Vanderpool v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 07 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:18-CV-44-RJ,5:18-CV-44-RJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | RICHARD MICHAUX VANDERPOOL, JR., Plaintiff/Claimant, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings [DE-16, -24] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Claimant Richard Michaux Vanderpool, Jr. ("Claimant") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the denial of his applications for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments. The time for filing responsive briefs has expired, and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the motions and memoranda submitted by the parties, Claimant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is allowed, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied, and the case is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Claimant protectively filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on April 7, 2014, alleging disability beginning July 31, 2013. (R. 23, 213-21). His claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 23, 77-128). A hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") was held on January 4, 2017, at which Claimant, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (R. 23, 41-73). On February 3, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Claimant's request for benefits. (R. 20-40). Claimant then requested a review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council (R. 211-12), and he submitted additional evidence as part of his request (R. 5). After reviewing and incorporating the additional evidence into the record, the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review on December 7, 2017. (R. 1-6). Claimant then filed a complaint in this court seeking review of the now-final administrative decision.
The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision regarding disability benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). "The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). While substantial evidence is not a "large or considerable amount of evidence," Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), it is "more than a mere scintilla . . . and somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (). Rather, in conducting the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court's review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained his or her findings and rationale in crediting the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).
The disability determination is based on a five-step sequential evaluation process as set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 under which the ALJ is to evaluate a claim:
The claimant (1) must not be engaged in "substantial gainful activity," i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a "severe" impairment that (3) meets or exceeds [in severity] the "listings" of specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity to (4) perform . . . past work or (5) any other work.
Albright v. Comm'r of the SSA, 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). "If an applicant's claim fails at any step of the process, the ALJ need not advance to the subsequent steps." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Id. At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that other work exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform. Id.
When assessing the severity of mental impairments, the ALJ must do so in accordance with the "special technique" described in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)-(c) and 416.920a(b)-(c). This regulatory scheme identifies four broad functional areas in which the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from a claimant's mental impairment(s): understand, remember, or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself. Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). The ALJ is required to incorporate into his written decision pertinent findings and conclusions based on the "special technique." Id. §§ 404.1520a(e)(3), 416.920a(e)(3).
In this case, Claimant alleges the following errors: (1) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that Claimant has the RFC to perform light work, and (2) the ALJ improperly relied upon the VE's testimony. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 8-15.
Applying the above-described sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Claimant "not disabled" as defined in the Act. At step one, the ALJ found Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since July 31, 2013, the alleged onset date. (R. 25). Next, the ALJ determined Claimant had the following severe impairments: disorders of muscle, ligament, and fascia; spine disorder; and learning disorder. Id. The ALJ also found Claimant had non-severe impairments of hypertension and gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). (R. 26). However, at step three, the ALJ concluded these impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. Applying the technique prescribed by the regulations, the ALJ found that Claimant's mental impairments have resulted in a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information; no limitation in interacting with others; a moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. (R. 27-28).
Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Claimant's RFC, finding Claimant had the ability to perform light work1 requiring the following limitations:
[T]he claimant can operate foot controls with his right foot occasionally. Theclaimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and never kneel, crouch, or crawl. He can occasionally climb ramps or stairs. He can occasionally balance with a hand held assistive device and stoop. The claimant can frequently perform bilateral gross and fine manipulation. He is limited to jobs that can be performed while using a hand held assistive device at all times when standing. The claimant must avoid all exposure to hazardous machinery and unprotected heights. Work is limited to simple and routine tasks in a low stress work environment, which is define [sic] as having no fixed production quotas, with no hazardous conditions and only occasional decision-making and occasional changes in the work setting. He is able to perform the job, either sitting or standing, as desired, such as in benchwork occupations.
(R. 28-33). In making this assessment, the ALJ found Claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms not fully consistent with the objective medical and other evidence. (R. 30).
At step four, the ALJ concluded Claimant did not have the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant work as a construction laborer, general laborer, or production worker. (R. 33). Nonetheless, at step five, upon considering Claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined Claimant is capable of adjusting to the demands of other employment opportunities that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 34-35).
Claimant contends that the ALJ erred in finding that he has the RFC to perform light work. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-17] at 8-12. The court disagrees.
An individual's RFC is the capacity he possesses despite the limitations caused by physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1); see also S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). "[T]he residual functional capacity 'assessment must first identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions' listed in the regulations." Masciov. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting S.S.R. 96-8p). The RFC is based on all relevant medical and other evidence in the record and may include a claimant's own description of limitations arising from alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3); see also S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5.
When a claimant has numerous impairments, including non-severe impairments, the ALJ must consider their cumulative effect in making a disability determination. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); see Hines v. Brown, 872 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1989) (...
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