ' a violation of law,' nor for ' any violation of law,' but for 'acts...
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...acts could be read as denoting only intentional criminal acts. Peasley supports his argument by citing Van Riper v. Constitutional Gov't League, 1 Wash.2d 635, 96 P.2d 588 (1939). Van Riper concerned a death benefit certificate which a wife sought to enforce after her husband died in a car ......
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