Vance v. Vance
| Decision Date | 21 June 1940 |
| Parties | VANCE v. VANCE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied July 12, 1940.
Suit for divorce by Ann Clark Vance against John R. Vance. A final decree of divorce incorporating a property settlement agreement was granted to plaintiff, and, from a judgment granting defendant's petition to modify the final decree plaintiff appeals.
Reversed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis, judge.
Valz & Wise, of Jacksonville, for appellant.
Rush & Pierce and L. Page Haddock, all of Jacksonville, for appellee.
Appellant and appellee were married in June, 1924. In October, 1937, they entered into a property settlement agreement and in April, 1938, they were divorced by decree of the Circuit Court of Duval County, the material part of the property settlement agreement having been made a part of the divorce decree which was secured by appellant.
Under the property settlement, appellee agreed to, (1) pay appellant one hundred dollars per month for six years, (2) keep current a certain policy of life insurance in the sum of $5,000 for the benefit of appellant; (3) appellant agreed to make no pledge of the credit of appellee for any goods, wares, or merchandise; (4) certain rugs which had been acquired by the joint effort of both were to be taken and held by appellee as his property and all other personal property owned or acquired by the parties was to be the property of appellant; (5) appellant agreed that in the event she was granted a divorce, she would make no claim for dower or any other interest in appellee's estate acquired by reason of her marital status. All provisions of the property settlement were made binding on the parties, their heirs, executors, and administrators, assignees, and personal representatives.
In January, 1940, John R. Vance petitioned the Chancellor to modify the final decree of divorce to relieve him from payment of the one hundred dollars per month which he agreed to pay Ann Clark Vance and to require her to return to him the policy of life insurance which he had turned over to her and agreed to keep current for her benefit. Answer was filed to this petition and on the issues so made, John R. Vance moved for decree in his favor which was granted. This appeal is from that decree.
The question presented is whether or not the property settlement agreement is such an agreement as may be modified in the manner authorized by Chapter 16780, Acts of 1935, and whether or not the facts in this case warranted the modification made by the decree appealed from.
Chapter 16780, Acts of 1935, declares the policy of this state with reference to modifying property settlement agreements or decrees affecting such settlements. It authorizes courts of equity to raise or lower any amounts previously decreed by the Court or awarded by agreement for separate support, maintenance or alimony, as the changed circumstances and the financial ability of the parties may reveal. Agreements like that brought in question are covered by the act and may be modified in the manner provided.
The sole ground relied on to modify the settlement in this case is that appellant has remarried and that the monthly payments made to her amount to nothing more than alimony which she is not now entitled to. Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87, Id., 87 Fla. 460, 100 So. 745, and cases of like import are relied on to support appeallee's theory of the case and such cases appear to have been the reliance of the Chancellor.
Under a proper state of facts, the Carlton cases would warrant the Chancellor's conclusion but not so by the facts in this case. In the Carlton cases, there was no property settlement involved. There was a decree of divorce and Mrs. Carlton was awarded alimony on the theory that she had contributed to the estate of the husband during their married life but this part of the decree was cut off when she remarried.
In the case at bar, irreconcilable differences arose between the parties causing them to separate and live apart. They entered into a voluntary property settlement which was satisfactory to both and is not...
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