Vander Laan v. Miedema

• Decision Date: 07 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 11,11
• Parties: Robert VANDER LAAN and Dorothy Vander Laan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald MIEDEMA d/b/a Miedema Construction Co., and Stephen Jay Karsten, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 564

188 N.W.2d 564

385 Mich. 226

Robert VANDER LAAN and Dorothy Vander Laan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald MIEDEMA d/b/a Miedema Construction Co., and Stephen Jay Karsten, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 7, 1971.

Mohney, Norris, Goodrich & Titta, Grand Rapids, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, Grand Rapids (Edward D. Wells, Grand Rapids, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Before the Entire Bench, except BLACK, J.

T. M. KAVANAGH, Chief Judge.

In this rear-end collision case the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Since the controlling question presented on appeal is whether the evidence entitled defendants to the 'sudden emergency' instruction given by the trial court, we accept the facts as they are on favorable view of the evidence and inferences therefrom to defendants. ¹

The accident occurred on the morning of June 24, 1965, on Aberdeen Street, N.E., in the city of Grand Rapids. At the point of impact Aberdeen is a paved two-lane, residential street with a 35 m.p.h. speed limit. Plaintiff-driver Dorothy Vander Laan's automobile was travelling between two Miedema Construction Company (defendant) trucks, all three vehicles proceeding in a westerly direction. As the vehicles approached an incline the lead truck slowed, forcing Mrs. Vander Laan to do likewise. At about the same time the truck to the rear which was being driven by defendant Stephen Jay Karsten at 20--25 m.p.h. crossed some bumps in the road. To insure that his load was still secure Karsten glanced in his rear-view mirror for 'just a second or so.' ² When he looked back the Vander Laan car was stopped (or virtually so) in front of him. ³ Although Karsten swerved to his left, the right front fender of the truck collided with the left rear portion of the Vander Laan car, driving it off the road to the right and into a mail box.

The plaintiff, Dorothy Vander Laan and her husband Robert, brought suit in Kent circuit court. At the conclusion of the trial, the Honorable John T. Letts, in instructing the jury on the issue of defendant's liability discussed the assured-clear-distance ⁴ and rear-end collision ⁵ statutes.

He added, at defendant's request and over plaintiffs' objection: ⁶

'However, if you find that the defendant was confronted with a sudden emergency, not of his own making, and if you find that he used ordinary care and was still unable to avoid the violation because of such emergency, then, of course, his violation is excused.'

Following the jury's verdict of no cause of action, plaintiffs' motion for a judgment n.o.v., or a new trial, based Inter alia on lack of evidence of 'sudden emergency,' was denied.

On appeal plaintiffs sought a new trial asserting that the sudden emergency instruction was not supported by the evidence and should not have been given. The Court of Appeals agreed, reasoning that the sudden emergency rule required an extraordinary condition which was lacking in this case. 22 Mich.App. 170, 177 N.W.2d 457. '(T)he looking through a rearview mirror for one second, for whatever reason, is not a condition that excuses.' 22 Mich.App. 178, 177 N.W.2d 461. Trial on remand was limited to the issues of damages '(s)ince Karsten admits colliding with plaintiff's automobile, and the reason offered for his failure to stop in time is not one that would excuse him from liability (under the statutes)' (178, 177 N.W.2d 461). We granted leave to appeal. 384 Mich. 753.

Although the parties have raised several issues, our answer to the following controls this case:

Was there evidence to support the sudden emergency instruction of the trial court?

Under the rear-end collision statute a rebuttable presumption arises that the offending driver is Prima facie guilty of negligence. Petrosky v. Dziurman (1962), 367 Mich. 539, 543, 116 N.W.2d 758; Garrigan v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Company (1961), 362 Mich. 262, 263, 106 N.W.2d 807. However, a violation of the assured-clear-distance statute constitutes negligence per se. McKinney v. Anderson, Supra, 373 Mich. 419, 129 N.W.2d 851.

However, as we have previously indicated the assured-clear-distance statute must be 'reasonably construed.' Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon (1957), 349 Mich. 387, 411, 84 N.W.2d 840. As such, it is not applicable under all circumstances where it might otherwise be literally employed. Instead, it is subject to 'qualification by the test of due or ordinary care, exercised in the light of the 'attending conditions." Patzer v. Bowerman-Halifax Funeral Home, Supra, 370 Mich. 353, 121 N.W.2d 844.

One such instance, where this statute is inapplicable, arises when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the defendants' own making. McKinney v. Anderson, Supra. Defendants urge us to apply that rule here. But, as far as our disposition of the present case is concerned, it must be recognized from a logical as well as from a legal point of view, that for the emergency doctrine to apply an 'emergency' within the meaning of that rule must have existed. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 5, 15.

To come within the purview of this rule the circumstances attending the accident must present a situation that is 'unusual or unsuspected.' Barringer v. Arnold (1960), 358 Mich. 594, 599, 101 N.W.2d 365.

The term 'unusual' is employed here in the sense that the factual background of the case varies from the everyday traffic routine confronting the motorist. Such an event is typically associated with a phenomenon of nature. A classical example of the 'unusual' predicament envisioned by the emergency doctrine is provided by Patzer v. Bowerman-Halifax Funeral Home, Supra, wherein the accident occurred amid an Upper Peninsula blizzard.

'Unsuspected' on the other hand connotes a potential peril within the everyday movement of traffic. To come within the narrow confines of the emergency doctrine as 'unsuspected' it is essential that the potential peril had not been in clearview for any significant length of time, and was totally unexpected. A good example of this can be seen in McKinney v. Anderson, Supra, where defendant rear-ended a plaintiff's car which had stopped while pushing a disabled vehicle on the highway. Coming over the crest of a hill, defendant first saw plaintiff's taillights when he was 400 feet away. However, defendant did not clearly see the peril of plaintiff's stopping until he was about 100--200 feet away, at which point it was too late to avoid a collision under the circumstances. Furthermore, the failure of the plaintiff to signal that he was stopping, coupled with the surrounding darkness, made the subsequent peril totally unexpected to the defendant.

The record in the instant case reveals that the accident occurred during daylight hours on a dry, paved highway, thereby precluding the possibility that the surrounding circumstances made the situation 'unusual.' Just prior to the accident defendant Karsten had been travelling only 'two or three car lengths, maybe four' behind the plaintiff, 'probably' at a speed of 20--25 m.p.h. Karsten had just turned onto Aberdeen Street, and as indicated by his own testimony, the entire pre-accident...