Vance v. Upson

• Decision Date: 25 June 1886
• Citation: 1 S.W. 179
• Parties: VANCE v. UPSON, Ex'r, and others.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

1 S.W. 179

VANCE v. UPSON, Ex'r, and others.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 25, 1886.

Appeal from Bexar county.

Proceedings for the probate of an olographic will, and its codicils, and also to vacate the existing probate of a different will made by the same testator. Probate opposed on the ground of testator's insanity. Verdict and judgment for contestants, and proponent appeals therefrom.

T. G. Pray, for appellant, John Vance. Jacob Waeldes, for appellees, Columbus Upson, Ex'r, and others.

STAYTON, J.

The charge given by the court, without request, was a clear presentation of the law applicable to the case made by the evidence. It in clear language informed the jury as to the mental capacity requisite to the making of a valid will; defined an insane delusion; its true bearing on testamentary capacity fully explained; and could not have been misunderstood by a jury of ordinary intelligence.

The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth charges asked by the appellant were given, although some of them were, in substance, in apt language contained in the charge already given.

The first, second, third, and fourth charges requested by the appellant were properly refused. These charges ought not to have been given for two reasons:

1. They were charges upon the weight of evidence, and would have given the jury to understand the papers offered for probate of themselves were the best and sufficient evidence of the sanity of the testator, and that the jury might hold them so to be, notwithstanding the jury might be of the opinion, from the other evidence before them, that these papers were the offspring of a mind acting under an insane delusion which prompted their execution. This will be well illustrated by parts of the charges referred to, which are as follows: "Peculiar opinions or delusions of one who himself plans and executes his last will, will not invalidate such will unless those peculiar opinions or delusions appear on the face of the instrument itself." "Therefore, if you find from the evidence that the testator, James Vance, did have peculiar opinions, hallucinations, or delusions, that fact will not avail, unless you further find that those peculiar opinions or delusions appear on the face of the papers presented here to be probated." "The strongest and best proof that can arise as to a lucid interval or soundness of mind in the testator is that which arises from the act itself of making the will." "Therefore, if you find from the evidence that these wills were wholly planned and executed by James Vance, and that their provisions are proper and natural, and such as a rational man would make, — in other words, that it was a rational act, rationally done, — I instruct you that, as a matter of law, the whole case for the plaintiff is proved." These views run through all the charges which were refused, and to have given them would have violated the statute, which forbids a judge to charge upon the weight of evidence.

These requests were misleading, and calculated to withdraw the minds of the jury from the real issue in the case. The papers may be such as some rational men, situated as was the testator, might execute, with nothing apparent upon their faces to indicate a want of testamentary capacity, and still be the product of an unsound mind. The evidence in this case cannot be read without coming to the conclusion that James Vance was essentially an insane man from some time in the year 1868 until his death in the year 1881, and it seems not to be denied by the appellant that during a great part of that time he had not testamentary capacity. This is illustrated by the fact that other papers, executed as wills by the testator subsequently to the papers offered for probate, although in due form, and written by the testator himself, are, in effect, admitted to have been executed at a time when the testator had not testamentary capacity. This is further illustrated by the fact that a will, regular in form, executed between the time the will sought to have probated was executed and the time the codicils which are claimed to refer to it, and to be a part of it, is passed over, doubtless for the reason that the intervening will was thought to have been executed when the testator had not testamentary capacity. It is contended, however, that the will and codicils which the appellant seeks to have probated were executed at times when this unsound condition of mind had ceased to exist, at least for the time. The true inquiry was as to this fact, — as to the testator's mental condition at the time the papers offered for probate were executed.

After carefully instructing the jury as to the degree of mental capacity requisite to the making of a valid will, the court instructed the jury as follows: "If, however, he had not the qualities or capabilities above enumerated, or if, at the time, he was laboring under an insane delusion, either in regard to his property, or the natural and proper objects of his bounty, which affected the disposition he was attempting to make, or of which delusion the papers were the offspring or fruit, then such a person was not in a condition to make a valid will, and a will propounded under those circumstances ought to be set aside, and held for naught." These charges presented the real issues made by the evidence as well as the pleadings in the case, from which the requests would largely have withdrawn the mind of the jury, and fixed it upon the contents, form, and manner of execution of the papers offered for probate as the controlling facts from which the testamentary capacity of the testator was to be determined. If the papers offered for probate were wholly planned and executed by James Vance, and made such disposition of his property as a sane man similarly situated would be expected to make, then they would furnish strong evidence of his testamentary capacity, and a jury would doubtless give due weight to them. The court below more than once instructed the jury to consider the papers offered for probate, in connection with the other evidence in the case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time they were executed. This was as far as the court could legally go in giving instructions. The jury, from an inspection of the papers offered for probate, and from the other evidence in the case, might have come to the conclusion that the provisions made in them were proper and natural, and such as a rational man might or would make, but at the same time have believed, and been justified in believing, from all the evidence in the case, that they did not make such a disposition of the property as James Vance would have made had he not been acting under a delusion which affected the disposition of his property. Wills are not to be probated solely upon the ground that the disposition which a testator may make of his property seems to a court or jury a natural and proper disposition, nor are they to be refused probate because to the court or jury the disposition of the property may seem to be improper or immaterial. If any other rule were adopted, the validity of wills would depend on the varying opinions of courts and juries as to what was a natural, reasonable, and proper disposition of property, and not upon that absolute power of a testator, of sound and disposing mind, to dispose of his estate as to him may seem proper.

It is urged that a charge given at the request of the contestants withdrew from the consideration of the jury the instruments offered for probate, as evidence of the testamentary capacity of James Vance. That instruction was as follows: "The burden of proof that James Vance was of sound mind at the time of making the wills and codicils propounded in this case is upon the plaintiff, and unless the evidence shows that he was of sound mind at the time, then the instruments presented for probate, however drawn, cannot be regarded as the will of the said Vance, and the verdict of the jury should be for the defendants or contestants." This instruction could not have been understood to have such effect. It simply informed the jury that it must appear that James Vance was of...