Vance v. Wilson, A-10002

• Decision Date: 15 July 1964
• Docket Number: No. A-10002,A-10002
• Citation: 382 S.W.2d 107
• Parties: Clyde R. VANCE et al., Petitioners, v. Maud Lillian WILSON, Ind. Ex'x., Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 107

382 S.W.2d 107

Clyde R. VANCE et al., Petitioners, v. Maud Lillian WILSON, Ind. Ex'x., Respondent.

No. A-10002.

Supreme Court of Texas.

July 15, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1964.

Hardie, Grambling, Sims & Galatzan, El Paso, for petitioners.

Kerr, Day & Cook, Fort Worth, Hill D. Hudson, Pecos, for respondent.

NORVELL, Justice.

In essence this is a suit to declare invalid four deed of trust sales covering various parts of a section of land in Reeves County, Texas. The legal effect of a judgment rendered in Cause No. 65,906-C on the docket of the District Court of Wichita County, Texas, styled Maud Lillian Wilson, Executrix v. Billie Sol Estes is the controlling factor in the case.

The plaintiffs in the trial court were Clyde R. Vance, Clyde Littlefield, Gus Morris and R. G. Weatherly. The defendant was Maud Lillian Wilson, individually and as independent executrix of the estate of J. R. Wilson, deceased. Mrs. Wilson by counterclaim brought Billie Sol Estes into the case.

The subject matter of the suit is Section 24, Block 50, Township 8 of the Texas & Pacific Railway Surveys, Reeves County, Texas. The plaintiffs separately claim various acreages in the section while Mrs. Wilson claims the entire section.

Both sides conceded that there were no fact issues involved and made motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion. ¹ The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to render judgment for Mrs. Wilson. 373 S.W.2d 848.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs in the trial court and Billie Sol Estes, the cross-defendant in Mrs. Wilson's counterclaim, are the petitioners in this Court. Mrs. Wilson is the respondent.

The facts and circumstances giving rise to this litigation are as follows:

On March 28, 1956, J. R. Wilson conveyed all of Section 24 to Billie Sol Estes by four separate deeds. The purchase price was represented by notes secured by deeds of trust. After Wilson's death, the respondent brought suit upon these notes. She alleged that such notes were secured by liens represented by four deeds of trust which were attached as exhibits to her petition. She prayed for judgment for her debt, together with interest and attorney's fees and for foreclosure of the deed of trust liens against the land. This cause was docketed as No. 65,906-C. A money judgment was rendered against the defendant. This judgment was silent as to the foreclosure relief prayed for by Mrs. Wilson.

Subsequently, without paying off this judgment, Estes conveyed four separate tracts out of Section 24 (aggregating the whole of the section) to petitioners Vance, Littlefield, Morris and Weatherly, and then took agricultural leases on the property from his grantees. Thereafter, the respondent requested the trustee named in the four deeds of trust above mentioned to sell the land described therein. At such sales the property was struck of to the respondent.

It is petitioners' contention that the judgment rendered in Cause No. 65,906-C by implication denied Mrs. Wilson a recovery by way of foreclosure of th deed of trust liens and consequently she could not thereafter foreclose the same by trustee's sale.

The general rule in Texas is that all issues presented by the pleadings are disposed of by the judgment unless the contrary appears from the face thereof. '(A) judgment which grants part of the relief but omits reference to other relief put in issue by the pleadings will ordinarily be construed to settle all issues by implication.' 4 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, 1340, § 17.10.

In Rackley v. Fowlkes, 89 Tex. 613, 36 S.W. 77 (1896), Fowlkes sued for rentals covering 75 acres for the years 1889, 1890, 1891, and 1892. The defendant Rackley pleaded among other things that Fowlkes had previously sued him in trespass to try title to recover the 75 acres in question and for rents for the year 1889; that Rackley had denied all and singular plaintiff's allegation; that the court had rendered judgment for plaintiff Fowlkes for the title and possession of said land but that the judgment made no mention of rents. Rackley introduced in evidence the petition, answer and judgment in this former cause and claimed that Fowlkes' right to recover rents for the year 1889 was barred by said judgment. Fowlkes' attorney testified that the question of rents was not considered in the trespass to try title case. The trial court allowed rentals for the year 1889 as well as for the other years requested and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, saying that since there was no evidence offered on the point in the previous case and the judgment did not mention the issue of rent, then it was manifest that the question of rent had not been adjudicated. In reversing, Mr. Justice Denman speaking for this Court said:

'The first question for us to determine is, what is the prima facie legal effect of the petition, answer, and judgment in the original cause, herein pleaded by defendant, Rackley, and introduced in evidence by plaintiff, Fowlkes, as aforesaid, upon the latter's claim for rent for the year 1889? The proposition seems to be sound in principle and well supported by authority that where the pleadings and judgment in evidence show that the pleadings upon which the trial was had put in issue plaintiff's right to recover upon two causes of action, and the judgment awards him a recovery upon one, but is silent as to the other, such judgment is prima facie an adjudication that he was not entitled to recover upon such other cause (citing authorities). This liberal construction of the judgment against the party who sought to recover therein is supported by the presumption that the court performed the duty devolved upon it upon the submission of the cause by disposing of every issue presented by the pleadings so as to render it judgment final and conclusive of the litigation, and by the further fact that the policy of the law favors the speedy settlement of litigation and opposes the harassing of the defendant with two suits for the same cause. The issue of plaintiff's right to recover rent for 1889 having been clearly presented by the pleadings, plaintiff cannot escape this construction of the judgment, except by showing that, before its rendition, he withdrew such issue, or that the court refused to decide it.'

See also Hermann v. Allen, 103 Tex. 382, 128 S.W. 115 (1910).

There are cases in which the question of the finality of a judgment so as to make it appealable has been passed on by the courts. The rule is that where a claim is not expressly disposed of by the judgment although raised by the pleading, the judgment will be construed as denying relief upon such claim, and the judgment will be considered as being final and...