Van Winkle v. King

• Decision Date: 05 December 1911
• Parties: VAN WINKLE v. KING et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

141 S.W. 46

145 Ky. 691

VAN WINKLE v. KING et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 5, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Whitley County.

Action by H. C. King and another against John S. Van Winkle. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Gillis & Gillis and Greene & Van Winkle, for appellant.

Tye &amp Siler, for appellees.

LASSING J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Whitley circuit court, in which the appellee King and his law partner, C. W. Lester, as plaintiffs, sought to recover of John S. Van Winkle the sum of $200, in consideration of their giving their consent that he might settle a certain lawsuit upon such terms as he could make with appellee's clients, the Anderson heirs. It appears that the heirs of Jacob Anderson had sued one John V Le Moyne for an interest in a tract of land containing about 8,000 acres. Le Moyne had acquired title to this land through the mother of appellant, and the testimony shows that, after this suit had been pending for some time, appellant, who lived in Danville, Ky. went to Williamsburg and had a conference with the attorneys King and Lester, representing the Andersons, and as a result of this conference, according to the testimony of both King and Lester, Van Winkle proposed that he would personally pay them a fee of $200 if they would consent that he might go to their clients and adjust the litigation. Van Winkle denies making this promise to pay them any sum whatever, though he admits having a conference with them, and that upon said occasion he procured a letter from King and Lester addressed to the Anderson heirs, advising them in substance that they were willing that the settlement proposed by Van Winkle should be made. Following this conference Van Winkle visited the Anderson heirs and procured from them a quitclaim deed to the property in question; and after this the lawsuit was dismissed, settled. The $200 being unpaid, suit was brought, and upon a trial in the lower court plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment; hence this appeal.

In the first place it is insisted for Van Winkle that he made no such promise. This was a matter for the determination of the jury. The jury found that such a promise was made, and the weight of the evidence is in accord with the finding of the jury on this disputed fact.

It is next urged that, if the promise was made, there was no consideration for it. In 9 Cyc. 308, we find a "consideration" thus defined: "Various definitions of consideration are to be found in the text-books and judicial opinions. A sufficient one is a benefit to the party promising, or a loss or a detriment to the party to whom the promise is made." And again, on page 311, we find that: "It may be laid down as a general rule, in accordance with the definition given above, that there is a sufficient consideration for a promise if there is any benefit to the promisor or any loss or detriment to the promise. It is not necessary that the benefit should accrue to the person making the promise; it is sufficient that something valuable flows from the person to whom it is made, or that he suffers some prejudice or inconvenience, and that the promise is the inducement to the transaction." Measured by this definition, it is immaterial whether appellant, Van Winkle, received any personal benefit from this transaction or not. By reason of his promise the consent of appellee to the settlement of the Anderson-Le Moyne suit was produced, and a result of such consent on the part of appellee the settlement was made upon terms acceptable to appellant and the suit was dismissed. This surrender on the part of appellee of his right to further prosecute the suit,...