Van Tassel v. Superior Court

Decision Date03 October 1974
Docket NumberS.F. 23114
Citation526 P.2d 969,12 Cal.3d 624,116 Cal.Rptr. 505
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 526 P.2d 969 Barbara VAN TASSEL, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent; 20TH CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, Real Party in Interest. In Bank

Clark & Glennon, and William G. Clark, San Jose, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

R. W. Levy, Fresno, for real party in interest.

McCOMB, Justice.

Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition restraining respondent court from enforcing a preliminary injunction and from proceeding further with an action filed by real party in interest for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief.

Facts: Petitioner is the mother of Pamela Parrish, who was killed in an accident while riding in an automobile owned by Arnold Wiebe, Inc., and leased to Caruthers Union High School District. The other motor vehicle involved in the accident was uninsured.

Kenneth Van Tassel, the husband of petitioner, and the stepfather of Pamela, was the named insured under a policy, which included uninsured motorist coverage, issued by real party in interest. Under the policy, the 'named insured' includes the insured's spouse if a resident of the same household, and the unqualified word 'insured' includes the relatives of the named insured while residents of the same household as the named insured. A factual question exists as to whether Pamela was a resident of the same household as her mother and her stepfather, the named insured.

Under the policy, the insurer is obligated to pay 'all damages which the insured becomes legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of Bodily injury sustained by the insured,s caused by accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such automobile; provided that (1) determination as to whether the insured is legally entitled to recover such damages, and (if so entitled) the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the Company Or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration . . ..' (Italics added.)

Real party in interest filed an action in respondent court seeking to enjoin petitioner from arbitrating her claim that Pamela was covered under the uninsured motorist provision contained in its policy and that it was therefore liable for damages resulting from Pamela's death. Respondent court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner from proceeding to arbitration. Following denial by the Court of Appeal of petitioner's petition for a writ of prohibition, this court granted a hearing and issued an alternative writ restraining any action relating to the injunction enjoining arbitration until further order of this court.

Question: Is the factual question whether a claimant is an insured under an uninsured motorist provision arbitrable?

Yes. As hereinabove pointed out, there is an arbitration agreement in the policy specifically authorizing arbitration in the event of disagreement with respect to the question whether an insured is legally entitled to recover damages. Such an agreement is required by the terms of section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code. 1 The existence of the arbitration agreement does not depend upon the standing of a claimant to recover. The agreement was made by the insurer and the named insured, as mandated by the statute; and anyone claiming to be an insured under the broad definition contained in the policy is claiming as a third party beneficiary of the named insured and is bound by the terms of the agreement made by him.

This court held in Orpustan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 7 Cal.3d 988, 103 Cal.Rptr. 919, 500 P.2d 1119, that under section 11580.2 of the Insurance Code and the provisions of the policy there involved the entire controversy with respect to a claim made under the uninsured motorist provision was to be determined by arbitration, including jurisdictional facts. Orpustan involved injuries which resulted after an insured automobile ran off the road in an apparent attempt to avoid collision with another vehicle (never identified and hence regarded as uninsured); and the jurisdictional fact was whether there had been physical contact between the two cars, such contact being required by statute for the claim to be covered under the uninsured motorist provision. We did not in any way indicate that other jurisdictional facts were to be regarded differently and intended our holding to pertain to jurisdictional facts generally.

It will be noted that in Orpustan the plaintiff had raised the larger issue of the scope of arbitration; and after stating the plaintiff's contention that all disputes arising under such coverage should be subject to arbitration, we said, 'It is our opinion that plaintiff's view should...

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    ...as reposing in the arbitrator primary jurisdiction over some or all issues of coverage. See Van Tassel v. Superior Court of Fresno Cty., 12 Cal.3d 624, 526 P.2d 969, 116 Cal.Rptr. 505 (1974) (arbitrator decides all jurisdictional facts); Orpustan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 7 Cal.3d ......
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