Vanderhoff v. Lawrence
| Decision Date | 08 December 1947 |
| Docket Number | 40428 |
| Citation | 206 S.W.2d 569 |
| Parties | Henry Vanderhoff and Anna Estel Vanderhoff, Appellants, v. Joe and Leon Lawrence, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
From the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Civil Appeal, Judge A R. Hammett
Affirmed
This is an action in unlawful detainer. The complaint was filed before a justice of the peace in Sugar Creek Township Randolph County, Missouri. The cause was transferred, on change of venue, to a justice of the peace of another township of the same county, where the cause was tried and judgment entered for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court of Randolph County, where a jury was waived and the cause tried to the court. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiffs in the circuit court and defendants appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment (Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, Mo.App., 201 S.W.2d 509), but transferred the cause to this court, because the result reached on one issue was deemed in conflict with a broad and unlimited principle of law announced by the Springfield Court of Appeals in Coleman v. Fletcher Mo.App., 188 S.W.2d 959, 963.
We determine the case as on original appeal. Mo.Const., Art. 5 Sec. 10, Mo.R.S.A.; Supreme Court Rule 2.06. After a careful review of the whole record and the applicable authorities, we have reached the conclusion that the opinion of Cave, J., as adopted by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, is correct and should be approved. Reference is had to that opinion for a full statement of the facts and issues. It will be unnecessary to restate the facts in detail or to review the authorities, because we approve the opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals as written, the conclusions there reached and the authorities approved and followed.
Briefly, respondents' evidence tended to show an oral contract by which the prior owners of the described premises, by agent, rented the property to appellants on January 24, 1945, on a cash and crop rental basis for one year, from March 1, 1945, to March 1, 1946. Appellants, with the consent of a prior tenant, entered into possession on February 21, 1945, and cultivated the land and paid the major portion of the rent, but refused to surrender possession of the premises on March 1, 1946, because no notice or demand for possession had been served upon them 60 days before the end of the term.
Appellants' evidence tended to show that the described property was rented to appellant Joe Lawrence, and that he was to have the place as long as he wanted it, "maybe four or five years."
The trial court found the issues for the plaintiffs-respondents, and that defendants-appellants had unlawfully detained the premises from March 1, 1946. In effect the court found that the oral contract of rental was for a term beginning March 1, 1945, and ending March 1, 1946; and that no notice was required to terminate the tenancy. The Kansas City Court of Appeals, on the facts presented, applied Section 2972, R.S. 1939, Mo.R.S.A., and approved the judgment of the trial court. Section 2972, supra, is as follows:
"No notice to quit shall be necessary from or to a tenant whose term is to end at a certain time, or when, by special agreement, notice is dispensed with."
The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the oral contract, although invalid in part by reason of the Statute of Frauds (Sec. 3354, R.S. 1939, Mo.R.S.A.), was sufficient under the facts and Sec. 2972, supra, and that, since the tenancy had been in effect for the full period of the oral letting, no further notice to appellants was required.
The broad and unlimited principle of law announced by the Springfield Court of Appeals in the case of Coleman v Fletcher, supra, which the Kansas City Court of Appeals deemed to be in conflict with the results reached in this case, is as follows: "The law is well settled that where a tenant enters into the possession of agricultural lands under an oral lease or contract, or one that is otherwise void or defective, and pays rent to his landlord, it creates a tenancy at will and if the tenant remains in possession, by operation of law, it becomes a tenancy from year to year and can be terminated on the part of the landlord, only, by giving the tenant a written notice to vacate at least 60 days...
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