Van v. Zahorik

Decision Date07 July 1999
Docket NumberDocket No. 111254, Calendar No. 2.
Citation460 Mich. 320,597 N.W.2d 15
PartiesScott VAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary ZAHORIK, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Geoffrey A. Sparks, Marinette, for plaintiff-appellant.

Jonathan P. Barstow, Menominee, for defendant-appellee.

John Forczak, Ypsilanti, for Children's Law Council for Children's Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan.

Katherine L. Barnhart, P.C. (by Karen S. Sendelbach), Bloomfield Hills, for Family Law Council for Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan.

Opinion

TAYLOR, J.

At issue is whether a person with a longstanding relationship to a child, but who is not a biological or legal parent of the child and not related by marriage to the child's biological parent, may pursue parental rights with the child under a theory of equitable parenthood or equitable estoppel. We conclude that plaintiff fails to state a claim to pursue parental rights with respect to the two children at issue under either theory, and, accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary disposition.

Facts and Proceedings

Plaintiff Scott Van and Defendant Mary Zahorik cohabited from 1986 to 1991 but were never married. Mr. Van claims that he and Ms. Zahorik continued their relationship for several years after they stopped living together. Ms. Zahorik had two children in the course of this relationship; one in 1989 and the other in 1993. Mr. Van alleges that Ms. Zahorik informed him that he was the father of the children. He believes that he was named as the father on the birth certificates of both children. He claims that he cared for and financially supported the children both during and after his relationship with Ms. Zahorik.

As of March 21, 1996, when Mr. Van started a relationship with another woman, Ms. Zahorik refused to allow Mr. Van to see the children. However, on March 25, 1996, Ms. Zahorik filed a paternity complaint against Mr. Van in which she alleged that he was the father of both children. Ms. Zahorik apparently dismissed this action. On July 26, 1996, Mr. Van filed an petition to establish paternity in which he alleged that he "believed and continues to believe he is the father" of the two children. On August 22, 1996, Ms. Zahorik filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), in which she argued that Mr. Van was not the biological father of either child1 and could not be an "equitable parent" to them because Mr. Van and Ms. Zahorik were never married. In response, Mr. Van conceded that blood testing showed that he was not the biological father but argued that he was an "equitable parent" and that Ms. Zahorik was equitably estopped from denying that he is the father. The trial court granted Ms. Zahorik's motion for summary disposition. The trial court indicated that its ruling turned on two factors: 1) that Mr. Van apparently was not the biological father of the children, and 2) that Mr. Van and Ms. Zahorik were never married. The Court noted that Michigan's public policy favored marriage and concluded that the doctrines of equitable estoppel, equitable parenthood, and equitable adoption require marriage.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. 227 Mich.App. 90, 575 N.W.2d 566 (1997). The majority noted that Michigan's public policy favors marriage and that the Legislature has enacted "a comprehensive statutory scheme dealing with issues such as the one in the case at bar." Id. at 96, 99, 575 N.W.2d 566. It held at 99, 575 N.W.2d 566:

In sum, the equitable parent doctrine has previously been applied only in situations where a child was born or conceived during a marriage, to convey equitable parenting status on a husband who was not the biological father of the child. Because of the magnitude of the policy considerations involved in extending application of the doctrine outside such circumstances and the presence of a complex statutory scheme dealing with such issues, we defer to the Legislature and decline to accord plaintiff equitable parent status.

It also rejected Mr. Van's equitable estoppel claim. It acknowledged that "[e]quitable estoppel can be used to estop a `father' who is not biologically related to a child from denying responsibilities associated with paternity." Id. at 100, 575 N.W.2d 566. However, it concluded at 101-102, 575 N.W.2d 566:

[I]n the case at bar we are asked to apply equitable estoppel against a natural parent to allow a third party parental visitation rights. There is no authority requiring us to apply equitable estoppel in such a manner, and out of judicial restraint, we refuse to do so. While plaintiff's argument that, if he theoretically could be estopped from denying a support obligation, he should have the right to visitation is sound, and there may be some implicit relationship between the duty to support and the right to visitation, Atkinson [v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 609, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987) ], we feel that in light of the policy considerations at issue, it is necessary to stop the expanding application of equitable estoppel and the corresponding decay of the equitable parent doctrine. Such a holding may seem arbitrary, but we feel strongly that such action is necessary to prevent further, improper, judicial intrusion into this legislative policy arena. As a result, we decline to apply equitable estoppel in the case at bar.

The majority further noted that equitable estoppel is not itself a cause of action and provides no remedy. Id. at 102, 575 N.W.2d 566. It concluded that Mr. Van improperly attempted to assert equitable estoppel as a cause of action. Id.

In a separate opinion, Judge Hood concurred in the majority's rejection of Mr. Van's equitable parenthood claim, but dissented from its rejection of his equitable estoppel claim. He stated that under Guise v. Robinson, 219 Mich.App. 139, 555 N.W.2d 887 (1996), Mr. Van would be estopped from denying liability for support payments. 227 Mich.App. at 106, 575 N.W.2d 566. He concluded:

I respectfully submit that it would be inequitable to hold that plaintiff could be liable for support payments but could not enjoy the benefits of visitation because he is not related to the children by blood. Defendant should be bound by the same rules of equitable estoppel as plaintiff.

* * *

I would hold that defendant should be equitably estopped from contesting plaintiff's rights to visit the children. [Id.]

This Court granted leave to appeal. 458 Mich. 865, 582 N.W.2d 836 (1998).

Standard of Review

The applicability of the doctrines of equitable parenthood or equitable estoppel arose in the context of Ms. Zahorik's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). This Court reviews rulings on summary disposition motions de novo. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998).

MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be granted. The motion must be granted if no factual development could justify the plaintiff's claim for relief.
Discussion

We begin with the premise that child custody disputes raise important public policy issues. We agree with the Court of Appeals majority, which stated:

As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. See In re Kurzyniec Estate, 207 Mich.App. 531, 543, 526 N.W.2d 191 (1994). This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: "The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours—of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternatives—is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's." O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 524, 542, 273 N.W.2d 829 (1979). [227 Mich.App. at 95, 575 N.W.2d 566.]

Specifically, this Court has indicated that the public policy issues related to child custody disputes are to be resolved by the Legislature, not the judiciary:

We are mindful of the extensive writings with regard to parental rights, the "best interests of the child" standard, "psychological parents," and the arguments, pro and con, for creating third-party rights to custody. We are also aware of the constitutional issues raised by the creation of third-party rights to custody. However, we are not in a position to make such policy judgments, especially in light of the fact that the Legislature appears to have chosen a different course in its consideration of the competing interests involved. Therefore, we leave to the Legislature the task of creating substantive rights, subject to any constitutional restraints, if it finds that public policy so requires. [Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 46-47, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992).]

Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals observation that the Legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme to deal with such issues in the Child Custody Act, M.C.L. § 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq. See 227 Mich.App. at 99, 575 N.W.2d 566. MCL 722.24; MSA 25.312(4) states that in all actions involving dispute of a minor child's custody, courts are to declare children's inherent rights and establish the rights and duties regarding custody, support and parenting time "in accordance with this act." Therefore, the Child Custody Act is the exclusive means for pursuing such rights. In addition to addressing child custody disputes between parents and between a parent and state agency, the Child Custody Act specifically addresses the rights of certain other parties, e.g., legal guardians and grandparents. MCL 722.26b; MSA 25.312(6b), M.C.L. § 722.27b; MSA 25.312(7b). However, none of these specific provisions cover Mr. Van's circumstance.

For purposes of the Child Custody Act, Mr. Van is a third...

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