Vanderbilt v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1924
• Docket Number: 106.
• Citation: 125 S.E. 387,188 N.C. 568
• Parties: VANDERBILT ET AL. v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

125 S.E. 387

188 N.C. 568

VANDERBILT ET AL. v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

No. 106.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 19, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, Johnston County; Pittman, Judge.

Action by Arthur Vanderbilt and others, as receivers of the Southern Cotton Oil Company, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

On March 22, 1917, the Southern Cotton Oil Company delivered to defendant at Selma, N. C., 96,500 pounds of cotton seed oil to be transported and delivered to plaintiff at Bayonne, N J. Defendant delivered only 82,800 pounds of said oil, and this action was instituted by the receivers of the Southern Cotton Oil Company on May 19, 1921, to recover of the defendant damages for the failure to deliver the balance of said shipment, to wit, 13,700 pounds. Upon answer filed and issues joined, the jury found, as appears by the verdict that plaintiff was damaged by the negligence of defendant, in the sum of $1,683.17, with interest from April 2, 1917. It was agreed by attorneys, in open court, that upon certain written admissions the court should answer the third issue which was as follows:

"(3) Is plaintiff's cause of action barred by the three-year statute of limitations as alleged in the answer?"

The court, being of opinion that as a matter of law, upon the admitted facts, the action was barred, answered the issue, "Yes," and signed judgment that plaintiff recover nothing of defendant in the action. To this judgment plaintiff excepted.

The following stipulation appears in the case on appeal settled by the judge:

"By agreement of counsel in open court, representing both the plaintiff and defendant, the only question at issue in this action is whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. It is admitted that the three-year statute of limitations was properly pleaded in bar of plaintiff's cause of action."

A statute will not be construed retrospectively, in view of strong presumption against such construction, unless words used clearly show that no other meaning can be annexed to them or unless legislative intent cannot otherwise be satisfied.

Charles E. Cotterill, of Atlanta, Ga., and F. H. Brooks, of Smithfield, for appellants.

Ed S. Abell, of Smithfield, for appellee.

CONNOR J.

This action was commenced by the issuance of summons on May 19, 1921. It is admitted that the cause of action accrued on April 2, 1917. The statute of limitations, therefore, began to run on that date and more than four years had expired before the action was commenced. The objection that the action was not commenced within the period prescribed by statute was duly taken in the answer. C. S. §§ 404, 405.

The period of time prescribed by the statute of limitations in force in North Carolina, at the date when plaintiff's cause of action accrued, and within which same must be commenced, was three years. C. S. § 441.

Attorneys for plaintiff, who challenge the correctness of the holding that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by this statute, in their brief say:

"The shipment of freight involved was made from Selma, N. C., on March 22, 1917. Suit was filed May 19, 1921, or more than three years after the cause of action arose. Without more appearing, the North Carolina statute would, of course, bar recovery. But federal control of the railways intervened between the time of making shipment and the institution of the suit. It is the position of plaintiff, appellant, that during the period of federal control (beginning December 31, 1917, and ending February 28, 1920) the operation of such North Carolina statute of limitations was suspended by the very terms of a constitutional enactment of the United States Congress, known as section 206 of the Transportation Act of 1920. If such period of federal control (26 months) be excluded, the suit was filed in ample time."

The North Carolina statute, in force when plaintiff's cause of action accrued, and which was applicable to it, has not been repealed, altered, or amended by the General Assembly of North Carolina. It is now, and has been continuously from the accrual of the cause of action to the issuance of summons, a bar to plaintiff's action. The defendant was at all times, during said period, subject to the processes of the courts of this state, and for the purposes of jurisdiction was and is now a North Carolina corporation. McGovern v. R. R., 180 N.C. 219, 104 S.E. 534; Brown v. Jackson, 179 N.C. 363, 102 S.E. 739; Staton v. Railroad, 144 N.C. 135, 56 S.E. 794. The dockets of the courts of this state show that during this period actions accruing prior to December 31, 1917, were constantly commenced and prosecuted to final judgment in said courts against this defendant by both resident and nonresident plaintiffs.

There was no interruption of the ordinary course of judicial proceedings in the courts of this state, which prevented the service of process for the commencement of actions against this or any other defendant. No conditions existed in North Carolina or in the United States such as the Supreme Court of the United States, in Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L.Ed. 939, held had the effect to suspend, during the Civil War, statutes of limitations in suits "between the inhabitants of the loyal states and the inhabitants of those in rebellion." U.S. v. Wiley, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 508, 20 L.Ed. 211.

The sole contention of plaintiff is that the North Carolina statute was suspended during the period of federal control of railroads, from December 31, 1917, to February 28, 1920, by an act of Congress, and that the time between said dates should be deducted from the time which elapsed between the date of accrual of the cause of action and the date of the issuance of the summons.

The Transportation Act 1920 (U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10071 1/4 et seq.) provides that federal control of railroads and systems of transportation shall terminate on March 1, 1920, and that the President shall on said date relinquish possession and control of all railroads and systems of transportation then under federal control. Section 206 of said act relates to causes of action arising out of federal control. Paragraph (f) of said section is as follows:

"The period of federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the commission for causes of action arising prior to federal control."

The President had taken possession and assumed control of the railroads and transportation systems of the country, under an act of Congress, as a war measure, which had become necessary in the national defense. The United States was at war with a foreign government. The relations of its own citizens with each other were not affected by the existence of war. The conditions during the Civil War relied upon to sustain the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hanger v. Abbott, supra, did not exist during the period of federal control. The court there held that--

"A state of war existing between the governments of the creditor and debtor suspends the right and opportunity of a citizen of one belligerent to sue in the courts of the other, and as a consequence the statute of limitations is suspended during the existence of the war, and that time is not computed in limitation of the action."

This is declared to be law, without regard to any statute. This statute, however, was not enacted to meet such a condition as prevailed at the time the act of Congress approved June 11, 1864 (13 Stat. 123), was enacted.

In Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 493, 20 L.Ed. 176, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the act of Congress approved June 11, 1864, relative to causes of action accruing during the Civil War, applied not only to cases in the federal courts, but also to cases in the courts of the states, and suspended state statutes of limitation pending in the state courts. Justice Swayne, in the opinion filed for the court, says:

"We are of the opinion that the meaning of the statute is, that the time which elapsed while the plaintiff could not prosecute his suit, by reason of the Rebellion, whether before or after the passage of the act, is to be deducted. Considering the evils which existed, the remedy prescribed, the object to be accomplished, and the considerations by which the law-makers were governed--lights which every court must hold up for its guidance when seeking the meaning of a statute which requires construction--we cannot doubt the soundness of the conclusion at which we have arrived."

Replying to the contention that the statute as thus construed was not warranted by the Constitution of the United States, he says:

"The power to pass it is necessarily implied from the powers to make war and suppress insurrections."

Plaintiffs were citizens and residents of New York. Defendants were citizens and residents of Louisiana. The suit was brought in the Fourth District Court of New Orleans, on April 16, 1866, upon a note dated August 10, 1860, and due seven months after date. The time prescribed by the state statute for the commencement of the action was five years.

The cause of action in the instant case accrued on April 2, 1917 defendant was on said date and at all times since has been a North Carolina corporation, for the purposes of jurisdiction; this action was brought on May 19, 1921, in the superior court of North Carolina. This court had jurisdiction of the action by virtue of the laws of North Carolina. Its jurisdiction was not dependent upon any law of the United States. The time prescribed by the state statute for the commencement of the...