Van Woy v. Willis

• Citation: 153 Fla. 189,14 So.2d 185
• Parties: VAN WOY v. WILLIS et al.
• Decision Date: 18 June 1943
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

14 So.2d 185

153 Fla. 189

VAN WOY v. WILLIS et al.

Florida Supreme Court

June 18, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; A. O Kanner, judge.

McCarthy Bond & Lane and Edward McCarthy, Jr., all of Jacksonville, and J. Franklin Garner, of Lakeland, for appellant.

Milam McIlvaine & Milam, of Jacksonville, for appellees.

CHAPMAN, Justice.

The Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, sustained a motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint, in the case at bar, thereby holding that the allegations thereof were legally insufficient to support a decree for the relief prayed. The plaintiff declined to file a second amended bill of complaint and the amended bill was dismissed and an appeal therefrom perfected to this court.

Pertinent allegations of the amended bill are viz.: Prior to September 18, 1940, 'The Casements', the former home of the late John D. Rockefeller, Sr., located at Daytona Beach, Florida, now owned by the latter's estate and controlled by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the executor. The plaintiff, Maud van Woy, was interested in the property as a school for girls. She was not familiar with real estate values; that she was desirous of an interview with John D Rockefeller, Jr., for a discussion with him looking toward the possible purchase of the property; that plaintiff was a resident of Washington, D. C., and engaged in the operation of a girls' school in said city.

Pierre Le Jard Willis was a real estate broker of West Palm Beach and contacted the plaintiff during the months of August September and October, 1940, with the view of selling her 'The Casements' as a school for girls for the sum of $75,000. Willis at the time was not the agent of Rockefeller, nor was he the owner of 'The Casements'. He falsely represented to the plaintiff that he was the agent of the owner of the property and stated that it could not be purchased for less than $75,000; that he had been designated by the owner as the exclusive agent to sell the property and was only interested to the extent of the usual and proper real estate commission.

The plaintiff requested Willis, it is alleged, to arrange an interview for her with the owners so that she might personally determine if they would be willing to sell 'The Casements' for a sum of money less than $75,000, and he (Willis) agreed so to contact the owners and arrange for the interview; that Willis did not contact the owners, as promised, but thereafter returned to the plaintiff and falsely announced that he had contacted the owners but they did not care to bother with details and would not consent to an interview, and falsely stated that he had been given authority to act for the owners and that they would deal with plaintiff only through him, and the purchase price was definitely fixed at $75,000; that the statements so made by Willis to the plaintiff were false and plaintiff believed they were true and acted upon these false representations and signed a written agreement on September 18, 1940, agreeing to pay $75,000 for 'The Casements', and paid Willis $5,000 as a down payment on the purchase price; that the written agreement so signed contained false recitals, falsely represented by Willis to the plaintiff as being placed therein pursuant to the direction of the owners.

The $5,000 check, down payment, was payable to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and delivered by plaintiff to Willis. It is further alleged that Willis never tendered the check to the owners but as a step in the schemes and plans of defendant to deceive the plaintiff, returned it to her and stated that John D. Rockefeller, Jr., requested that in lieu of the $5,000 check payable to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., that two checks be issued by plaintiff payable to Willis--one for $1,000 and the other for $4,000; that the requested change was falsely represented by Willis to be the request of the owners.

Another step in Willis' scheme and plan to defraud plaintiff occurred on or about October 16, 1940, when he advised plaintiff that the owners requested the execution of a second purchase contract for the property whereby Willis was placed in control of the sale and falsely represented that it was the owners' request so as to relieve them of the incidental details of negotiations. That the statements were false and made by Willis for the purpose of obtaining her money and signature to the contract of purchase, and plaintiff acted on the false representations and the owners of the property were without knowledge of the false representations made to plaintiff by Willis.

Plaintiff prior to signing the second purchase price contract again requested Willis to secure an interview for her with the owners for the purpose of obtaining a price on the property less than $75,000; that Willis agreed so to do and after a short time returned to the plaintiff and falsely represented that he had contacted the owners and presented the request for the interview but that the owners declined the requested interview, which representations were false and untrue. That he stated if the property was to be purchased by the plaintiff, negotiations would have to be made with him (Willis) as the sole representative of the owners and that the owners were unwilling to accept less than $75,000, which statements were false, but plaintiff, believing them to be true, acted to her loss and detriment.

Plaintiff requested Willis to contact the owners and ascertain from them if more favorable terms of payment could be obtained than enumerated in the second contract of purchase, which he agreed to do, but shortly thereafter returned to plaintiff and falsely represented that the owners were unwilling to grant better terms. It is alleged that the statements were false because Willis did not contact the owners; was not their exclusive agent in the sale of the property, and the owners had never been requested to grant plaintiff better terms. That the plaintiff believed the false representations made to her by Willis as true and acted thereon to her injury.

Plaintiff requested an adjustment of a clause in the second mortgage and requested Willis to contact the owners with a view of eliminating the same. The objectionable clause required the plaintiff's school located in Washington, D. C., to endorse the notes. Willis agreed to contact the owners and present plaintiff's request. Some few days intervened, when he returned and falsely represented to the plaintiff that the owners would not sell the property on terms without the objectionable clause. That Willis had never contacted the owners or requested of them an adjustment and plaintiff, believing the false statements to be true, acted upon same to her injury. The second agreement was obtained from plaintiff by Willis on the false representation that he was the exclusive agent for the owner; that he had presented plaintiff's request for an interview, the request for more favorable terms, and the request for an adjustment of a clause in the mortgage, and falsely represented that the owners had declined each request, and that the statements were false and known to be false on the part of Willis.

The amended bill further alleged that Willis knew the property could be bought for less than $75,000; that Willis falsely and fraudulently represented to the plaintiff that he was agent for the owners and was handling the property in their behalf; that he falsely represented that the owners were unwilling to sell the same for less than $75,000, when as a matter of truth and fact the owners were willing to sell it for $37,500, and did sell it to Willis for said sum. Willis represented to the plaintiff that he was interested in the sale of the property to the limited extent of a proper and usual real estate commission. The truth was that Willis was not the agent of the owners; he had never contacted them or presented plaintiff's request to the owners; that he was interested to a greater extent than the usual and just real estate commission as a broker; that he was interested in a large profit from the sale of the property, to-wit, $37,500, because the owners of the property were willing to sell the same for $37,500.

Paragraph 5 of the amended bill is viz.: 'This plaintiff further alleges that as a part and parcel of the defendant's scheme to defraud this plaintiff into paying more than she should have for the property, the defendant upon and after the execution of the contract last mentioned, contacted the owners of the property with the view of purchasing for himself, the defendant, these premises at and for the sum of Thirty-seven Thousand Five Hundred ($37,500.00) Dollars, and that the owners of the property did enter into such contract with the defendant, the same being entered into on October 21, 1940, and the plaintiff alleges that the consideration paid to the owners of the said property at the time of the execution of said contract was the same Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars or a part thereof, which the defendant had fraudulently obtained from this plaintiff as hereinabove alleged and that the plaintiff did not know of this transaction at the time of completing the purchase of said property nor was known by the plaintiff until a much later time as is herein alleged.'

Plaintiff alleged further that the $5,000 paid by her to Willis was by Willis paid to the owners and a purchase price contract signed wherby Willis was to acquire title to 'The Casements' for $37,500. Willis assisted plaintiff in raising the $37,500 which was obtained from a bank at Daytona Beach. That this was necessary in order to close the sale agreement between the owners and Willis so that the title could be transferred to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then executed a second mortgage for $37,500 to Willis on 'The Casements' and...