Vance v. State
| Decision Date | 22 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. S92A0222,S92A0222 |
| Citation | 416 S.E.2d 516,262 Ga. 236 |
| Parties | VANCE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael C. Garrett, Augusta, for Vance.
Dupont K. Cheney, Dist. Atty., Hinesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Robert D. McCullers, Staff Atty. Atlanta, for the State.
Randy Edward Vance was convicted by a jury of one count of malice murder and one count of cruelty to children following the death of his girlfriend's 21-month-old son. The child died as the result of loss of blood from an internal organ ruptured by blunt trauma to the abdomen. Numerous other injuries were found on the child's body, including hemorrhaging inside his skull and around his brain, bruises on his arms and torso, and a tear in his anus consistent with the forceful insertion of a large foreign object.
Vance appeals his conviction and the sentences of life imprisonment for murder and 20 years to serve for cruelty to children. 1 We affirm.
1. Vance contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after the state asserted in its closing argument that the life of the couple's other child might be in danger if Vance were acquitted. Vance argues that this statement was prejudicial, had no basis in the evidence, and invited the jury to abandon their investigation of guilt or innocence and adopt the role of guardian for the younger child.
We disagree.
"[T]he state is permitted to argue that a defendant's probable future behavior 'indicates a need for the most effective means of incapacitation....' " Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640, 653, 398 S.E.2d 179 (1990) (). "Arguments addressing [future dangerousness] are not improper if based on evidence adduced at trial." Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 34, 326 S.E.2d 194 (1985); Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 730, 352 S.E.2d 762 (1987). We find the state's arguments regarding Vance's possible future behavior were permissible based on evidence that Vance caused the deceased child's death, and that the victim's mother had since given birth to another child fathered by Vance, had married Vance, and did not acknowledge any culpability whatsoever on the part of Vance in the victim's death.
2. In his second enumeration of error, Vance argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that "moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be required in a legal investigation." 2 Vance argues that the charge permitted the jury to convict on a lesser standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt," which is the standard of proof for conviction of a crime set forth in OCGA § 16-1-5. 3
We find that the court's charge as a whole repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt. 4 In light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the use of the words "moral and reasonable certainty" created no reversible error when "considered in the context of the charge as a whole." 5 Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S 307, 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).
3. Finally, we find that the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Vance guilty of malice murder and cruelty to children. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Judgment affirmed.
All Justices concur.
1 The crimes were committed on June 19, 1989. Vance was indicted on February 9, 1990, by a Long County grand jury. He was tried between April 2 and 4, 1990, and sentenced on April 4, 1990. Vance filed a motion for new trial on April 27, 1990, which was amended on September 5, 1991, and was denied on September 30, 1991. Vance filed his notice of appeal on October 8, 1991. The appeal was docketed in this court on November 14, 1991, and submitted without oral argument on December 27, 1991.
2 This language appears in OCGA § 24-4-3, which reads in full as follows:
3 OCGA § 16-1-5 states that "[n]o person shall be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
4 The trial judge gave the following charge regarding burden of proof, which is substantially the same as that recommended by the Council of Superior Court Judges...
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