Vance v. Vance
| Decision Date | 28 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 17695,17695 |
| Citation | 375 S.E.2d 427,180 W.Va. 63 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Ervin VANCE v. Margaret Joan VANCE. |
Syllabus by the Court
Syllabus point 1, Somerville v. Somerville, 179 W.Va. 386, 369 S.E.2d 459 (1988).
Charles T. Bailey, Bailey & Wagner, Logan, for appellant.
Bernard L. Spaulding, Logan, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Logan County, entered April 7, 1987, which granted the parties a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. At issue in this appeal is the lower court's division of the couple's assets. We conclude that the lower court erred in its disposition of the parties' property, and we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings.
The parties, Ervin Vance and Margaret Joan Vance were married on December 14, 1973 in Logan County. The union produced one child, now emancipated. The parties began to experience marital difficulties in 1978 and separated a number of times, but always reconciled. In August 1985, the parties separated permanently, and Mr. Vance subsequently instituted divorce proceedings on grounds of irreconcilable differences and mental cruelty. Mrs. Vance filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a divorce on the same grounds.
The evidence adduced below showed that shortly before the marriage, Mr. Vance had purchased an ambulance business. After the marriage both parties worked in the business and were paid equal monthly salaries. Mrs. Vance initially did the paperwork in the office, but when she later qualified as an emergency medical technician, her duties were expanded to include driving the ambulances and rendering emergency medical services as well.
Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Vance had purchased a home in Crooked Creek and a lot in Mitchell Heights. In 1974 the parties contracted to build a house on the Mitchell Heights lot. Mrs. Vance sold the Crooked Creek home and applied the proceeds to the construction of the Mitchell Heights home, which was titled in the names of the parties jointly. The parties, their daughter and Mrs. Vance's three children from previous relationships moved into the Mitchell Heights home in 1976. Mrs. Vance was primarily responsible for homemaking and child rearing services throughout the marriage.
In 1977, Mr. Vance sold the ambulance business, but the buyer was subsequently unable to fulfill his obligation. Each of the parties then acquired 50% of the corporate stock and assumed joint ownership of the business. In 1981, Mrs. Vance transferred her interest in the business to her husband. In May 1983, Mr. Vance ceased working due to an injury, although he continued to receive a paycheck from the business until October 1983. Mrs. Vance ran the ambulance service alone until May 1985, when it apparently went out of business.
On August 25, 1985, the parties separated. Three days later, Mr. Vance cashed two certificates of deposit in the amount of $40,000. These investments, purchased by Mr. Vance in 1983 and 1984 with his earnings during the marriage, were titled in his name alone. On September 5, 1985, Mr. Vance instituted divorce proceedings in the Circuit Court of Logan County.
In his complaint, Mr. Vance sought title to the marital home, the household goods and furnishings and the parties' automobile. In her counterclaim, Mrs. Vance requested return of her separate property, including the proceeds of term life insurance policies on her children, and equitable distribution of the couple's marital property, including the marital home and household goods, the automobile, the proceeds of the certificates of deposit and the assets of the ambulance business. Mrs. Vance asserted that she had contributed to the acquisition, maintenance and improvement of this marital property by donating her earnings and assets and her homemaker and child care services.
By order dated April 7, 1987, the circuit court granted the parties a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. The court awarded Mr. Vance the proceeds of the certificates of deposit and title to the ambulance service and its assets. Mrs. Vance was awarded her separate property, including the proceeds of the insurance policies, and various items of personal property. The marital home and the automobile were ordered sold, the proceeds to be divided equally. 1
On appeal, Mrs. Vance contends that she was entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the certificates of deposit and of the ambulance business and its assets pursuant to our equitable distribution statute, W.Va.Code § 48-2-32 (1986 Replacement Vol.). The premise of the equitable distribution statute is the presumption that, in the absence of a valid separation agreement, the marital property of the parties to a divorce should be divided equally between them. W.Va.Code §§ 48-2-32(a), (c). The trial court may, however,
alter this distribution, without regard to fault, based on consideration of certain statutorily enumerated factors, including: (1) monetary contributions to marital property such as employment income, other earnings, and funds which were separate property; (2) non-monetary contributions to marital property, such as homemaker services, child care services, labor performed without compensation, labor performed in the acual maintenance or improvement of tangible marital property, or labor performed in the management or investment of assets which are marital property; (3) the effect of the marriage on the income-earning abilities of the parties, such as contributions by either party to the education or training of the other party, or foregoing by either party of employment or education; or (4) conduct by either party that lessened the value of marital property. W.Va.Code § 48-2-32(c) (1986).
Syllabus point 1, in part, Somerville v. Somerville, 179 W.Va. 386, 369 S.E.2d 459 (1988). After considering these factors, the circuit court is required to distinguish the separate property of the respective parties from their marital property and to determine the value of the marital assets before proceeding with their distribution to the parties. W.Va.Code §§ 48-2-32(d)(1)--(3).
As an initial matter, we conclude that at the time of the separation, the ambulance business and the certificates of deposit constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution. W.Va.Code § 48-2-1(e) (1986 Replacement Vol.) defines "marital property" as:
(1) All property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage including every valuable right and interest, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, real or personal, regardless of the form of ownership, whether legal or beneficial, whether individually held in trust by a third party, whether held by the parties to the marriage in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, or any other form of shared ownership recognized in other jurisdictions without this state except that marital property shall not include separate property as defined in subsection (f) of this section; and
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the parties to a marriage, which increase results from (a) an expenditure of funds which are marital property, including an expenditure of such funds which reduces indebtedness against separate property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise increases the net value of separate property, or (b) work performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.
"Separate property" is defined in W.Va.Code § 48-2-1(f) as:
(1) Property acquired by a person before marriage; or
(2) Property acquired by a person during marriage in exchange for separate property which was acquired before the marriage; or
(3) Property acquired by a person during marriage, but excluded from treatment as marital property by a valid agreement of...
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