Vance v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 29 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 2530-II,2530-II
• Citation: 18 Wn.App. 418,569 P.2d 1194
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: William E. VANCE, Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Seattle Civil Service Commission, and David Towne, Superintendent of Department of Parks and Recreation, Respondents.

Page 418

18 Wn.App. 418

569 P.2d 1194

William E. VANCE, Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Seattle Civil Service Commission, and David Towne, Superintendent of Department of Parks and Recreation, Respondents.

No. 2530-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Aug. 29, 1977.

Stanley R. Byrd, Clinton, Fleck, Glein & Brown, Seattle, for appellant.

John P. Harris, Corp. Counsel, Philip M. King, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, for respondents.

REED, Judge.

William E. Vance appeals from an order of the King County Superior Court which dismissed an action by which Vance sought review of a City of Seattle Civil Service Commission ruling which upheld his discharge by that city's Superintendent of Parks and Recreation.

Mr. Vance filed his complaint January 31, 1974 and the City filed responsive pleadings asserting, inter alia, defenses of the statute of limitations and laches. The trial court applied the 3-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080, and dismissed Vance's action because it was not filed within 3 years from December 1, 1970, the date of Vance's dismissal. Vance contends on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that the statute did not commence to run, or in the alternative that it was tolled, until the Commission acted to sustain his dismissal on April 14, 1971. We affirm the dismissal of Vance's action, but on a ground different from that assigned thereto by the trial court.

The facts are these. On December 1, 1970 plaintiff was dismissed from his position as Senior Public Information Representative by the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation. Pursuant to the city charter provisions and civil service commission rules, ¹ plaintiff made timely application to the civil service commission for a reversal of his dismissal, for reinstatement and for back pay. After an investigation had been conducted and hearings held in accordance with the charter and civil service rules, the Commission entered findings and conclusions on April 14, 1971 upholding the dismissal. In May of 1971 plaintiff commenced an action in King County Superior Court seeking reversal of the Commission's decision and again asking for reinstatement and back pay. This action was dismissed without prejudice on June 9, 1972 because plaintiff failed to file a transcript of the civil service proceeding. Prior to dismissal, the matter had been set for trial and continued once at plaintiff's behest. Plaintiff subsequently procured the necessary transcript and refiled his complaint January 31, 1974. The complaint was almost identical to his original complaint and sought the same relief. It is from a dismissal of this second effort to reverse the Commission's order that plaintiff appeals.

As mentioned, the trial court based its dismissal on RCW 4.16.080, the 3-year statute of limitations. On appeal, as in the trial court, the parties have addressed only the issue of laches and the question of whether the clock should have started running on plaintiff's "cause of action" on December 1, 1970, the date of the discharge, or on April 14, 1971, the date of final Commission action. We have determined, however, that the question is really one of the timeliness of judicial review. ²

The parties concede that plaintiff had no access to the courts of this state until he had exhausted his administrative remedies before the Civil Service Commission as prescribed by charter and commission rules. State ex rel. Dunn v. Elliott, 6 Wash.2d 426, 107 P.2d 915 (1940). Plaintiff has further conceded, as we think he must, that he seeks by his "complaint" in superior court, not a trial de novo, but a review of the civil service commission action. That it was so considered by the trial court is evidenced by its dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff's first complaint on the ground that he had not filed a transcript of the civil service proceedings. The parties also agree that the scope of judicial review of the Commission's action is extremely limited. As stated in State ex rel. Littau v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 64, 69, 63 P.2d 515, 517 (1937):

The principle of law governing the situation is this: When, in a case of removal from office or position within the classified civil service, it appears that the appointing power has filed with the civil service commission a written statement of the reasons for the removal, upon charges that cannot be said to be utterly frivolous, and when it further appears that the commission has awarded the party charged a full opportunity to be heard, and that competent evidence has been produced tending, in some measure at least, to prove the charges made, the court may not inquire into the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Its power is confined to the inquiry whether the officers entrusted with the authority to effect removals and discharges have acted within the prescribed rules.

And in State ex rel. Perry v. Seattle, 69 Wash.2d 816, 820, 420 P.2d 704, 707 (1966), the court said:

Upon review by certiorari the function of the court is equally important, but of a different nature. The court is neither a fact-finding agency, a policy-making body, nor a hiring hall. Its function is limited to testing the legality of the administrative procedure. Was a written statement filed setting forth reasons for the discharge? Were the charges so frivolous that all minds must necessarily agree that a legitimate cause for discharge was not stated? Was respondent advised of the charges preferred against him? Was he afforded the right of a full and complete hearing with the aid of counsel? Did the commission disregard the facts? Was the commission's decision made upon "an inherently wrong basis" . . .? Was the action of the commission arbitrary and capricious?

(Citations omitted.)

Plaintiff, having pursued the appropriate administrative procedures to a conclusion, and feeling aggrieved by the Commission decision, was entitled to a judicial review of that determination by filing in a timely manner an appropriate proceeding in superior court. This is true because administrative determinations of the type herein involved are judicial in nature; the public body acts as an inferior or lower court in the state's judicial system. Okanogan County School Dist. 400 v. Andrews, 58 Wash.2d 371, 363 P.2d 129 (1961). As such a tribunal, the Commission's final determination, in the absence of statutes or rules providing for a right of appeal, are subject to review by means of the writ of certiorari. RCW 7.16.040; ³ Reagles v. Simpson, 72 Wash.2d 577, 434 P.2d 559 (1967); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash.2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963); Wurth v. Affeldt, 265 Wis. 119, 60 N.W.2d 708, 40 A.L.R.2d 1376 (1953); 14 C.J.S. Certiorari § 37(a) at 180 (1939).

In our state, the time within which certiorari must be applied for is determined by reference to the time prescribed by statute or court rule for bringing an appeal. Reagles v. Simpson, supra; Pierce v. King County, supra; State ex rel. Buchanan & Co. v. Washington Public Serv. Comm., 39 Wash.2d 706, 237 P.2d 1024 (1951); State ex rel. Von Herberg v. Superior Court, 6 Wash.2d 615, 108 P.2d 826 (1940) (mandamus); Spooner v. Seattle, 6 Wash. 370, 33 P. 963 (1893).

In State ex rel. Lowary v. Superior Court, 41 Wash. 450, 452, 83 P. 726, 727 (1906), the court entertained a tardy application for a writ of review because of the relator's incompetency, but states The statute does not fix the time within which such applications (writ of review) must be made, but the courts by analogy apply the limitation fixed by law for the prosecution of an appeal.

In State ex rel. Alexander v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 684, 85 P. 673 (1906), the court adopts what it describes as the then "current of authority," as exemplified by cited cases from other jurisdictions, and follows the rule set forth in Lowary; the court recognizes, however, that there may be extenuating circumstances excusing a lack of diligence and calling for the exercise of the court's discretion to extend the time for seeking the writ. Later cases adhering to the rule are State ex rel. Barry v. Superior Court, 179 Wash. 55, 35 P.2d 1095 (1934); State ex rel. Clark v. Superior Court, 167 Wash. 481, 10 P.2d 233 (1933); State ex rel. Neal v. Kauffman, 86 Wash. 172, 149 P. 656 (1915); State ex rel. Jakubowski v. Superior Court, 84 Wash. 663, 147 P. 408 (1915), and State ex rel. Tumwater Power & Water Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Wash. 287, 105 P. 815 (1909). See also the cases collected in State ex rel. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 134 Wash. 620, 236 P. 99 (1925).

Turning to the case before us, at all times pertinent to Vance's grievance, there was no statute or rule specifically providing for a direct appeal from the city civil service commission rulings. However, appeals to the superior court from final decisions of courts of limited jurisdiction must be taken within 20 days. JCR 73(a). By analogy, Vance should have applied to the Superior Court for King County within 20 days from the date of the civil service commission decision which he sought to reverse. ⁴ Not having done so, his attempt to review that decision was not timely and was properly dismissed. Clark v. Chicago, 233 Ill. 113, 84 N.E. 170 (1908). Even though the trial court may have given an erroneous or insufficient reason for its dismissal, its action may be affirmed if it is sustainable on any ground within the pleadings and proof. Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash.2d 585, 446 P.2d 200...